Following EU Today’s recent article on Russia-linked aviation supply chains and possible sanctions circumvention, the outlet gave an interview to the Ukrainian publication Podrobnosti about the investigation, the pressure that followed publication, and the wider risks faced by journalists reporting on sanctions-sensitive material.
Originally published in Ukrainian, the interview is reproduced below in English.
Gary Cartwright, Editor of EU Today, discusses the outlet’s sanctions reporting, the pressure that followed its investigation into Russia-linked aviation supply chains, and why journalists, researchers and civil-society actors need stronger protection when examining possible sanctions evasion.
Gathering evidence on sanctions evasion is not a quiet or risk-free exercise. Before governments act, journalists, researchers, experts and civil-society organisations often examine the material that brings hidden networks into public view: contracts, invoices, customs records, corporate filings, freight documents, aviation paperwork and procurement trails.
Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, sanctions have become one of the European Union’s main tools for responding to Moscow’s aggression against Ukraine. After the full-scale invasion in 2022, the sanctions regime expanded sharply, covering finance, energy, transport, dual-use goods, aviation, shipping, technology and military-industrial supply chains. Yet sanctions are only as effective as their enforcement. Russia has repeatedly shown that it can reconfigure supply routes through third countries, free zones, brokers, logistics firms, banks and corporate intermediaries.
EU Today has covered sanctions since 2014. The outlet maintains a dedicated Sanctions section and has published extensively on Russia’s shadow fleet, Western components found in Russian weapons, and networks that may allow restricted goods and services to continue reaching Russia. Its White Paper on Russia’s shadow fleet has received more than 32,000 views. Gary Cartwright, EU Today’s editor, has also taken part in demonstrations in Brussels calling for the renewal of sanctions against Russia — a process that, before the full-scale invasion, was not always politically assured.
For Cartwright, EU Today is not only a news website. It is also a public-interest campaigning platform, intended to draw the attention of EU institutions, policymakers and readers to subjects that can otherwise remain hidden in technical documentation. The same approach informed EU Today’s earlier advocacy on Ukraine, including its Holodomor petition to the British Parliament.
In May 2026, EU Today published an article on one of the less visible areas of sanctions enforcement: Russian aviation supply chains. After 2022, Russia failed to return many Western-owned aircraft leased from foreign companies. Those Boeing and Airbus aircraft continue to fly inside Russia and beyond, despite restrictions on spare parts, maintenance, insurance, certification and technical services. Their continued operation raises a central question: how are parts, repairs, documentation and services still reaching Russian aviation entities?
EU Today says its article was based on a substantial review of documents, including contracts, invoices, purchase orders, licensing material and freight records. The article named several companies, while making clear that the documents did not by themselves prove unlawful conduct, sanctions breaches or criminal wrongdoing by every named party.
The reaction was immediate. According to EU Today, legal demands and private messages began arriving within minutes of publication, even though the article appeared on a Sunday — and on International Press Freedom Day. Some communications came through official editorial channels; others were sent to private contact details, including mobile and WhatsApp.
We spoke with Gary Cartwright, Editor of EU Today, about sanctions journalism, pressure on media outlets, Russia’s shadow aviation networks, and why European institutions should take more seriously the protection of journalists, experts and researchers who investigate sanctions evasion.
What can you tell us about the pressure on EU Today after the article was published? Why were journalists targeted over potential sanctions issues when journalists do not impose sanctions?
Gary Cartwright:
That is the central misunderstanding — or perhaps the central tactic. Journalists do not impose sanctions. We do not freeze assets, we do not blacklist companies, and we do not decide whether a transaction is lawful or unlawful. Those are matters for governments, regulators, courts and sanctions authorities.
What journalists do is different, but still important. We examine documents. We identify patterns. We ask whether the official sanctions architecture is working in the real world. That is not an act of prosecution. It is an act of public-interest reporting.
In this case, the response was almost immediate. Messages and legal demands began arriving within minutes of publication. This was on a Sunday and, with some irony, on International Press Freedom Day. Some correspondence came through proper editorial channels, but some came through private contacts, including mobile and WhatsApp.
