August 1991

Today marks the 33rd anniversary of one of the most consequential events in modern Russian history—the failed 1991 coup attempt by the State Committee on the State of Emergency (GKChP).

From 19 to 22 August 1991, hardline Soviet officials launched a desperate bid to preserve the crumbling Soviet Union by overthrowing President Mikhail Gorbachev and halting the democratic reforms that threatened their power. Though the coup collapsed within days, it catalysed the disintegration of the Soviet Union, shifting the course of history for Russia and its former republics.

As we reflect on this anniversary, parallels between the 1991 coup and modern Russia under Vladimir Putin are hard to ignore. Thirty-three years after the GKChP’s attempt to restore Soviet authoritarianism, today’s Russia is engaged in a similar struggle—though under very different circumstances—to reassert its influence over former Soviet territories. The echoes of empire and the contest over regional dominance continue to resonate.

The 1991 Coup and Its Aftermath

The GKChP coup attempt was a reactionary move by conservative Soviet leaders who feared that Gorbachev’s reforms, particularly perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness), were dismantling the Soviet state. By August 1991, the Soviet Union was nearing collapse. The Baltic republics had already declared their independence, and nationalist movements across other republics were gaining momentum. The economy was in crisis, and public dissatisfaction with the government was widespread.

On 19 August 1991, while Gorbachev was on holiday in Crimea, the coup plotters placed him under house arrest and declared a state of emergency across the Soviet Union. They announced that Gorbachev was unable to govern due to illness and attempted to seize control of the state. Tanks rolled into Moscow, and troops occupied key buildings in an effort to restore order.

However, the coup was met with strong resistance, most notably from Boris Yeltsin, the president of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR). Yeltsin famously stood atop a tank outside the Russian White House, rallying the public and military forces to oppose the coup. Thousands of citizens took to the streets in support of Yeltsin, and several military commanders defied orders to back the coup. By 22 August, the plot had collapsed, Gorbachev was freed, and the coup leaders were arrested.

Although the coup failed, it delivered a fatal blow to the Soviet Union. Over the following months, the Communist Party’s power rapidly eroded, and the momentum for independence within the republics grew stronger. By December 1991, the Soviet Union was formally dissolved, and Gorbachev resigned as its last leader.

Parallels with Today’s Russia

Three decades later, the legacy of the GKChP coup still looms large in Russian politics. Though the Soviet Union no longer exists, many of the underlying impulses that motivated the coup plotters—anxiety over the loss of empire, a desire for centralised control, and a suspicion of Western influence—remain relevant in today’s Russia.

Vladimir Putin, who described the collapse of the Soviet Union as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century,” has sought to reassert Russia’s power in the post-Soviet space. His administration has pursued a strategy of restoring Russian influence over former Soviet republics, primarily through military interventions and support for separatist movements. The annexation of Crimea in 2014, the ongoing war in Ukraine, and Russia’s actions in Georgia and Moldova all point to a renewed drive to rebuild a sphere of influence that mirrors the old Soviet empire.

This strategy bears a striking resemblance to the objectives of the GKChP. While the methods have changed, the desire to reverse the geopolitical shifts that followed the Soviet collapse is clear. Putin’s Russia, like the GKChP in 1991, seeks to preserve a sense of historical continuity and prevent what it sees as the fragmentation of Russian power.

The Use of Force: Then and Now

One of the most direct parallels between the 1991 coup and modern Russian actions is the use of military force to maintain or restore control. During the coup, tanks and troops were deployed in Moscow in a bid to intimidate the opposition and reassert authority over the country. Although this show of force failed to achieve its objective, it underscored the willingness of the Soviet old guard to use military means to preserve the state.

Similarly, today’s Russia has repeatedly resorted to military intervention as a means of asserting control over former Soviet territories. The annexation of Crimea and the subsequent war in Eastern Ukraine were justified by the Kremlin as necessary measures to protect ethnic Russians and preserve Russian influence in the region. These actions, much like the GKChP’s attempt to reassert control through force, reflect an enduring belief in the efficacy of military power as a tool of statecraft.

Nationalism and the Fear of Fragmentation

Nationalism and the fear of territorial fragmentation are other common threads between the events of 1991 and Russia’s contemporary foreign policy. The coup plotters in 1991 were motivated by a fear that the nationalist movements sweeping across the Soviet republics would break apart the union and diminish Moscow’s authority. This fear of fragmentation drove them to attempt to reverse Gorbachev’s reforms and restore the centralised Soviet state.

In a similar vein, Putin’s administration has been characterised by a deep concern over the independence movements and Western orientation of former Soviet republics. The Ukrainian revolution in 2014, which ousted a pro-Russian government and pivoted toward the European Union and NATO, was seen by the Kremlin as a direct threat to Russia’s sphere of influence. In response, Russia annexed Crimea and backed separatist forces in Eastern Ukraine, seeking to prevent further fragmentation of its geopolitical hold.

Opposition to Western Influence

Both the GKChP coup and today’s Russian government share a common opposition to Western influence in the former Soviet space. In 1991, the coup plotters saw Gorbachev’s reforms as opening the Soviet Union to Western-style democracy and economic liberalism, which they feared would undermine the Soviet system. Today, Putin’s Russia views the expansion of NATO and the European Union into former Soviet territories as a direct threat to its security and influence.

This opposition to Western influence has led to a reactionary stance in both eras. Just as the coup plotters sought to roll back Gorbachev’s reforms and preserve the Soviet system, modern Russia seeks to prevent former Soviet republics from fully integrating into Western institutions. This has resulted in a series of confrontations with the West, from the war in Ukraine to ongoing tensions with NATO and the European Union.

On this 33rd anniversary of the GKChP coup, the echoes of 1991 continue to reverberate through Russia’s foreign and domestic policies. The coup, though a failure, marked the final gasp of a Soviet leadership desperate to preserve its empire. Today, under Vladimir Putin, Russia is engaged in a similar effort—though with more sophisticated methods—to restore its influence and resist the forces of fragmentation that the coup plotters feared.

As history often demonstrates, the past remains a powerful force in shaping the present. Just as the collapse of the Soviet Union marked the end of one empire, Russia’s current actions suggest an ongoing struggle to reclaim its place as a dominant power in the region. The lessons of 1991, 33 years later, continue to inform the geopolitics of today.