Turkey and Kazakhstan have lodged formal protests with Kyiv after Ukrainian naval drones struck two Russian oil tankers in the Black Sea and damaged a key oil terminal used for Kazakh exports at Novorossiysk.
The diplomatic reactions highlight the pressure Ukraine’s campaign against Russia’s energy sector is placing on partners that have tried to maintain a degree of neutrality since the full-scale invasion began.
On Saturday Ankara condemned Ukrainian drone attacks on the tankers Kairos and Virat inside Turkey’s exclusive economic zone, describing them as incidents that posed “serious risks to navigation, life, property and environmental safety” in the Black Sea. Both vessels are identified in Western sanctions lists as part of Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet” used to circumvent oil price caps and transport restrictions.
The strikes followed a separate operation in which Ukrainian sea drones severely damaged a mooring at the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) terminal near Novorossiysk, forcing a temporary halt to loadings. The CPC pipeline carries crude from Kazakhstan’s Tengiz, Karachaganak and Kashagan fields to the Black Sea and handles the bulk of the country’s exports, although it also ships a smaller share of Russian oil.
Astana responded with unusually sharp language, calling the attack “a deliberate strike” on “purely civilian critical infrastructure” and warning that it “harms the bilateral relations of the Republic of Kazakhstan and Ukraine”. The foreign ministry said it expected Ukraine to take “effective measures to prevent similar incidents in the future”, while energy officials described the action as “unacceptable”.
Kyiv has defended both operations as part of a broader strategy to degrade the financial base of Russia’s war. Ukrainian security officials say the tankers targeted near Turkey were empty but en route to load Russian oil for export and were already sanctioned by the US, EU, UK and others. The foreign ministry has also replied to Kazakhstan’s protest by stressing that the strike hit infrastructure on the territory of an aggressor state, noting that Astana had not issued comparable statements about Russian missile and drone attacks on Ukrainian cities and energy facilities.
The dispute exposes the difficult position of Kazakhstan, which is formally a military ally of Russia through the Collective Security Treaty Organisation and a member of the Eurasian Economic Union, yet also relies on Western companies and markets for its oil exports. The dominance of the CPC route makes Kazakhstan structurally dependent on Russian territory and ports. At the same time, Western governments and independent analysts have repeatedly highlighted the role of Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states in so-called parallel imports, where goods restricted by sanctions are re-exported to Russia after being imported into third countries. One study found that Kazakhstan’s imports of computers increased sevenfold in 2022, with a substantial volume then shipped on to Russia.
Ukrainian commentators argue that this trade, along with continued use of Russian transit routes, makes Astana an important enabler of the Kremlin’s war effort, even as segments of Kazakh society express clear sympathy for Ukraine. They point to highly visible grassroots initiatives such as the “Yurts of Invincibility” – traditional Kazakh tents installed in Ukrainian cities including Bucha, Kyiv and Lviv during the winter of 2022–23 as heated shelters during blackouts – which were financed largely by private donors and elements of the Kazakh business community.
Relations have also been affected by the unresolved case of Kazakh opposition journalist Aidos Sadykov, who was shot in Kyiv in June 2024 and later died of his injuries. Ukrainian investigators have issued warrants for two Kazakh citizens suspected of carrying out the attack and have complained of limited cooperation from Astana. Press freedom groups report that Sadykov’s widow, journalist Nataliia Sadykova, has repeatedly alleged surveillance by individuals she links to Kazakh security services, claims that Kazakhstan denies.
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Turkey faces similar scrutiny. Ankara has supplied Ukraine with military equipment, including Bayraktar drones early in the war, yet trade with Russia has expanded and Western governments have sanctioned Turkish firms accused of facilitating sanctions evasion or servicing Russian defence-linked shipping. The presence of Russian capital and tourists on Turkey’s Mediterranean coast, as well as its role as a logistics and financial hub, has allowed Moscow-linked business networks to retain access to a “Western-style” environment despite restrictions elsewhere.
The latest tanker and terminal strikes therefore come at a moment when the European Union and G7 are intensifying efforts to clamp down on Russia’s shadow fleet and close loopholes in the oil price cap regime. The EU’s 16th sanctions package added dozens of additional tankers and related entities to its blacklist, while Washington has stepped up warnings to states and companies suspected of helping Russia circumvent measures.
For Ukraine, the message is that any state profiting from Russian oil flows – whether through shipping, transit pipelines or re-export of sanctioned technology – risks being drawn into the conflict’s economic front line. For Turkey and Kazakhstan, the challenge is to protect energy and commercial interests without appearing to shield Russian assets from a campaign that Kyiv and many of its Western partners now regard as central to the conduct of the war.
Ukrainian strike forces shutdown of oil exports from Novorossiysk
