For all the posturing, declarations and strategic autonomy seminars in Brussels, one figure continues to haunt European defence ambitions: 2 per cent.
That is the current NATO guideline for defence spending as a share of GDP, and for most European Union member states, it remains as elusive as ever.
Despite the war raging on Europe’s doorstep and the repeated admonishments from Washington, a majority of EU countries are still falling short of this basic benchmark. Meanwhile, the same governments continue to float grandiose visions of a “European Defence Union”—a fantasy that looks increasingly like a fig leaf for political evasion.
When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, the message seemed to land: Europe was vulnerable, and it had to rearm. Germany’s then Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced a Zeitenwende—a turning point in defence policy—and pledged €100 billion for the Bundeswehr. France called for “strategic autonomy.” Eastern Europeans sounded the alarm with renewed urgency. NATO was back.
Yet three years on, the results are mixed at best.
According to NATO’s latest data, only 11 of the alliance’s 32 members are meeting the 2 per cent target—and most of them are in Eastern Europe. Poland, the Baltic States, Romania, and Finland have all surged their defence spending. Poland, in particular, now spends more than 4 per cent of GDP on its military, with an eye firmly fixed on Russian revanchism.
But among the wealthier Western European countries, complacency and inertia remain the default. Germany still struggles to allocate its special fund, let alone reform its procurement processes. France, while more muscular in doctrine, has only just crossed the 2 per cent threshold. Italy, Spain, and Belgium linger below it, distracted by domestic squabbles and political paralysis.
And what of the European Union as a bloc? The EU’s push for common defence initiatives has produced endless working groups, but precious few battalions. The much-vaunted European Defence Fund has delivered studies, frameworks, and pilot projects—but not readiness, not deterrence.
Brussels continues to dream of a “European pillar” within NATO, one that supposedly complements American strength with continental resolve. In reality, it is Washington that remains the backbone of European security. The U.S. provides the majority of NATO’s strategic enablers: airlift, ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance), missile defence, and command-and-control. Without it, the European theatre would be paralysed.
The Americans know this. Which is why they’re growing increasingly impatient.
Donald Trump’s return to the White House has only sharpened the mood. His warning that NATO would be “obsolete” without European investment was once dismissed as hyperbole. Now, even moderate Republicans echo the sentiment. Why, they ask, should the U.S. taxpayer subsidise German pacifism or Italian indifference?
In private, Pentagon planners are already drafting scenarios for a reduced U.S. footprint in Europe by the early 2030s—whether by choice or necessity. That leaves Europe with a stark choice: get serious, or get exposed.
Some are trying. Denmark and the Netherlands have announced spending hikes. Sweden, newly joined to NATO, is integrating its formidable air force into alliance structures. Yet these remain the exceptions, not the rule.
The deeper problem lies not just in spending, but in how that spending is used. European defence remains riddled with duplication, national vanity projects, and incompatible systems. The EU’s 27 armies operate 17 different tank models and 29 types of frigates. National industries guard their turf, while joint procurement flounders on bureaucracy and politics.
Even NATO’s own command has expressed concern over Europe’s inability to generate sufficient deployable, combat-ready forces. Paper armies may satisfy statistical reporting—but they do not deter adversaries.
And while Brussels talks up “values-based defence,” the facts are unforgiving. Europe cannot defend itself alone. Until it can, its aspirations to be a global actor will remain hollow.
The time for excuses has passed. The EU must either treat NATO as the indispensable guarantor of peace—and act accordingly—or admit that its strategic autonomy amounts to little more than an academic exercise.
For if Europe will not pay the price to secure its own continent, it cannot expect others to underwrite its security forever.
