Before any official reports emerged regarding the outcome of the conversation between the leaders of the Russian Federation and the United States of America, Russian representative Kirill Dmitriev wrote: “under the leadership of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin and the newly elected President of the United States of America Donald Trump, the world has become much safer today!”
What a striking declaration—it could even be recorded in history. Such a statement certainly carries a dramatic tone. It is evident that Kirill Dmitriev was permitted by Kremlin political authorities to respond first and issue his own forceful remark, rather than deferring to the one figure truly expected to comment on events of such significance.
This move highlights Dmitriev’s exceptional role in the communications between the two world leaders. It is also notable that a narrative emerged from the American side: “The future of relations between the two countries (the United States of America and the Russian Federation. — M.G.) encompasses huge economic agreements and geopolitical stability.”
However, this article is not primarily about the exchange between two autocrats and heads of major powers. Rather, it is necessary to examine the potential tangible outcomes that could arise from the partnership between the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, and the newly elected President of the United States of America, Donald Trump.
Coordinate System
It is important to highlight that what may initially appear to be illogical behaviour on the part of the newly elected President of the United States of America, Donald Trump, and his team, may in fact appear coherent when viewed through an alternative coordinate system. The conduct of the newly elected President is Orwellian in nature—suggesting that he operates within a post-truth framework, in which the aggressor is not recognised as such, the victim is merely another party to the conflict, and defeat is redefined as victory.
Within this distorted system of reference, notions such as “surrender is peace” and “lies and falsifications are alternative truth” are not contradictions but accepted premises. The result is a worldview in which tactics such as “divide and rule”, “reject allies”, and “perpetual conflict” become standard operating procedures and provoke no particular surprise.
This is not simply a matter of absent moral constraints within the newly elected President’s administration or within the mafia-kleptocratic circle of security elites from St Petersburg. Rather, it is necessary to consider the pace at which the United States is shifting from its position as a global leader of the free world towards a dictatorship of personalist type. The transformation raises critical questions—particularly when considered in the Ukrainian context—about what lies behind these developments and to what end they are directed.
These trends, visible in both the political system and economic trajectory of the United States, prompt a pressing question: what consequences could this evolution have for Ukrainian society, and how might it shape the broader geopolitical landscape?
Alien and Predator
Based on what has already been outlined regarding the political types represented by the President of the Russian Federation and the newly elected President of the United States of America, Donald Trump—and the latter’s long-standing fascination with the former dating back to his previous term in office—it is reasonable to assume that the emergence of this partnership, here referred to as TrumpPut, may have been a premeditated development.
The political model embodied by the President of the Russian Federation closely resembles that of individuals with backgrounds in intelligence and security services. His overarching objective in engaging with the new U.S. administration is not primarily financial. Rather, his ambitions are centred on the acquisition of intangible advantages—such as international status, leverage, and influence—which hold little value for his American counterpart but are fundamental to his vision of restoring what he perceives as the “greatness of the Russian Federation”. A comparable example can be found in his interpretation of the notion of “sustainable peace”.
Within this framework, “peace” is defined not as the absence of conflict but as the strategic subordination of Ukraine and parts of Europe to the Russian Federation’s sphere of influence. The redefinition of terms extends to security architecture, where the boundaries of NATO, in the Russian view, might ideally return to pre-1997 lines—or be dismantled entirely.
This approach presents no significant obstacle for his counterpart in Washington. For the newly elected President of the United States, such reconfigurations are negotiable. His worldview is governed by a markedly different coordinate system, one in which profitable transactions and short-term advantages occupy the highest tiers of value. In this worldview, organisations such as NATO, the European Union, and Ukraine itself are perceived as either burdens or expendable assets with minimal strategic return.
The President of the Russian Federation, for his part, has long demonstrated proficiency in persuading potential partners to accept “offers that cannot be refused”. He has already secured a notable level of influence in Hungary, through the consistent support of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. In the past, he came close to integrating Ukraine under President Yanukovych, and nearly succeeded in aligning Germany more closely with Moscow during Angela Merkel’s chancellorship. However, both ambitions faltered due to critical miscalculations—underestimating Ukrainian resilience in 2014 and again in 2022.
While some tactical adjustments were made in 2019, the Russian leadership’s broader strategic objectives collapsed once more in 2022. These miscalculations not only disrupted the intended trajectory in Ukraine but also produced unexpected complications within the wider European political environment.
