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Only 11 per cent of Europeans across 15 countries now view the United States as an ally, according to a new European Council on Foreign Relations survey that points to a sharp deterioration in public confidence in the American security guarantee.
The survey, published on Wednesday, found that most Europeans no longer believe the US would come to their country’s aid if it were attacked. The polling was carried out in May in Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
The findings, first reported by The Guardian, show that European views of Washington have shifted from alliance confidence to strategic caution. In November 2024, 22 per cent of respondents saw the US as an ally. Six months ago, the figure was 16 per cent. It now stands at 11 per cent.
The prevailing view in the survey is that the US remains a “necessary partner”, but not a country that shares Europe’s interests and values in the way traditionally associated with an alliance. Thirteen per cent of respondents described the US as a rival, while 12 per cent described it as an adversary.
The result has direct implications for European defence policy. NATO remains the central framework for collective defence, but the survey indicates that public assumptions about the reliability of the American pillar of that system have weakened. That does not mean Europeans want to replace NATO with an EU-only defence structure. The same polling found limited backing, at 29 per cent, for creating a new European defence body instead of the Alliance.
The more important shift is practical rather than institutional. Europeans appear increasingly willing to reduce dependence on US military hardware, support higher defence spending and rely more on European neighbours in a crisis. According to the polling, majorities in nearly every country surveyed said their government should reduce strategic dependence on American equipment.
Support for buying European was especially high in Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, Portugal, France, Switzerland, the UK and Spain. That matters for European defence industry because public opinion can influence whether governments have political space to place procurement with European suppliers, even when US equipment is available faster, cheaper or already integrated into NATO force structures.
The survey also found that Europeans were, on average, four percentage points more likely to support higher national defence spending than last year. Italy was the only country where a clear majority remained opposed. There was also support for collective EU borrowing to finance defence, with 47 per cent in favour and 35 per cent opposed. The strongest support came from Portugal, Denmark, the Netherlands and Spain.
The limits of that support are also clear. Most respondents did not want domestic public spending cut to pay for larger defence budgets. Opposition to such cuts was particularly strong in Italy, Austria, Germany, Spain and Denmark. This points to a central difficulty for European governments: voters may support stronger defence in principle, but not necessarily the fiscal trade-offs required to deliver it.
For defence planners, the polling is useful because it separates three questions that are often blurred together. Europeans are not calling for NATO to be abolished. They are not ready to pay any domestic cost for rearmament. But they are increasingly doubtful that the US can be treated as a predictable guarantor and increasingly open to reducing dependence on American equipment.
That combination is likely to shape decisions on air defence, long-range strike, ammunition, drones, armoured vehicles, command systems and missile production. It strengthens the political case for European industrial capacity, but it does not solve the problems of cost, fragmentation, production speed or capability gaps.
The timing is also significant. The findings were released before major G7 and NATO meetings, at a moment when European governments are under pressure to increase defence spending and take greater responsibility for conventional deterrence. US policy under President Donald Trump has intensified European concern over Washington’s long-term posture, including its commitment to NATO, future troop levels in Europe and the direction of American foreign policy.
The poll does not show a clean break with the US. Many Europeans still expect transatlantic relations to improve after Trump leaves office. It also shows limited appetite for replacing NATO with a purely European framework. The more realistic reading is that European publics are moving towards hedging: keeping the US relationship where possible, while preparing for scenarios in which American support is delayed, reduced or conditional.
That is a different political environment from the one that shaped European defence after the Cold War. For decades, many governments were able to limit defence spending while relying on US military power as the ultimate backstop. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine changed the strategic context. The renewed instability of US policy has changed the public debate.
The procurement implications may be substantial. If voters increasingly favour reduced dependence on US hardware, European governments may face pressure to justify major purchases from American suppliers, especially where European alternatives exist. At the same time, European industry will have to prove that it can produce at scale and on time. Public preference alone will not build air-defence systems, artillery shells or missile stockpiles.
The survey also indicates stronger confidence in European solidarity than in US protection. In most countries, respondents believed that at least some European neighbours would help them if attacked. That perception could support closer regional defence groupings, joint procurement and cross-border capability projects.
For policymakers, the message is not that European defence autonomy has already arrived. It has not. Europe still depends heavily on the US for intelligence, strategic lift, high-end air power, nuclear deterrence, air defence architecture and command structures. The ECFR findings instead suggest that the political basis for that dependence is weakening.
That creates pressure on European leaders to move faster on practical defence capacity rather than relying on slogans about strategic autonomy. The public appears to have accepted that the US may no longer be a fully reliable security guarantor. The unanswered question is whether European governments can turn that change in perception into credible military capability.
