Rosatom: France Could Lead in the Sanctions Against the Russian Nuclear Sector, Writes Andrii Chubyk

The Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) passed on March 8th, 2024 a resolution drafted by Ukraine regarding nuclear safety, security, and safeguards in Ukraine, with a majority vote.

The document calls on Russia to urgently withdraw all unauthorised personnel, including the military, from the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) and to immediately return the plant to the full control of the competent Ukrainian authorities. 

This resolution provides an important signal of support for Ukraine but will be most likely ignored by Russia, if not supplemented by sanctions against state atomic energy corporation Rosatom, a vertically integrated holding in charge of Russian civil and military nuclear sectors.

France could become a driving force in this direction, being already a step ahead of Germany in providing long-range missiles to Ukraine.

Precise choice of the sanction scope and direction will make it possible to execute the strike quite soon while systematic work will help to transform ongoing challenges into new opportunities for French enterprises and partners from other countries. 

Political unity and trust in the EU

Since January 2024, France has been actively discussing a draft law on national energy sovereignty. It aims to fix medium to long-term targets for national energy sector development, taking into consideration the EU decarbonisation goals until 2050.

France promotes nuclear generation as one of the key sources of low-carbon electricity and seeks to establish the entire chain of nuclear fuel production for its own needs. Several other EU Member States also support France’s efforts to keep nuclear generation as one of the effective tools for national energy sector decarbonisation in the long-term perspective. 

However, other EU Member States, in particular, Germany and Austria, are strictly against further perspectives on nuclear generation and try to exclude it from European framework energy laws as one of the future low-carbon electricity sources. 

The confrontation between supporters and opponents of nuclear generation splits unity among the EU Member States, and leads to mistrust, political crises, and disintegration of common energy space. It endangers European energy security at times when Russia continues to weaponise energy exports and cooperation. 

It is now high time to return constructive dialogue, trust and understanding to energy relations between the EU Member States.

The European Commission should accelerate efforts to find a win-win compromise among supporters of both, renewable and nuclear generation as soon as possible. 

Alternatives to Russian natural uranium

In the last ten years, France’s natural uranium imports were provided, according to Euroatom Supply Agency, primarily from four countries – Kazakhstan (27%), Niger (20%), Uzbekistan (19%) and Namibia (15%).

In autumn 2023, France reportedly lost access to uranium imports from Niger. To compensate for losses, Paris initiated active dialogue with Kazakhstan, aiming to increase imports and utilise bypassing Russia Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR).

Kazatomprom JSC has already used the TITR in recent years. In 2023, natural uranium was transported via the TITR to Canadian Cameco and Romanian Societatea Natională “Nuclearelectrica” S.A. 

The TITR has infrastructure bottlenecks in the Caspian region, as well as some legal and political constraints. Kazakhstan is ready to increase railway and Aktau port capacities on its territory, but support is much more needed to push other regional countries to action. 

In both, Georgia and Azerbaijan, the TITR has reportedly limited largeur de bande for natural uranium transportation. However, political factors are considered more challenging.

Georgia remains under strong Russian influence, while Azerbaijan and Turkey might be unwilling to cooperate with France because it supports Armenia.

Moreover, Russia will deploy different hybrid instruments in Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan to block the TITR natural uranium transportation. This applies also to the French Orano Zoovch-Ovoo project in Mongolia, because this country is land-locked between Russia and China. 

To promote further cooperation, dialogue and security in the Caucasus region for natural uranium transportation, France needs support from global players, such as the EU, the USA, Canada and Japan.

Together, they can offer security guarantees, financial resources and long-term contracts for regional uranium suppliers. As an alternative solution, cooperation with Canadian Cameco should be promoted.

The latter is going to expand uranium production and look for new long-term contracts. And last but not least, France should be encouraged to return together with partner countries to Western Africa’s uranium mines. 

Uranium conversion

France can reduce reliance on Russia’s Tenex for uranium conversion services by switching to cooperation with American companies.

For instance, ConverDyn, a joint venture of Honeywell and General Atomics, reached an annual production rate of 7,000 tons of uranium as UF6 and still has the potential to increase to 15,000 tons if investments are secured by long-term contracts.

More contracts for non-Russian conversion capacities will help to close the existing shortage and open the way to painful sanctions through the denial of access to modern equipment and spare parts. There should be a political will and long-term strategic decision to cut reliance on Russian service providers and pay for those changes.

Uranium enrichment 

Several political mistakes in the last thirty years created unequal dependence between the USA and the EU as customers and Russia as a supplier of enriched uranium and nuclear fuel.