Companies have a right to challenge inaccurate reporting. They have a right of reply. They are entitled to defend their reputation. But there is a difference between saying, “this fact is wrong and here is the evidence”, and attempting to overwhelm a publisher with demands, threats, private messages and requests for source material. The first is legitimate. The second can become pressure.
Why do you think some foreign companies react so aggressively to European journalists reporting on sanctions?
Gary Cartwright:
Because sanctions reporting can have consequences beyond the article itself. If a company’s name appears in documentation involving Russian aviation entities after February 2022, the concern for that company may not be only reputational. It may affect banks, insurers, suppliers, aviation counterparties, regulators and compliance departments.
That is why some actors treat journalism as if it were the first stage of an enforcement process. They know that once information is public, it can be read by regulators, sanctions authorities, financial institutions and governments. They also know that journalists often see fragments of a network before institutions assemble the full picture.
So, in some cases, the objective is not simply to correct a sentence. It is to stop the trail being followed.
That is why it is so important to distinguish between a lawful complaint and an attempt to deter scrutiny. A serious company should be able to say: here is the document you cited, here is why it is wrong, here is the verified original, here is the correction we request. That is normal. What is not normal is trying to make the journalist responsible for the consequences of the company’s own appearance in sanctions-sensitive documentation.
EU Today has covered sanctions since 2014. How did this become such an important subject for you?
Gary Cartwright:
Sanctions became central after Crimea, long before they became fashionable as a policy topic. In 2014, there was still a great deal of hesitation in Europe. Many people wanted the Russia problem to remain manageable, commercial and reversible. It was easier to say that Crimea was an anomaly than to recognise it as the beginning of a long war against the European security order.
I took part in demonstrations in Brussels calling on the European Commission and EU institutions to maintain sanctions and renew them every six months. Before 2022, that renewal was not politically self-evident. There were always voices arguing for business as usual, or for a softer line.
EU Today covered sanctions because they were one of the few tools Europe had, and because their renewal depended partly on public awareness. A sanctions regime cannot survive if the public does not understand why it exists.
Over time, the story changed. At first, the question was: will Europe maintain sanctions? After 2022, the question became: can Europe enforce them? That is now the central issue.
You also describe EU Today as a campaigning platform as well as a news outlet. What does that mean?
Gary Cartwright:
It means that journalism should not be passive when the subject is war, accountability and the security of Europe. EU Today reports news, but we also try to draw attention to matters that institutions may find inconvenient, technical or too slow-moving for daily political debate.
That does not mean abandoning standards. Quite the opposite. If you are dealing with sanctions, war crimes, disinformation or historical justice, precision matters more, not less.
We did this with our work around the Holodomor petition to the British Parliament. We have done it with Russia’s shadow fleet. We have done it with Western components found in Russian weapons. And we have done it with sanctions circumvention.
For me, a campaigning publication is not one that invents conclusions. It is one that refuses to let important evidence disappear into silence.
Your recent article focused on aviation supply chains. Why is aviation such an important sanctions issue?
Gary Cartwright:
Because aviation exposes the gap between sanctions as written and sanctions as enforced.
After the full-scale invasion, Russia failed to return many aircraft leased from Western companies. These were Boeing and Airbus aircraft owned by foreign leasing firms. Russia effectively kept them and continued to fly them. But a modern aircraft is not a car that can be kept running indefinitely with improvised parts. It needs certified components, maintenance, documentation, software, technical support and specialist services.
If those aircraft are still flying, one has to ask: how? Where are the parts coming from? Who is repairing components? Who is handling freight? Which companies are acting as intermediaries? Which banks are processing payments? Which jurisdictions are being used as transit points?
Those questions matter because civil aviation is not isolated from the Russian state. Aircraft, airports, maintenance systems and logistics networks exist inside a wartime economy. The continued operation of Russian aviation therefore raises legitimate enforcement questions.
How does Russia keep these supply chains functioning despite sanctions?
Gary Cartwright:
Russia is extremely skilled at adaptation. It rarely relies on a single route. If one door closes, it looks for three side doors.
