The EU’s Migration and Asylum Pact, adopted in May 2024, introduces a mandatory “solidarity” system to share responsibility for asylum seekers.
At its core is an annual solidarity pool with a target of at least 30,000 relocations across the Union and the option for member states to make financial or operational contributions instead. Those declining to take part in relocations are expected to pay €20,000 per person not accepted or provide equivalent support in staff, equipment or logistics.
A central question is whether a member state can be excused entirely from these obligations. The Commission’s public guidance indicates that EU law does not provide for a blanket exemption. Rather, it allows partial or, in some cases, full deductions from a country’s pledged solidarity contribution where it is judged to be “under migratory pressure”. Such relief can take the form of fewer relocations, reduced financial contributions or alternative in-kind measures. The scope and duration of any deduction depend on an assessment of each member state’s situation.
The developing test case is Poland. Warsaw argues that the intake of refugees from Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine places it in a distinct category and warrants relief under the pact. Prime Minister Donald Tusk has repeatedly said Poland will not participate in relocations. Polish outlets and officials have suggested that exemptions from relocation and parts of the financial obligation are in prospect, though the Commission has not confirmed this. Reporting in recent days has highlighted Poland’s position and the Commission’s acknowledgement that Poland’s support for Ukrainians is a factor in its assessment.
Other member states most frequently cited in discussions of possible relief are those facing sustained arrivals at external borders, including Greece, Spain and Italy. The pact was designed to couple mandatory solidarity with flexibility, expressly allowing states to choose between relocation, financial payments, and operational support. Any deductions for countries under pressure would sit within that framework rather than outside it. There is, at present, no official list of countries designated for relief or exemption.
The institutional picture has also shifted. In the new College, Magnus Brunner holds the Home Affairs and Migration portfolio. Commission material and think-tank coverage from mid-2025 show Brunner laying out a “firm but fair” roadmap for implementation, including the solidarity pool mechanics. That pool is expected to combine a minimum of 30,000 relocations with at least €600 million in financial contributions each year. These parameters reinforce that deductions would be calibrated within an overall EU-wide target rather than negating obligations altogether.
Timing is sensitive. The Commission had been expected this week to outline which member states are under migratory pressure and to set next year’s solidarity pool. That presentation has been delayed. A Commission spokesperson has indicated a new publication date will be announced in due course. The pause leaves national claims—such as Poland’s—unverified by an EU decision and prolongs uncertainty over the scale and distribution of solidarity contributions for 2026.
There are political cross-currents. Some Polish figures in the European Parliament have argued that “systemic exclusion” of Poland from the pact is not possible, and Commission messaging earlier in 2025 underlined that the pact is binding on all member states, with enforcement available if implementation is undermined. Against that, Commission briefings have acknowledged Poland’s exceptional efforts in hosting Ukrainians and said this would be taken fully into account in solidarity calculations. The balance between recognition of pressure and the need to preserve a uniform legal regime is therefore likely to shape any decision.
In practical terms, what could relief look like? If a state is formally recognised as under migratory pressure, it could face a lower relocation figure, a reduced or waived financial payment for non-relocation, or a shift towards in-kind operational support. Procedural obligations—such as screening at borders—are more tightly set in law and are less likely to be waived. Any relief would be time-limited and reviewable. The Commission will also be wary of precedent: granting extensive deductions to one state may lead others to seek similar treatment, potentially triggering legal or political challenges if interpretations diverge. For now, the legal position is clear: full opt-outs are not foreseen; calibrated deductions are. The policy position—who benefits, by how much, and for how long—awaits the Commission’s delayed assessment.
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