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Washington’s current handling of negotiations with Moscow over Ukraine has reached the point where another round of high-profile visits will not, on its own, change the course of the war.
The most recent talks in Moscow between United States envoys and the Kremlin, which ended without key concessions from Russia, underlined that a back-channel reliant on personal access to Vladimir Putin cannot substitute for a structured strategy built on leverage rather than optics.
The existing diplomatic track has produced a leaked peace framework that offers sanctions relief and territorial compromises while Russian forces continue operations on the ground. The 28-point document, presented as a way to end the conflict, has already prompted concern over the extent to which it aligns with Russian interests and shifts costs onto Ukraine and its European partners. This text sets the context in which any new approach from Washington will be judged.
A more effective course is available. The decisive instruments at Washington’s disposal lie in the energy and financial domains, where the United States has already demonstrated that sanctions can disrupt Russian revenue streams when applied with consistency.
Recent measures targeting Rosneft and Lukoil, combined with Ukrainian strikes against oil and petrochemical infrastructure, have begun to constrain Russia’s ability to convert hydrocarbons into war finance, as shown in detailed reporting on the latest sanctions package and associated attacks.
The priority now is enforcement. Oil sanctions must be treated not as signalling devices but as operational tools. This requires tightening controls on the “shadow fleet”, closing gaps in price-cap implementation, and using secondary sanctions against banks, shipowners and insurers that enable evasion.
EU Today’s analysis of tanker movements and naval monitoring in European waters has already highlighted how Russian vessels continue to operate in breach of sanctions regimes, and how targeted action can raise their costs and risks, as documented in recent coverage of maritime activity and sanctions exposure.
Washington has already signalled a willingness to apply pressure beyond Russia’s borders. Public threats of “very severe” measures against states that continue business as usual with Moscow mark an important step towards a genuinely global sanctions regime, as outlined in accounts of US warnings to third countries. To be credible, such warnings must be followed by concrete designations and enforcement, not occasional statements that leave room for doubt.
In practice this means focusing on those economies most central to Russia’s resilience. China occupies a pivotal position: it is both a key buyer of discounted Russian crude and a major supplier of dual-use components and restricted items that feed Russia’s defence-industrial base. Trade data show sustained flows of high-priority battlefield goods from Chinese companies to Russian entities despite existing restrictions, as documented in open-source research summarised in recent reporting on these exports.
A coherent American strategy would therefore combine pressure on Russian energy exports with calibrated measures aimed at entities in China and other states that facilitate sanctions circumvention. The European Union has already moved to list several China-based firms linked to Moscow’s wartime oil trade, signalling that such action is both legally and politically feasible, as shown by the latest round of listings against Chinese refineries and traders tied to Russian flows. The United States can reinforce and extend this approach with its own designations and financial restrictions.
Evidence from the oil market indicates that this type of pressure works. Following new US measures on Russian energy, Chinese refiners have already curtailed some seaborne purchases of Russian crude, while compliance teams reassess their exposure and pricing power shifts away from Moscow, as described in analysis of recent cuts in Chinese buying. Over time, sustained enforcement of this kind narrows Russia’s options, erodes fiscal space and limits its capacity to fund prolonged operations in Ukraine.
At the same time, pressure alone is insufficient without a parallel commitment to Ukraine’s defence and economic stability. Continued military assistance, deep-strike capabilities against legitimate military and logistical targets, and predictable budgetary support are essential to ensure that Moscow cannot simply outlast Kyiv. Recent reporting on Ukraine’s evolving strike campaign against Russian logistics and energy assets, including operations against key fuel depots and infrastructure, illustrates how external support translates directly into pressure on Russia’s war machine.
The overall direction is clear. Instead of relying on back-channel missions that leave the initiative in the Kremlin’s hands, Washington should anchor its policy in four pillars: rigorous enforcement and tightening of energy and financial sanctions; targeted measures against third-country enablers, including Chinese entities; sustained military and economic support for Ukraine; and a clear link between any future sanctions relief and verifiable steps towards a ceasefire along the current line of contact. Such a strategy would restore leverage, reduce the scope for diplomatic theatre and create real conditions for a ceasefire, whether before the end of the present term or for the administration that takes office in 2029.
First published on euglobal.news
Risk in European Waters: The Shadow Fleet, Sanctions Evasion and Safety Gaps