It uses third countries, free zones, intermediaries, freight forwarders, brokers, shell structures and companies that may claim to be one step removed from the final end-user. It also benefits from the fact that many components are small, high-value and technically complex. A shipment of aircraft parts may not look politically dramatic. It may appear as a line item in a purchase order, a freight invoice, or an air waybill.
That is why document-based journalism is important. You often do not see the pattern in one document. You see it in repetition: the same Russian entities, the same part numbers, the same routes, the same intermediaries, the same banks, the same logistics references.
Sanctions evasion is not always cinematic. It is often administrative.
What kind of material did EU Today review before publication?
Gary Cartwright:
We reviewed contracts, invoices, purchase orders, licensing documents, freight records and related material. These were not vague claims presented in isolation. The article was based on a substantial review of documentation.
But it was also written with caution. We did not say that every named company had breached sanctions. We did not say that every transaction was unlawful. We did not say that every person named had been found guilty by a court or listed by a sanctions authority.
The point of the article was narrower and, I think, stronger: Russian aviation-linked entities continued to appear in commercial paperwork after February 2022, involving companies and intermediaries outside Russia. That raises compliance questions. It should be examined. That is a legitimate subject for journalism.
One company has now disputed the authenticity of some documents. How should journalists respond to such disputes?
Gary Cartwright:
A document dispute must be taken seriously. But it must also be specific.
If a company says, “the documents are fake”, that is not the end of the matter. Which document? Which page? Which invoice number? Which contract? Which signature? Which air waybill? What precisely is false? What is the authoritative record that disproves it?
There is a great difference between a forensic challenge to one page in a compiled dossier and proof that every invoice, purchase order or freight record is false. A genuine document can be digitally generated. A real invoice can be produced from a template. A PDF can contain embedded images without being forged. Technical analysis is useful, but it has to be interpreted carefully.
Our responsibility is to review the claim, preserve the material, amend where appropriate, and seek specificity. But we will not disclose confidential sources or internal editorial material simply because a company demands it.
What happened with the private messages and WhatsApp contact?
Gary Cartwright:
There were calls, emails and WhatsApp messages. Some were sent through official EU Today channels, others through private contacts.
I do not want to dramatise the personal aspect. The more important point is structural. When a small independent outlet receives pressure through multiple channels, it creates a burden. It consumes time, creates anxiety, and can make editors question whether reporting on a subject is worth the cost.
That is the chilling effect. It rarely announces itself openly. It appears as legal letters, private messages, reputational pressure, threats of escalation, and demands for material that journalists are professionally obliged to protect.
Another publication reportedly published an apology after pressure. What does that say about the wider media environment?
Gary Cartwright:
It shows how exposed smaller publishers are. A major newspaper has lawyers, insurance, institutional backing and financial depth. Smaller outlets often operate with far fewer resources. If they receive aggressive legal correspondence, the rational decision may be to remove material simply to avoid ruinous cost.
That does not mean the material was wrong. It may mean the outlet was under pressure.
This is one of the weaknesses in the public-interest information ecosystem. Sanctions evasion is often uncovered by smaller media, NGOs, investigators and researchers. Yet they are the least equipped to withstand legal and commercial pressure from well-funded actors.
If Europe wants sanctions enforcement to work, it has to understand this vulnerability.
There have also been claims that some publications were offered inducements to remove articles or publish apologies. What can you say about that?
Gary Cartwright:
I would be very careful. I can speak only about what EU Today has experienced directly and what we can document. In our case, the pressure came through legal demands and private communications.
If there are claims of inducements elsewhere, those should be documented and investigated separately. Such conduct, if proven, would be extremely serious. But I will not make allegations without evidence.
That is also part of responsible journalism. We must not behave like those who accuse us. We have to be precise.
EU Today has also reported on Western components found in Russian weapons. How does that connect with the aviation issue?
Gary Cartwright:
It is the same problem viewed through a different lens.
We recently covered reports that Russian missiles used in attacks on Kyiv contained more than 100 Western components. That is a shocking fact, but it is also a technical one. It tells us that export controls and sanctions are being bypassed somewhere in the chain.
The aviation story is similar. The shadow fleet is similar. Russia needs oil revenues, aircraft parts, machine tools, microelectronics, financial services and logistics. If it cannot obtain them directly, it will seek them indirectly.
