Britain’s Director of Public Prosecutions has said the case against two men accused of spying for China collapsed because the Government declined, over many months, to provide evidence that China constituted a national-security “enemy” at the time of the alleged offences.
In a letter to the chairs of the Home Affairs and Justice committees, Stephen Parkinson said the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) had done “everything possible” to bring the case but could not proceed without specific testimony on China’s status under the Official Secrets Act 1911. The CPS concluded in late August that the necessary evidence would not be forthcoming.
Christopher Cash, 30, a former director of the China Research Group, and Christopher Berry, 33, were first arrested in March 2023 and charged in April 2024 with passing politically sensitive information to a Chinese intelligence contact. Both deny wrongdoing. Charges were discontinued last month, shortly before trial.
Mr Parkinson said prosecutors believed they had sufficient material to charge in April 2024, but a subsequent High Court judgment in a Russian espionage case clarified that, for the 1911 Act, “enemy” means a state posing a threat to UK national security at the time of the alleged conduct. Prosecutors then sought additional Government evidence to meet that test; no witness statement stated that China met it for the relevant period.
The DPP said he was providing public clarification because Government briefings had already commented on the evidential position. While ministers have stressed prosecutorial independence, Mr Parkinson’s account confirms that only officials could supply the designation needed after the court ruling.
Downing Street has said it did not withdraw evidence and that the evidential position did not materially change after charges were brought. Government sources argue the request could not be met because, during the period in question, the UK’s public stance did not define China in terms that would satisfy the 1911 Act.
Sir Keir Starmer said the CPS request pre-dated Labour taking office and that prosecutions must reflect the state of affairs at the time of the alleged offences. Speaking en route to India, he said: “You have to prosecute people on the basis of what was the state of affairs at the time of the offence,” adding that a later designation could not be applied retrospectively.
Opposition figures have called for greater transparency on the decision-making and the role of senior officials. Parliamentary committees have written to the DPP seeking further detail on the evidential chronology and the interface between intelligence assessments and policy designations.
Security warnings about Chinese activity long pre-date the case. In October 2023, MI5’s Director-General, Ken McCallum, described Chinese espionage in the UK as occurring on an “epic” scale, including large-scale approaches to potential targets. In April 2024, Tom Tugendhat, then Security Minister, told the Commons that hostile activity by Chinese authorities and state-affiliated groups posed a “serious threat” to the security and wellbeing of the British people and allies.
By contrast, UK policy documents and ministerial language in recent years have tended to frame China as a “systemic challenge” and to focus on “de-risking”, updated in part through the National Security Act 2023, which modernised espionage offences. The CPS case nevertheless fell under the pre-existing 1911 Act, and the court’s 2024 interpretation of “enemy” was decisive for evidential purposes.
For a European readership, the episode sits within a wider pattern of concern over Chinese intelligence activity and legal adaptation across the EU. Dutch intelligence has reported extensive Chinese cyber-espionage against Western governments and defence firms, and the Netherlands has moved to criminalise “digital” and “diaspora” espionage.
Germany has opened multiple investigations and arrests linked to alleged Chinese espionage, including a former aide in the European Parliament and suspects tied to dual-use technology transfers. These cases underline the shared challenge across EU jurisdictions—even as legal thresholds and public designations differ.
EU policy, meanwhile, is framed around “de-risking, not decoupling” from China—reducing strategic dependencies while maintaining channels for trade and dialogue. This approach informs national choices about legal tools and evidential standards, and it shapes the political calculus when prosecutions intersect with diplomacy.
The UK’s handling of a Russian spy ring earlier this year illustrates how legal characterisations can affect outcomes. Six Bulgarians acting for Russia were convicted and jailed for more than 50 years in total, following proceedings under the Official Secrets Act and related offences—cases where Russia’s adversarial status was not in doubt.
Image: A court sketch of Christopher Berry (left) and Christopher Cash during their trial at Westminster magistrates’ court
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