The European Union has expanded its Russia sanctions regime, adding 34 individuals and 47 entities to its blacklist in a move aimed at Moscow’s military-industrial base, energy revenue networks, propaganda channels and human rights abuses.
The new measures, adopted by the Council on 15 June, mark another attempt by the bloc to tighten pressure on Russia while a broader 21st sanctions package remains under discussion among member states.
The latest listings bring together several strands of EU policy: restricting Russia’s ability to sustain its war against Ukraine, targeting the shipping and services network behind its oil exports, penalising those accused of political repression, and acting against individuals and organisations involved in pro-Kremlin information operations.
The Council said the measures were designed to “further constrain” Russia’s military-industrial complex and reduce energy revenues by targeting the ecosystem around the so-called shadow fleet. That fleet consists of tankers and associated companies used to move Russian oil and petroleum products while seeking to avoid Western price-cap restrictions, insurance limits and other sanctions.
Among those listed are figures accused of helping facilitate Russian oil exports. They include Tahir Garayev, founder of Coral Energy, later known as 2Rivers Group, and Konstantin Rogach. The EU alleges that Garayev enabled the shipment and export of Russian crude, including from sanctioned energy company Rosneft, through company networks intended to conceal the oil’s origin. Rogach is accused of facilitating insurance and administrative services for vessels transporting Russian crude or petroleum products.
The decision shows that Brussels is moving beyond sanctions against vessels alone and is focusing more closely on the commercial, insurance, consultancy and ownership networks that allow Russia to continue earning revenue from energy exports. This is becoming a central enforcement issue for the EU, as the shadow fleet has been repeatedly identified as a weakness in the Western sanctions architecture.
The sanctions also cover seven individuals and 21 entities linked to Russia’s military and industrial complex, including those accused of supporting military production and procurement. These listings form part of the EU’s wider effort to limit Russia’s access to technology, components and services that can be used for weapons production.
A separate part of the package targets individuals linked to the death of Russian opposition figure Alexei Navalny. The EU listed 15 people, including judges and prosecutors, in connection with his treatment and death in custody. The move places the Navalny case within the same sanctions framework as Russia’s war economy and information operations, signalling that Brussels intends to keep repression inside Russia connected to its wider policy towards Moscow.
The package also includes people accused of spreading disinformation intended to justify, promote or legitimise Russia’s war against Ukraine. Those listed include journalists, a social media figure and Georgiy Shevkunov, a bishop in the Russian Orthodox Church. The inclusion of religious and media-linked figures reflects the EU’s view that Russia’s war effort is supported not only by military and industrial structures, but also by organised propaganda networks.
The new listings come as EU foreign ministers continue work on a wider 21st sanctions package. That proposed package is expected to focus heavily on Russia’s financial sector, crypto platforms, oil traders, shadow-fleet vessels and export restrictions affecting the defence and aerospace sectors.
EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said work on the broader package was continuing and estimated that Western sanctions had already cost Russia’s economy between €1 trillion and €1.3 trillion. The figure is difficult to assess independently, but it reflects the EU’s argument that sanctions are having cumulative effects even when they do not immediately change Moscow’s conduct.
The latest decision also illustrates a change in the EU’s sanctions priorities. Earlier rounds focused heavily on banks, oligarchs, state enterprises and export bans. More recent measures have increasingly targeted circumvention networks, third-country enablers, maritime services, propaganda channels and individuals involved in domestic repression.
That shift reflects the way Russia has adapted to previous sanctions. Oil continues to move through opaque shipping structures, prohibited goods may reach Russia through intermediaries, and financial services can be routed through less visible channels. For Brussels, the question is no longer only whether sanctions exist, but whether they can be enforced against the networks designed to weaken them.
The package also has implications for companies, insurers, shipping intermediaries and service providers operating around Russian trade. EU sanctions prohibit making funds or economic resources available to listed individuals and entities, and they impose travel bans and asset freezes on designated persons. Companies with exposure to maritime services, energy trading or logistics connected to Russia will now face additional compliance checks.
Politically, the move allows the EU to show continued pressure on Moscow at a time when the war in Ukraine remains central to European security policy and when G7 discussions are focused on Russia, Iran and global energy risks. It also comes as several member states are pressing for tougher action against the shadow fleet, which is increasingly treated as both a sanctions-evasion mechanism and a maritime-security concern.
The effectiveness of the new measures will depend on implementation. Listings can restrict access to EU financial and commercial systems, but enforcement requires national authorities, port controls, insurers, banks and corporate compliance teams to identify links that are often deliberately obscured.
For that reason, the 15 June package is less a final step than part of a continuing sanctions contest. Russia has sought to build alternative routes for finance, oil exports and procurement. The EU is now attempting to close those routes by targeting the operators, service providers and political structures that sustain them.
The immediate significance of the package lies in its breadth. By combining energy, military production, propaganda and the Navalny case, the EU is treating Russia’s war against Ukraine, domestic repression and external influence operations as connected parts of the same strategic challenge.