The common question is: where does the Western-controlled item enter the chain, where is it diverted, who handles it, who pays, and who looks away?
That is the real sanctions story.
The discussion around this case has referred to S7 and its wider role in Russia’s aviation system. How should journalists handle such claims?
Gary Cartwright:
With care and attribution. If an entity is sanctioned, we can report the official designation and the reasons given by the authority. If credible sources report military or state-related functions, those claims must be attributed and checked.
But there is a broader point: Russian aviation does not exist outside the war economy. Airlines, maintenance companies, airports and logistics networks all operate within the Russian state environment. That does not mean every aviation transaction is military. It does mean that aviation supply chains involving Russian operators after 2022 deserve scrutiny.
Precision is essential. Journalism should not overstate. But it should not look away because a subject is technically complicated or legally uncomfortable.
Why do you think companies sometimes blame journalists rather than regulators or sanctions authorities?
Gary Cartwright:
Because the journalist is the visible target. Regulators may be slow, opaque or difficult to influence. A journalist can be pressured quickly.
There is also a strategic element. If a company can discredit the reporting, force a correction, obtain an apology, or make the documents appear unreliable, it can use that later with banks, counterparties or regulators. The media response becomes part of the compliance narrative.
That is why journalists must be very careful about unnecessary concessions. If something is wrong, correct it. But do not apologise for asking legitimate questions. Do not concede that reporting is improper simply because it is uncomfortable.
What should EU institutions do to protect journalists, experts and NGOs working on sanctions enforcement?
Gary Cartwright:
First, there should be secure and credible channels for submitting evidence to competent authorities. Journalists and NGOs often see information before institutions do, but they need a way to pass material without exposing sources.
Second, anti-SLAPP and media freedom protections must take account of foreign pressure. The pressure does not always come from an EU politician or domestic oligarch. It may come from a foreign company, a law firm, a private intermediary, or an actor whose interests are aligned with a hostile state’s ability to evade restrictions.
Third, EU institutions should recognise that sanctions enforcement is not only a customs or banking issue. It is also an information issue. If journalists and researchers are silenced, the enforcement system loses visibility.
The European Democracy Shield is intended to protect democratic resilience. Is it sufficient?
Gary Cartwright:
It is a useful concept, but it must reflect the real methods used to pressure media. Threats to democratic resilience do not always look like propaganda broadcasts or election interference. Sometimes they look like legal letters, private intimidation, commercial pressure, demands for source disclosure, reputational attacks and attempts to force small outlets to remove inconvenient reporting.
If foreign-based actors can use money, legal threats or private pressure to suppress sanctions reporting inside the EU, that is a democracy issue. It affects the public’s right to know whether sanctions are being undermined.
European democracy is not defended only by protecting elections. It is also defended by protecting the people who expose how hostile states and their enablers operate.
What is your message to companies named in sanctions-related reporting?
Gary Cartwright:
My message is simple: respond with evidence.
If we have made a factual error, identify it. If a document is not authentic, explain precisely why. If there is a legitimate correction, send it. If you want a right of reply, we will consider it.
But do not confuse scrutiny with persecution. Do not treat journalists as sanctions authorities. Do not demand confidential sources. Do not assume that pressure will make the public-interest question disappear.
If a company has nothing to hide, it should welcome precision. It should not fear questions.
What is the wider lesson from this case?
Gary Cartwright:
The wider lesson is that sanctions are not enforced only in Council decisions or Treasury notices. They are enforced — or evaded — in the daily paperwork of trade: invoices, contracts, airway bills, insurance documents, bank transfers, customs entries and corporate records.
Russia’s war economy survives by adaptation. It studies the rules, finds the gaps, and builds routes around them. Those routes are not always obvious. They often appear first as fragments.
A journalist may see one invoice. An NGO may see a shipping pattern. A customs officer may see a suspicious end-user. A bank may see a payment route. A regulator may later see the whole network.
That is why attempts to intimidate sanctions reporters should concern European institutions. The issue is not one article, one publication or one company. The issue is whether Europe is prepared to protect the people who make hidden enforcement failures visible.
