Viktor Orbán has said he wrote to Vladimir Putin to ask how Russia would respond if the European Union moves ahead with plans to use immobilised Russian sovereign assets to support Ukraine, and whether Moscow would take account of dissenting member states.
Speaking on a flight to Brussels ahead of an EU leaders’ meeting, the Hungarian prime minister said he received a reply indicating Russia’s reaction “would be strong” and that it would consider how individual countries position themselves on the issue.
Orbán’s comments come as EU governments seek a way to secure large-scale funding for Ukraine’s budget and defence needs in 2026 and 2027, at a time when Kyiv and its partners are warning of tightening finances. EU envoys have been working on a proposed “reparations loan” model that would draw on cash generated by the immobilised Russian central bank assets held in the EU, without formally confiscating the underlying principal.
At the centre of the debate is the EU’s decision to immobilise the Russian central bank assets on a long-term basis, removing the need for periodic renewal that could be blocked by a single member state. The move was agreed by ambassadors using an emergency clause in the EU treaties, a route that requires a qualified majority rather than unanimity.
The sums involved are substantial. European Parliament research has put the value of immobilised Russian sovereign assets in the EU at about €210 billion, alongside roughly €28 billion of frozen private assets. Most of the sovereign assets are held via Belgium-based Euroclear, which has become a focal point for legal and financial risk.
According to reporting on the negotiations, the “reparations loan” concept would use accumulated cash linked to the immobilised assets to back EU-issued debt, with the proceeds then lent to Ukraine. The idea is structured so that Ukraine would repay only after a future settlement in which Russia pays reparations, while the EU argues the arrangement avoids “theft” because Russia’s underlying claim to the assets is not extinguished.
Belgium has been a key holdout, citing exposure to litigation and possible retaliation because Euroclear is headquartered in Brussels. Euroclear itself has warned publicly that the plan could create legal uncertainty, and Russia’s central bank has filed suit in Moscow against the clearing house.
Those concerns have started to feed into market scrutiny. Fitch Ratings has placed Euroclear Bank on “rating watch negative”, pointing to potential legal and liquidity risks if the proposed mechanism creates mismatches on the firm’s balance sheet or if protections are judged insufficient. Euroclear has said it wants more clarity on safeguards and on how risk would be shared among member states.
In this context, Orbán reiterated Hungary’s opposition to using the immobilised assets, arguing it would amount to a new step in escalation. He has also complained that EU partners have sidelined Budapest in the sanctions debate; in a post on X, Orbán said the bloc had “stripped Hungary of its rights” and suggested he would no longer treat the EU’s principle of “loyal cooperation” as binding for Hungary on this question.
Mandiner, a pro-government Hungarian outlet, reported that Orbán raised the matter directly with Putin in writing and received assurances that Russia would consider the stances of individual EU countries. The outlet also reported Orbán joking that what he likes most about Brussels is “chocolate”, the city’s main square, and, above all, leaving.
Kyiv has responded sharply to Orbán’s public campaign against the assets plan. Ukraine’s foreign minister, Andrii Sybiha, replied to Orbán’s comments by calling the Hungarian leader “Russia’s most valuable frozen asset in Europe”.
Russia’s most valuable frozen asset in Europe. https://t.co/wdTnf1kFIg
— Andrii Sybiha 🇺🇦 (@andrii_sybiha) December 14, 2025
EU leaders are expected to return to the issue at the summit, with officials weighing whether political momentum and financial safeguards can bring Belgium and other cautious capitals onside. With a qualified majority sufficient for some decisions linked to the mechanism, the debate also tests the EU’s willingness to use treaty tools designed for emergencies to bypass veto points on sanctions-linked measures.
