Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said that at least one fifth of vessels in Russia’s “shadow fleet” have stopped operating after what he described as coordinated pressure with a number of partner states.
The Ukrainian president made the claim after a briefing from Oleh Luhovskyi, first deputy head of Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SZR). He said Moscow was seeking to make up the losses by bringing new ships into service, and that Kyiv was working to ensure those vessels were added to sanctions lists.
The First Deputy Head of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine, Oleh Luhovskyi, delivered a report. He informed me about the behind-the-scenes approaches of partners to communication with the Russian side and about the real attitude toward Ukraine and negotiations at this… pic.twitter.com/HozplEeF9U
— Volodymyr Zelenskyy / Володимир Зеленський (@ZelenskyyUa) January 13, 2026
Zelenskyy also said that existing restrictions on Russia’s seaborne oil exports, measured over a year, should reduce Russian revenues by at least $30 billion. He did not set out the calculation, but presented the figure as a benchmark for the impact of the current sanctions framework when it is enforced consistently.
The shadow fleet is generally understood by Western governments to be a network of tankers and intermediaries used to move Russian oil and petroleum products outside mainstream shipping services. The system typically relies on opaque ownership structures, frequent changes of flag and management, and the use of service providers willing to work around restrictions. Practices described by officials and maritime monitors include disabling ship-tracking transponders and ship-to-ship transfers designed to obscure cargo origin.
Since the introduction of sanctions and the G7-led oil price cap, the EU, UK and the United States have increasingly treated the shadow fleet as a practical problem of enforcement as much as policy design. The fleet provides Russia with additional transport capacity and routes to buyers, while shifting risk onto older vessels and less transparent service chains.
Ukraine has pressed for vessel-by-vessel designations and for broader action against the ecosystem that keeps the ships moving. In public comments over the past year, Zelenskyy has repeatedly argued that sanctions should cover not only hulls and owners but also the service architecture: insurers, brokers, ship managers, port agents and operators involved in arranging voyages and payments.
Kyiv has also built its own sanctions architecture. In December 2025, Zelenskyy signed a decree implementing sanctions against 656 vessels identified by Ukraine as part of the Russian shadow fleet. The measures were presented in Kyiv as the largest Ukrainian package aimed at such shipping and were framed as a tool for sharing designations with partners and encouraging parallel action.
In earlier statements, Zelenskyy said Ukrainian assessments suggested hundreds of shadow-fleet tankers had already been sanctioned internationally, while claiming a far larger number of ships were “working for Russia” in different capacities. He has argued that the scale of the network requires constant updating of lists as operators rotate vessels and change company structures.
European Union measures have continued to expand. On 18 December 2025, the Council of the EU announced restrictive measures against an additional 41 vessels, adding them to a list subject to an EU port access ban and a prohibition on providing a broad range of maritime transport services. The Council said the total number of designated shadow-fleet vessels stood at 598.
Britain has taken a parallel approach. In September 2025, the UK government announced sanctions on 70 more ships linked to the shadow fleet as part of a wider package. London has argued that vessel sanctions, combined with restrictions on services and enforcement activity, are intended to make it harder and more expensive for Russia to move oil by sea.
Zelenskyy’s latest comments suggest Kyiv believes the combined effect of these measures is now visible in operating patterns. He characterised the reported 20 per cent stoppage as a result of coordinated pressure, while warning that Russia is already attempting to replace disrupted capacity with new ships. The Ukrainian president said Ukraine was working to identify those vessels quickly and secure their designation.
Ukraine’s campaign has not been limited to paperwork. The country has increasingly used drones to target infrastructure and shipping linked to Russian energy exports. In December 2025, Ukrainian media and international reporting highlighted an attack on the crude oil tanker Qendil in the Mediterranean Sea. The ship was struck by aerial drones in neutral waters more than 2,000 kilometres from Ukraine, and was empty at the time.
Ukraine’s SBU claims drone strike on Russian “shadow fleet” tanker in Mediterranean Sea
Maritime outlet gCaptain later reported that the Oman-flagged Qendil ran aground off Turkey after the strike. The incident was cited as an example of the operational risks surrounding shadow-fleet routes and the condition of some vessels used in the trade.
For Western policymakers, the question is whether designations translate into real-world disruption. A vessel listing is most effective when paired with restrictions on port access, insurance, financing, classification, ship management and other services needed for international trade. Enforcement is uneven by definition: the shadow fleet exists to seek out permissive jurisdictions, willing intermediaries and gaps in oversight.
Zelenskyy’s $30 billion revenue figure sits within that context. The intent of restrictions on seaborne oil exports is to limit the flow of earnings while maintaining global supply. Kyiv’s argument is that tighter enforcement against the shadow fleet can reduce Russia’s ability to monetise exports, as operators face higher costs, delays and the loss of access to mainstream maritime services.
In his readout of the intelligence briefing, Zelenskyy presented the campaign as an ongoing contest of adaptation. Russia, he said, is trying to compensate by adding ships; Ukraine, he added, is working to ensure the replacements are identified and sanctioned in turn.
Risk in European Waters: The Shadow Fleet, Sanctions Evasion and Safety Gaps