Nevertheless, years of strategic positioning under the unofficial slogan “our trusted man in the White House”—a reference to securing influence at the heart of what is viewed as Russia’s principal adversary—appear to have produced results. This would be the second such instance, following the events of 2016. One possible factor in this outcome was the intervention of oligarch Dmitry Rybolovlev, who is reported to have overpaid by approximately $50 million for a Palm Beach property owned by Donald Trump in 2008. Analysts Yurii Felshtinskyi and Vladimir Popov, in From the Red Terror to the Mafia State, suggest that this transaction may have been akin to a bribe, an advance, or a financial favour.
Regardless of whether the newly elected U.S. President is in fact the product of a long-term covert operation by the Russian Federation, what is clear is that an element foreign to democratic norms has appeared at the centre of Western governance. This development reflects the importation of a political model shaped during the Putin era, one which now manifests in Washington. However, it should also be noted that while there are similarities in style and approach, the new actor is not entirely controllable. The current U.S. President may share traits with his Russian counterpart, but he operates according to his own rationale and strategic preferences.
The analogy of Alien versus Predator, drawn from the well-known science fiction franchise, is apt in this context. According to this framing, only the Predator—here symbolising the Kremlin leader—is capable of confronting the Alien, a figure who represents an unpredictable and aggressive force entering the system. This comparison has even surfaced in U.S. political discourse. Vice President Kamala Harris, whether deliberately or not, seemed to reflect this sentiment when she remarked that the Russian President would “eat Donald Trump for lunch”.
However, as in the film itself, the outcome is far from guaranteed. The Alien is dangerous, volatile, and difficult to anticipate. The newly elected U.S. President, for his part, brings a familiar method to the negotiating table: take everything possible from the counterparty through pressure and transactional advantage, often bordering on coercive or deceptive tactics.
This approach is effective when directed at less powerful partners—states such as Canada, Denmark, Panama, or Ukraine—who may be pressured to accept deals on unfavourable terms. But when engaging with a counterpart of similar strength and influence, the dynamic shifts. In such cases, the process becomes a balancing of interests: one party concedes or provides leverage in exchange for equivalent gains from the other. It is a transactional equilibrium, rather than one-sided extraction.
Yet for the current U.S. President, success is measured exclusively in terms of financial return—revenue streams generated from deals that in his view will “make the United States of America great again”. Ideological, diplomatic, or strategic considerations hold little weight against the metric of profit.
Material Context
The core proposition behind the partnership between the newly elected President of the United States of America, Donald Trump, and the President of the Russian Federation is, from the Russian side, being managed by Kirill Dmitriev. He is known to have close ties to the Russian president’s inner circle—reportedly through his association with the president’s daughter, Ekaterina Tikhonova—and is also well regarded in certain American circles, having graduated from both Stanford and Harvard, in addition to holding a diploma from the Academy of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation (SVR).
The concept underpinning this engagement is to attract Donald Trump—via Steve Witkoff, his longstanding business associate and friend since the 1980s—by offering prospects of substantial profit from the resale of Russian energy and mineral resources on the European market. Following a meeting with the Russian President on 21 February, Witkoff stated “I spent a lot of time with Putin. Talking and developing a friendship and relationship with him…”
From the Kremlin’s perspective, the key objective now is the reintegration of Russian oil and gas into the European Union market, concealed under non-Russian branding. The strategy relies on re-labelling energy exports at the point of departure—whether at Russian terminals or nearby hubs—so that they appear to originate from the United States. Through this mechanism, Russian-origin goods could be marketed across Europe as American, with the necessary documentation manufactured to support the claim.
It is this approach that has reportedly sparked renewed interest from American investor Stephen Lynch in the restoration of the Nord Stream pipeline network—a system of offshore pipelines running beneath the Baltic Sea from Russia to Germany, historically used to supply Western Europe with natural gas. The idea also enjoys the backing of Matthias Warnig, a former East German Stasi officer and a long-time associate of the Russian President. Parallel developments, such as discussions around the potential purchase of Rosneft Deutschland’s stakes in German refineries, further indicate growing efforts to reinstate Russian-sourced fuel into the European supply chain.
The wider strategy of disguising the reintroduction of Russian energy into Europe under various fronts is examined in a report by the Centre for Global Studies “Strategy XXI”, entitled Russia is Disguising Itself to Return Its Oil and Gas to Europe: How to Stop It.
However, Donald Trump and Steve Witkoff, both experienced in protecting their commercial and political interests, are unlikely to accept terms that offer minimal returns. The Russian side may offer prices below international benchmarks—rates that are effectively equivalent to domestic Russian valuations—but these may not meet the profit expectations of the American side. Given that the Russian Federation remains under sanctions, and the United States may be in a position to facilitate its partial economic reintegration, this imbalance provides room for negotiation, albeit with pressure applied from both sides.
