The declaration of a ‘Global war on terror’ marked the most obvious but by no means the only response to the rise in international terrorism. But, Five years after the Islamic State lost its “caliphate,” an enduring defeat has yet to be achieved.
IS (Islamic State) has diminished, yet it remains a threat, with increased activity in various regions compared to the past. Notably, IS-K (Islamic State in Khorasan) operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and Russia exemplify this persistence.
Meanwhile, on a different front, the Syrian rebel group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS- which broke ties with al-Qa‘ida) has emerged as a formidable force. In a surprising offensive in November 2024, HTS seized control of Aleppo, Syria’s second-largest city, encountering minimal resistance from government forces. Long dominant in the country’s northwest, HTS’s sudden capture of Aleppo stunned observers, including the group’s own leadership. Since then, HTS has advanced further south toward Damascus, igniting conflict in several towns and cities across Syria.
However, as HTS celebrates its swift territorial gains, the group now faces the daunting challenge of holding these newly acquired areas.
According to Jerome Drevon, a senior analyst on jihadism at the International Crisis Group, the Syrian army, bolstered by Russian and Iranian support, is preparing a counteroffensive. Governing and defending these territories will likely prove far more challenging for HTS and the allied armed factions, raising critical questions about the group’s long- term prospects and governance capacity.
Despite the heightened propaganda and increased activity of HTS within Syria, greater attention should be directed toward the Islamic State. As a transnational terrorist organisation that still maintains a foothold in Syria, IS poses future threats that could extend far beyond the immediate conflict. Its capacity to operate across borders and exploit regional instability underscores the importance of prioritising IS in ongoing counterterrorism efforts, as its resurgence could have profound implications for both Syria and the broader international community.
The Islamic State asserted accountability for the deadly assault at the Crocus City Hall venue in Moscow on March 22nd, resulting in the tragic loss of more than 150 lives, marking it as Russia’s most severe terrorist incident in two decades. U.S. authorities specifically linked the Islamic State Khorasan Province, known as IS-K, a faction rooted in Afghanistan and Pakistan that pledges allegiance to the broader leadership of the Islamic State, to the attack.
It can be said that IS-K, founded in 2015, has expanded its external operations more than any other branch of ISIS. In early 2020, when IS-K was on the decline, it attempted to revive itself by implementing ISIS tactics in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region and utilizing a full spectrum of external operations.
During the initial years of IS-K’s formation, the group sought to extend its sphere of influence beyond its main headquarters in Nangarhar through its local deployment operations. Initially targeting Kabul and Jalalabad, especially the Shia community in Kabul, as well as various government targets.
Throughout the formative years of IS-K, the group utilised guerrilla and cross-border operations to expand its attacks in the tribal areas of northwest Pakistan and within the country.
In a short period (from 2015 to 2017), a growing network of supporters and allies of IS-K carried out a series of deadly attacks in the country: first in Karachi and Sindh, then in Lahore and other cities in Punjab, and later in the city of Quetta in Balochistan. Recently, following the Taliban’s rise to power in Afghanistan in August 2021, a series of coordinated cross-border operations were carried out in 2022 with the coordination of IS-K, targeting not only Pakistan (in March) but also Uzbekistan (in April), Tajikistan (in May), and Iran (in October).
These attacks may seem like sporadic assaults by a weak organisation. Still, they indicate that IS-K has crossed the threshold of structural and operational capabilities needed to sustain this year-long campaign.
Ultimately, after warnings issued in early 2019 about IS-K’s potential scenarios for external operations, in early 2020, the level of its capabilities was proven with the neutralisation of one of the group’s operations. In a joint operation planned by ISIS- Sham and IS-K, four Tajik nationals were supposed to target US and NATO military bases in Germany in April 2020.
Since then, between 2022 and 2023, several European countries have reported that IS-K has been attempting to establish connections with local communities in Australia, Germany, and the Netherlands to coordinate its external operations.
The expansion of IS-K’s media outputs to multiple languages post-2020, compared to their limited content production in a few languages before 2020, is a significant shift. IS employs political, military, and propaganda tactics in their insurgency to weaken adversaries stronger than the group typically.
