Conflict Armament Research Exposes North Korea’s Foreign Tech Reliance

Upon meticulous examination of the remnants of the ballistic missile following an attack in Kharkiv, Ukraine, Conflict Armament Research (CAR) investigators uncovered more than 290 electronic components manufactured outside of North Korea. 

Notably, a significant proportion of these components were traced back to companies primarily based in the United States.

This revelation raises questions about the efficacy of international efforts to control the export of commercial electronic components, particularly in the face of longstanding United Nations sanctions aimed at restricting North Korea’s access to advanced technology.

The dependence of North Korea on the global semiconductor industry mirrors similar patterns observed in other sanctioned states such as Iran and the Russian Federation.

These countries rely on non-domestic technology to acquire critical components essential for military production, posing significant challenges for regulators attempting to control the flow of commercial electronic components across international borders.

CAR’s meticulous investigation provides crucial insights into the origins and production timeline of these components.

Conducted on 27th January and 1st February 2024, CAR’s field investigation team meticulously documented the remnants of the missile, primarily focusing on its navigation system.

The documentation revealed a significant presence of recently manufactured components, many of which bore the marks of companies predominantly based in the United States.

CAR identified over 290 components, comprising 50 unique models, with links to 26 companies headquartered across eight jurisdictions, including China, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Singapore, Switzerland, Taiwan, and the United States.

Of particular significance is the distribution of these components, with 75% linked to companies incorporated in the United States, 16% to European companies, and 9% to Asian manufacturers.

CAR plans to dispatch trace requests to these companies to further investigate the supply chain and acquisition of these components.

Further analysis of the documented components revealed that more than 75% indicated production between 2021 and 2023.

Based on these production dates, CAR concludes that the missile recovered in Kharkiv could not have been assembled before March 2023.

This timeline highlights the recent production of the missile and the narrow window between its reported transfer to the Russian Federation and its use in the Kharkiv attack in January 2024.

The presence of a significant proportion of recently produced non-domestic electronic components in the North Korean ballistic missile indicates the development of a robust acquisition network capable of evading detection and sanction regimes that have been in place for nearly two decades.

This highlights the ongoing challenge of effectively regulating and controlling the export of commercial semiconductor components, a recurring theme observed in previous CAR documentation of Russian and Iranian weapons used in Ukraine.

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