While such a commercial arrangement may not be welcomed enthusiastically by the Kremlin’s political leadership, experienced intermediaries such as Dmitriev and Witkoff are likely to construct a proposal designed to satisfy both parties. One possible solution would involve the partial unfreezing of Russian frozen state assets—specifically the €260 billion of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation. A portion of these assets could be redirected into investment schemes within the United States. Trump has already expressed support for inward investment as a means to stimulate domestic economic growth.
That said, the underlying nature of such a proposal raises concerns. The offer may not be intended to fund new infrastructure projects or legitimate enterprise, but rather to replenish a covert reserve accessible to the two political leaderships—managed through close family members, namely the daughters of both presidents. In this arrangement, capital would not only be preserved but would grow, supporting the parallel interests of both influential family networks.
There is a suggestion that ongoing negotiations between the two presidents may also involve the subject of reparations. Should the United States insist on compensation from the Russian Federation for damage caused to Ukraine, this would likely block any attempt by the U.S. side to access the frozen assets for other purposes.
Another element in the equation is the “Middle Eastern Riviera” project in the Gaza Strip, an initiative reportedly favoured by both Donald Trump and Steve Witkoff. Witkoff, who also holds the post of Special Representative of the U.S. President for the Middle East, is said to be seeking significant investment to advance this development. Here, too, the Russian President may position himself as a partner, offering verbal support and pledges of assistance—though these may amount to little more than rhetorical commitments.
The Russian approach to such negotiations often involves trading in intangible or symbolic assets, offering promises rather than binding commitments, while extracting concrete concessions in return. In this case, one likely objective for Moscow is the preservation of Russian military facilities in Syria. This interest is supported by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who seeks to reduce both Palestinian presence in Gaza and Turkish influence in Syria.
In this way, commercial ventures are interwoven with geopolitical manoeuvring. What appears at first glance to be an economic arrangement is in fact deeply embedded within broader strategic calculations involving the Middle East, Europe, and the global energy market.
Intangible things
When it comes to intangible matters—those of considerable significance to the President of the Russian Federation, but of limited interest to the newly elected President of the United States of America—they appear, at first glance, to have been conceded by Washington with little resistance. These include the decision not to label the Russian Federation an aggressor, or its president a war criminal, in the context of the war against Ukraine. The United States has also stepped back from investigating the crime of military aggression committed against Ukraine, has withheld support for Ukraine’s accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and has declined to offer meaningful security guarantees.
Such concessions may be seen as a form of “entry ticket” to broader cooperation—paving the way for commercially advantageous arrangements with the Kremlin in material spheres. This posture could also be interpreted as an attempt by the newly elected U.S. president to settle a kind of informal “debt” inherited from the first Trump administration. Despite its confrontational tone, that administration did not dismantle NATO, did not recognise Crimea as part of the Russian Federation, and did not lift sanctions. On the contrary, the 2018 “Pompeo Declaration” reaffirmed Washington’s recognition of Crimea as Ukrainian territory, while in Syria, U.S. forces destroyed an entire unit of the Wagner Group. Further sanctions were imposed on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline—financed by Gazprom and several European energy companies—dealing a significant blow to one of Moscow’s key strategic energy initiatives.
Nevertheless, the current administration appears willing to forgo certain political principles in the hope of influencing Russia’s foreign policy alignment. In particular, there is a clear effort to disrupt Moscow’s strategic partnership with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). For this, Ukraine is increasingly treated as a bargaining chip. This transactional approach is partly underpinned by the ideological framework set out in the policy document Mandate for Leadership: Project 2025. The document frames the Cold War not as a clash between opposing civilisations, but as a “struggle within the Western family”, thereby positioning the Russian Federation as part of the broader West.
This line of reasoning underlies the belief, held by some within the American political establishment—including the newly elected President—that Russia can serve as an ally in confronting China, which is cast as belonging to a rival civilisation. According to the logic of Project 2025, China is portrayed not only as a systemic threat to the United States but also to Russia itself.
Statements from the U.S. President regarding the Arctic have further unsettled the Kremlin. His assertions of interest in Greenland and parts of northern Canada have triggered concern in Moscow, where the Arctic is viewed as a core element of Russian national territory. Control over the Northern Sea Route is seen as essential to Russian strategic interests. By this logic, control over Greenland equates to control of the North Atlantic, while the western Arctic—anchored by Spitsbergen—is effectively under Norwegian jurisdiction. This has long been a point of contention for Russia.