Currently, IS-K is at its peak, having taken responsibility for 290 operations in Afghanistan from the Taliban’s rise in 2021 until 2023. On average, they carried out 30 terrorist operations per month.
Over 15 months, IS-K conducted three terrorist operations within Iran (in 2022-2023), resulting in 110 Iranian fatalities and 250 injuries. The tragic terrorist attack on March 22nd, 2024, at Crocus City Hall in Moscow, left 130 dead and 182 wounded. External operations are deemed vital for IS to achieve its strategic goals throughout the various stages of its insurgency.
Now Various Scenarios Can Be Envisioned for the Future of IS
Scenario 1: Gradual Weakening of IS and Limited Operations
The primary scenario involves the gradual decline and weakening of IS by distancing itself from key strengths such as professional organization, hierarchical structures, powerful communication networks, impactful media presence, and global terror. IS will increasingly rely on smaller, individual operations akin to lone wolves and isolated island-like activities.
Scenario 2: IS Isolation in the Middle East
In this scenario, IS’s decline, coupled with reduced competitiveness against other active extremist groups, will lead to pressure and isolation in the geographies of Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq. In this context, IS will resort to clandestine and underground activities.
Scenario 3: Destruction of IS
As a result of global and regional counterterrorism policies, IS is headed toward eradication and destruction. The logical outcome is that IS will not find a viable rationale to continue its activities in the same structure, tactics, and strategies.
Scenario 4: IS as a Media Entity Relying on Psychological Operations
Transforming into a tool, IS will navigate aimlessly, turning into a media-centric entity without military escalation or recruitment, focusing more on propaganda through psychological operations and media, supported by increased economic, financial, and logistical aid but diminishing political backing.
Scenario 5: Upgraded ISIS
Having gone through a period of resurgence and growth, IS, after a pause and rebranding, will attempt to alter the global order by changing its name, and flag, and utilising previous logic and strategies to align with actors like the United States, Russia, Iran, Syria, the Taliban, and Pakistan.
Analysis of the Fifth Scenario: IS as a Catalyst for the Fifth Wave of Terrorism
It appears that the fifth scenario, which considers IS as a catalyst for initiating the fifth wave of terrorism, is stronger and more probable.
Following significant setbacks in 2019, ISIS intended to allocate time for revival, respiration, and rejuvenation based on the strategy of some theorists, such as Abu Bakr al-Naji, who explained in the book “The Management of Savagery (2004)”.
After the establishment of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2021, IS-K’s operations and its media activities breathed new life into the weakened body of IS. In the years 2023 and 2024, IS managed to carry out some of the most impactful operations geographically in Iran and Russia. These operations were unprecedented in terms of casualties and the style of terrorist operation design, posing a significant security challenge.
Now, following IS-K’s terrorist attack on Russia, it seems that global observers’ attention will turn towards jihadist and extremist groups. We may witness further operations in Central Asia, and the Middle East, and even resort to strategies like “lone wolves” and “self-initiated fighters”.
It is hoped that there will be greater convergence in global counterterrorism policies to prevent terrorism from exploiting the lack of convergence in counterterrorism models and their various diversities.
Moreover, the renewed activity of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and allied rebel factions in northern Syria—particularly in strategic areas such as Aleppo province— may signal the onset of a new jihadist wave. Should these groups mobilise militants from Syria, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Central Asia, and beyond, the potential for a unified Takfiri front could materialize, significantly heightening the risk of a global jihadist resurgence.
In sum, the prospect of convergence between IS-K and HTS, or similar factions, could facilitate the emergence of a formidable transnational jihadist coalition. Such a scenario would pose a grave threat not only to the Middle East but to global security as a whole, underscoring the imperative for a cohesive, multidimensional counterterrorism response.
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my esteemed colleague at Coventry University, Mohammad Manoochehri, for his valuable insights and constructive suggestions, which greatly contributed to the development of this Brief analytical overview. – Dr. Yaser Esmailzadeh (University of Tehran)
Main Image: Islamic-State-member-waving-flag-image-via-Wikipedia-e1616590709674
