The recent release of three political prisoners from Belarusian jails may signal the beginning of a larger agreement between the administration of US President Donald Trump and Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko.
According to Western diplomats in Vilnius, Christopher W. Smith, a senior US State Department official who previously engaged with Belarus under the Biden administration, played a key role in negotiations leading up to the prisoners’ release.
The discussions, reportedly led by Smith, indicate that Washington is considering a broader deal with Minsk. This agreement could involve the mass release of political prisoners in Belarus in exchange for easing economic sanctions, particularly those targeting Belarus’s financial system and key state-owned enterprises. However, such an arrangement appears to be driven more by short-term political expediency rather than a principled approach to democracy and human rights.
Lukashenko’s Gains at US Expense
For Lukashenko, this deal is an undeniable victory. Not only would it allow him to present a false image of reform, but it would also help break Belarus’s international isolation, which has significantly limited his regime’s ability to balance relations between Moscow, Beijing, and Western powers.
Since 2020, Belarus has become increasingly reliant on Russia, both politically and economically, as Western sanctions have taken their toll. Restoring some level of economic engagement with the US could provide Minsk with additional financial resources, which Lukashenko has historically treated as a crucial element of his political survival.
The potential deal also aligns with Lukashenko’s broader strategy of securing external funding. Over the past three decades, Belarus has relied on foreign financial support, including Russian subsidies, to sustain its economy. Access to Western financial markets, even if limited, would provide much-needed relief to Belarus’s struggling economy—relief that will almost certainly be misused to prop up his authoritarian regime.
US Short-Sightedness and Strategic Blunders
From Washington’s perspective, engaging with Minsk could serve multiple purposes beyond securing the release of political prisoners. By providing Belarus with an alternative to complete economic dependence on Russia, the US may seek to weaken Moscow’s influence in the post-Soviet space. However, such a strategy is deeply flawed. Any notion that Lukashenko could be turned into a Western ally is naive at best and dangerously counterproductive at worst.
The US has a long history of making ill-conceived deals with authoritarian leaders, only to be manipulated or betrayed when their interests shift. Washington’s apparent willingness to ease sanctions without demanding genuine democratic reforms exposes a glaring weakness in its foreign policy approach—one that often prioritises optics over substance. Rather than taking a firm stance against autocrats, the US appears willing to negotiate with a leader who has brutally suppressed his own people, simply for the illusion of progress.
Historical Parallels and Missteps
The idea that Washington could significantly alter Belarus’s strategic alignment by easing sanctions is met with scepticism by many analysts. Lukashenko’s reliance on Russian backing extends beyond economic assistance; it also includes military and security support. The Kremlin has demonstrated its commitment to propping up allied authoritarian regimes, as evidenced by its unwavering support for Lukashenko during the 2020 protests. If Belarus were to face another wave of domestic unrest, it is unlikely that the US would intervene, whereas Moscow has already shown a willingness to act decisively in such scenarios.
A historical comparison can be drawn to Ukraine’s former president, Viktor Yanukovych. Yanukovych attempted to balance relations between Russia and the West but ultimately failed to secure lasting Western support when faced with mass protests in 2013–2014. When his administration collapsed, it was Russia that stepped in, leading to the annexation of Crimea and the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine. The situation in Belarus follows a similar trajectory—while the US may offer economic incentives, it is Russia that remains Lukashenko’s ultimate guarantor of power.
A Gift to Moscow
If the US were to reduce sanctions on Belarus, one potential unintended consequence could be an indirect benefit to Russia. Before the full-scale war in Ukraine, Belarus served as a critical financial and logistical gateway for Russian economic activities. Easing restrictions on Belarus’s financial system could inadvertently provide Moscow with new avenues to circumvent Western sanctions. Given the ongoing war in Ukraine and the continued economic pressure on Russia, any policy shift that benefits Belarus could also strengthen Putin’s ability to sustain his regime.
Conclusion: Washington’s Misguided Approach
While the release of three political prisoners is a significant development, it remains to be seen whether it marks the beginning of a larger geopolitical shift. A deal between the US and Belarus would require careful negotiations and substantial assurances from Minsk—assurances that history suggests are unlikely to be honoured. The Biden administration’s previous approach of maintaining pressure on the Belarusian regime was far more effective in isolating Lukashenko. The Trump administration’s willingness to negotiate with him suggests a dangerous shift towards appeasement.
Instead of offering concessions to a dictator who has repeatedly violated human rights, Washington should be focusing on increasing, not decreasing, the economic and political pressure on Belarus. Anything less would not only be a betrayal of the Belarusian people’s struggle for democracy but would also play directly into the hands of Vladimir Putin. The US’s lack of strategic foresight in this situation raises serious questions about the effectiveness of its broader foreign policy approach in Eastern Europe.
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