Belgium’s State Security Service has unveiled a troubling trend in its latest annual report: the systematic recruitment of ‘freelance agents’ by Russia as part of its hybrid warfare operations.
These agents are often hired via platforms like Telegram to carry out intelligence-gathering and disruptive activities across Europe. This approach, likened to gig platforms such as Uber or Deliveroo, highlights the Kremlin’s adaptability and ingenuity in waging hybrid warfare. Far from being a new tactic, these methods have been observed in various forms for years, particularly in Ukraine and Poland, as part of Russia’s long-term efforts to destabilise Western nations.
Adapting Strategies After Diplomatic Expulsions
In 2022, following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, European countries expelled dozens of Russian diplomats and embassy staff suspected of espionage. Belgium alone removed around seventy individuals, delivering a significant blow to Moscow’s intelligence capabilities. This forced Russian intelligence agencies to innovate.
According to Francisca Bostyn, head of Belgium’s State Security Service, Russian operatives have turned to recruiting freelance agents without formal ties to intelligence services. This new strategy involves leveraging messaging platforms like Telegram to find individuals willing to perform specific tasks, often starting with low-risk activities that later escalate to serious offences.
For example, a typical recruitment begins with an anonymous advertisement offering €20 for simple acts such as putting up anti-Ukrainian stickers in public spaces. Those who respond are vetted through basic screening questions, after which they are contacted by a Russian intelligence officer for further instructions. Over time, these tasks become increasingly illegal, ranging from sabotage to espionage. Payments are made in cryptocurrencies, ensuring anonymity and reducing the risk of detection.
Telegram: A Central Tool in Ukraine
The use of Telegram as a recruitment and operational tool is well-documented, particularly in Ukraine, where Russia has utilised the platform extensively. For instance, Russian-affiliated groups created a Telegram channel named “Civil Defense,” ostensibly offering free software to Ukrainian military recruits. In reality, the channel distributed malware designed to locate Ukrainian recruitment centres and military positions.
Additionally, the channel was used to collect anti-mobilisation propaganda aimed at undermining Ukraine’s war effort. This strategy combines elements of cyber espionage, psychological operations, and grassroots manipulation, showcasing the multifaceted nature of Russia’s hybrid warfare.
Sabotage Efforts in Poland
Poland has also been a significant target of Russia’s hybrid tactics. In early 2023, a Ukrainian refugee residing in Poland responded to a Telegram job posting offering small payments for acts of vandalism. Initially tasked with relatively harmless activities, such as defacing property, the individual was later instructed to engage in more severe actions, including sabotaging surveillance equipment along railway lines used to transport Western military aid to Ukraine.
This escalation demonstrates a common pattern in Russia’s freelance recruitment strategy: starting with low-stakes tasks to build trust and gradually transitioning to more consequential operations. Such cases underscore the vulnerability of individuals in precarious situations to exploitation by foreign intelligence agencies.
Broader European Operations
Russia’s use of freelance agents extends far beyond Ukraine and Poland. In Latvia, a Russian-recruited individual was tasked with attacking the Museum of the Occupation of Latvia using a Molotov cocktail. The act was designed to stoke political tensions and provoke fear. Similarly, in France, Moldovan nationals were recruited via TikTok to vandalise buildings in Paris with Stars of David, aiming to incite societal unrest.
Maritime operations have also become a focus of Russian hybrid activities. Belgian authorities reported a marked increase in suspicious activity by Russian-linked vessels in the North Sea in 2024. Civilian and commercial ships are now reportedly being used to monitor and potentially sabotage critical underwater infrastructure, such as power and communication cables.
One high-profile incident involved the Russian ship Eagle S, which allegedly damaged undersea power cables between Finland and Estonia on Christmas Day. Finnish investigators discovered espionage equipment aboard the vessel, adding weight to suspicions of deliberate sabotage. In another instance, the same ship loitered near Dutch telecommunications cables, raising further alarms.
Ambiguity as a Strategic Advantage
A key feature of Russia’s hybrid warfare is its deliberate reliance on ambiguity. By using freelance agents and anonymous platforms like Telegram, Russia ensures its activities are difficult to attribute directly to the state. This strategy of “plausible deniability” creates uncertainty, complicating the ability of NATO and other Western entities to respond decisively.
The deliberate ambiguity of these actions serves multiple purposes. Firstly, it sows doubt and panic within target nations, eroding public confidence in national security. Secondly, it exploits the risk of overreaction by Western states, which can play into Russia’s hands by amplifying perceptions of its omnipresence and capability.
Parallels with Other State Actors
The report also notes that Russia is not the only country employing hybrid warfare tactics. China, for example, uses similar methods to achieve its geopolitical objectives, including cyber operations and influence campaigns. The overlap in strategies employed by state and non-state actors further complicates the security landscape, requiring coordinated international efforts to address these evolving threats.
The Growing Threat to Europe
Belgium’s State Security Service warns that Russia’s hybrid warfare tactics, including the recruitment of freelance agents, pose a significant and growing threat to European security. The use of gig-like recruitment platforms, combined with advanced cyber capabilities and maritime operations, represents a multifaceted challenge that is difficult to counter using traditional security measures.
This hybrid approach also blurs the line between state and non-state actors, creating additional hurdles for intelligence agencies attempting to trace and disrupt these operations. Furthermore, the recruitment of individuals with no prior connections to Russian intelligence reduces the risk for Moscow while increasing the difficulty of detection.
Russia’s use of freelance agents in hybrid warfare is not a new phenomenon but an evolution of long-established strategies. From coordinating sabotage efforts via Telegram in Ukraine and Poland to maritime espionage in the North Sea, these tactics reflect the Kremlin’s ability to adapt and innovate in response to changing circumstances.
Addressing these threats will require a robust, coordinated response from Western nations, including enhanced intelligence sharing, stricter oversight of online platforms, and public awareness campaigns to prevent individuals from unwittingly becoming tools of foreign intelligence. As Russia continues to exploit the vulnerabilities of open societies, vigilance and collaboration will be key to countering its hybrid warfare strategies.
This Article Was Published Originally By EU Global News & Is Re-published Here With Their Kind Permission.