On 14 March, the Kremlin accused Norway of militarising the Svalbard archipelago in breach of the 1920 Spitsbergen Treaty—a move widely interpreted as a precursor to efforts aimed at asserting Russian control over the territory. In the context of these developments, it is perhaps unsurprising that if the U.S. President feels entitled to lay claim to a vast Arctic landmass, his Russian counterpart may seek to secure a comparatively modest, ice-covered archipelago.
Whether a formal pact exists between Kirill Dmitriev and Steve Witkoff remains unknown—just as the existence of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was denied until long after its effects were evident. It is unclear what may be contained within any agreement between the two administrations regarding the “division” of strategic zones or influence. However, the marked synchronisation of their respective actions is noteworthy, and has led to speculation that the two envoys have discussed more than just commercial matters.
Witkoff himself has publicly remarked that the United States and the Russian Federation share many opportunities for economic cooperation, and that productive communication tends to yield positive outcomes. This alignment in approach, if sustained, could give rise to longer-term partnerships across both economic and political spheres.
Ukrainian factor
In the current context, Ukraine holds limited strategic value in the worldview of the newly elected President of the United States of America, Donald Trump. At the same time, it is perceived as a burdensome issue—an inconvenient obstacle that, from his perspective, stands in the way of more important geopolitical ambitions, namely improved cooperation with the Russian Federation to counter the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Iran.
Crucially, the American president appears to be under the illusion that he can win over the Russian leadership, disregarding the nature of the counterpart he is attempting to engage. Within Western expert circles, there is broad consensus that efforts to pivot the Russian Federation towards alignment with the United States—politically or economically—are unlikely to succeed. A similar strategy was once pursued by President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger in the 1970s, when they sought to draw China closer to the West. However, the prevailing view today is that the Russian Federation cannot be transformed into a reliable strategic partner for the United States, regardless of the diplomatic or commercial incentives offered.
Despite this, Donald Trump continues to pursue that goal with persistent determination, reminiscent of the mythological figure Sisyphus—condemned to push a boulder uphill, only for it to roll back down each time.
There is little purpose in listing the specific military positions or policy concessions whose surrender by Kyiv might satisfy Washington’s current posture. The broader point remains: the American president appears to hold a fundamental view that Ukraine belongs within Russia’s sphere of influence—and, by extension, so does Europe.
His approach is shaped by a method of applying psychological pressure, intended to force partners to operate according to his rules and to secure deals on his terms. This method leaves little room for compromise or long-term partnership. As such, it is vital not to harbour illusions about the intent behind his posture towards Ukraine. The goal is not a sustainable peace, but rather a settlement aligned with his broader transactional strategy.
Ukraine, however, has demonstrated over the past eleven years that it is not easily manipulated, nor is it susceptible to coercive tactics or opaque deals. The full-scale invasion launched by the Russian Federation failed to break the unity of the country or to achieve its territorial ambitions. Despite the immense challenges of war—economic, political, and social—Ukraine has remained resilient, sovereign, and intact.
Should pressure from the United States intensify, Ukraine must respond with the same resolve and clarity it has shown since 2014. The strategy should be consistent: to resist all external attempts to dictate unfavourable outcomes under the guise of diplomacy or pragmatic deal-making.
On 23 March, the next round of negotiations between the United States and the Russian Federation is scheduled to take place in Jeddah. While these talks have not been formally framed as excluding Ukraine or Europe, the nature of recent developments suggests that an informal pact between Russian envoy Kirill Dmitriev and U.S. representative Steve Witkoff is already in motion—one that sidelines key European and Ukrainian interests.
It is unlikely that such a high-level meeting in the Saudi desert will be limited to ceremonial diplomacy or trivial discussions, such as sporting exchanges proposed by the Russian President. Rather, it is essential for both Ukrainians and Europeans to assert their position firmly: no decisions affecting them can be taken in their absence. The guiding principle must be clear—“nothing about us without us.”
This sentiment was articulated clearly by Czech Foreign Minister Jan Lipavský during his visit to Ukraine in November 2024, when he remarked: “Toughness is something that is respected in the real world where we all live.” This approach remains crucial. Crimea is part of Ukraine—so are the other occupied territories. No international negotiation, however discreet or well-intentioned, can be allowed to override that fact or to legitimise territorial concessions made without Ukraine’s consent.
Originally published by ZN.UA: https://zn.ua/eng/the-dmitriev-witkoff-pact-as-the-basis-of-the-putin-trump-partnership.html.
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