The European Commission is preparing a legal proposal that would turn the EU’s restrictions on Russian oil into a permanent ban, in a move that would extend beyond the current sanctions framework and remain in force even if future political circumstances change.
According to Reuters, the proposal is expected to be tabled on 15 April 2026, three days after Hungary’s parliamentary election.
The reported timing is politically significant. EU officials described the scheduling as deliberate, intended to avoid making the Russian oil issue a central factor in Hungary’s election campaign. Hungary and Slovakia, which still rely on Russian crude, have consistently opposed a full ban.
This would mark a shift in how Brussels is managing the remaining Russian oil flows. The EU has already imposed sanctions on seaborne Russian oil imports, but pipeline deliveries have remained a point of contention, particularly for landlocked member states. The Commission’s new approach appears aimed at embedding the phase-out in ordinary EU legislation rather than relying solely on sanctions measures, which are politically more vulnerable and require unanimity. The ban is intended to remain in place even if a future peace settlement in Ukraine led to sanctions being lifted.
The proposal also fits into a broader EU strategy to eliminate residual dependence on Russian energy by the end of 2027. The Commission’s REPowerEU phase-out page states that it intends to table legislation in early 2026 to ban Russian oil imports “as soon as possible, but not later than 2027”. The Council of the EU, in January 2026, also said the Commission planned to propose legislation to phase out Russian oil imports by the end of 2027.
That timeline follows the bloc’s recent legal move on gas. In January, the Council gave final approval to a stepwise ban on Russian gas imports, turning the EU’s political commitment into binding law. In the same communication, the Council noted that member states still importing Russian oil would be required to submit diversification plans, linking oil and gas policy within the same security-of-supply framework.
The economic backdrop suggests the Commission is acting at a moment when the remaining volumes are relatively limited at EU level but still highly sensitive for a small number of states. Reuters reported that by the final quarter of 2025, only 1% of EU oil imports were coming from Russia, largely because of sanctions already in place on seaborne crude. The political challenge, however, is concentrated in Hungary and Slovakia, whose refineries and supply chains remain more exposed to Russian pipeline crude.
That concentration explains why the issue has become a test of internal EU cohesion. Druzhba pipeline supplies to Hungary and Slovakia were interrupted from 27 January after damage to pipeline equipment in western Ukraine, and that the disruption has fuelled a wider dispute involving Budapest, Bratislava and Kyiv. In parallel, Hungary has used its position in EU decision-making to block or delay measures related to Russia and Ukraine, increasing concern in Brussels about the vulnerability of the sanctions process to national vetoes. EU officials expect the Commission to use a legal route that can be approved by qualified majority, rather than unanimity, to avoid a Hungarian or Slovak veto.
If that legislative route is confirmed, the proposed oil ban would be important not only for energy policy but also for institutional reasons. It would indicate a continued shift from emergency sanctions politics towards more durable internal market and energy legislation, where the threshold for approval is lower and enforcement can be more systematic. For Brussels, this is likely to be presented as a matter of strategic resilience and legal certainty.