A shortage of these materials can trigger severe negative consequences for nuclear power plants functioning in one to three years, depending on fuel stocks.

At the same time, the Russian state budget income from nuclear exports is quite moderate and can be ignored or sacrificed for the sake of victory over the West. 

Western companies also fear breaking long-term contracts with “Rosatom” because of eventual negative consequences – fines and financial vulnerabilities, as well as the absence of reliable alternatives.

Russian propaganda effectively spreads rumours about billions of fines, which will be paid by the Finish Fennovoima for the termination of a contract on the construction of the Hanhikivi-1 NPP and fuel supply. 

Some American and European politicians also are afraid that Russian enriched uranium and nuclear fuel, if not supplied to their countries, will flow in bigger amounts to China, enabling the production of new nuclear warheads from plutonium-239, produced at fast-neutron reactors. 

To mitigate risks of nuclear material shortages and prepare sanctions against Russian nuclear sector, the USA and France make efforts to modernise and increase uranium enrichment capacities.

French nuclear energy company Orano is investing €1.7 billion to increase its uranium-enrichment capacity at Georges Besse II (GB-II) on the Tricastin site (Drôme et Vaucluse). Production at two additional units is expected to start up as of 2028.

The project is realised in close cooperation with the Japan-France Enrichment Investing consortium, and Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power shareholders in the Tricastin enrichment company SETH (Société d’Enrichissement du Tricastin Holding).

Technologies and equipment 

Russia’s “Rosatom” is crucially dependent on modern technologies and equipment for the realisation of projects in third countries as well as for the maintenance and development of domestic nuclear facilities.

Sanctions and restrictions on the supply of technologies and equipment from Western companies will most probably delay or even put on hold most foreign projects as well as slow down domestic production, conversion and enrichment. Given substantial domestic demand, it will minimise exports both to Western companies and China together with potential abuses in contract violations and court cases. 

In the short-term perspective, private and partially state-owned companies in America and Europe can experience financial losses and need to be supported by national authorities.

However, “Rosatom” displacement from the nuclear sector in Europe will create a perspective of a multi-billion market for maintenance and fuel supply for Soviet-era and Russian reactors.

French companies Framatome and GE Steam Power (formerly Alstom Power Systems) are trying to preserve agreements with “Rosatom” on the supply of command and control systems, as well as reactor components for its foreign projects. In that way, Framatome and GE Steam Power will extend Russian influence in third countries and secure more revenues for aggression against Europe.

However, they can preserve business and technological gains for engagement in the project “Accelerated Program for Implementation of Secure VVER Fuel Supply” (APIS), which aimed to substitute together with Westinghouse services of “Rosatom” at all European Soviet or Russian-designed pressurized water reactors (VVER) and beyond.

France can also initiate cooperation with American and European partners to develop affordable projects of nuclear power plants for third countries, competitive in comparison with Russian and Chinese proposals. 

It is important to expel “Rosatom” from all international nuclear programs, organisations, and forums.

It ignores the standards and norms of the IAEA, being a part of Russian occupation forces at the Zaporizhzhia NPP, which prohibit access to working places and torture Ukrainian personnel, replace with own specialists, not trained and certified to work with modernised equipment and Westinghouse fuel assemblies at the nuclear station.

“Rosatom” personnel are responsible for providing advice to Russian military troops on how to threaten with nuclear accidents at the Zaporizhzhia NPP in communication with Western audiences. 

The only interest of “Rosatom” membership at the international institutions is in securing access to modern technologies and advanced research results, imports of equipment, and decision-makers among specialists, politicians and businessmen. 

recently launched international efforts to develop alternative sources and routes of natural uranium imports, conversion and enrichment allow France to become a leading player in accelerating sanction pressure against the Russian nuclear sector.

The main direction should be the prohibition of trade and supply of modern equipment and technologies from French companies to “Rosatom”. Such initiative should be further promoted to German, American and Korean companies.

As an alternative, France can propose to establish an international consortium and develop proposals for European and third countries in the field of peaceful utilisation of nuclear generation, which will be affordable for consumers and competitive in comparison with Russian or Chinese. 

It should be noted that Russia can strike in advance, similar to gas supply limitations and infrastructure subversions in 2021 and 2022 in Europe, sacrificing supporting financial and reputational losses.

This could stimulate European and American countries as well as other G7 partners to downplay dependence on Russian nuclear fuel and services as well as transform it into future advantages.

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Andrii Chubyk is an Associate Expert at the Centre for Global Studies “Strategy XXI”

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Main Image: By Ler from RU SPb – Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant, CC BY-SA 2.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=60729920

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