Russia’s latest bombardment of Ukraine’s natural gas facilities ahead of winter is likely to affect Europe’s gas balance, as Kyiv prepares to source additional volumes from neighbouring EU states to offset disrupted output.
Naftogaz reported the largest strike on its gas production assets since the full-scale invasion, with sites in Kharkiv and Poltava hit. Ukrainian officials say energy infrastructure has been targeted repeatedly in recent days.
Naftogaz and government statements indicate earlier attacks this year cut domestic gas output by roughly 40%, a figure reiterated in recent briefings and market reporting. The latest strikes therefore raise the prospect of a renewed production shortfall into the heating season.
The timing is sensitive. Ukraine is refilling underground storage while coping with intermittent power constraints. It operates Europe’s largest storage system (31 bcm capacity). EU storage indicators show the region entering October at about 83% full, below last year’s level.
Ukraine’s gas transit role has also changed. The five-year Russia–Ukraine transit agreement expired on 1 January 2025, and flows via Ukraine ceased that morning. The end of transit removed a long-standing rationale for sparing parts of Ukraine’s network from attack and altered commercial flows across central Europe.
Kyiv now covers demand with its own production (about 19 bcm in 2024) and imports via interconnectors with Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Authorities have also opened south-north routes to enable deliveries via the Trans-Balkan corridor from Greece and other entry points, including initial deals using that pathway.
Following the latest damage, the Energy Ministry has signalled an intent to increase gas imports by around 30% for winter security. Naftogaz has secured a €300 million EIB loan to support purchases, while reiterating that imported volumes exclude Russian origin gas.
Any extra Ukrainian purchasing will add to European demand at a time when the EU gas market has already been reconfigured. European Commission data show Russian gas imports fell from 150 bcm (45% of EU imports) in 2021 to 52 bcm (19%) in 2024, with policy proposals to phase out remaining Russian gas by 2027.
LNG now provides a substantial cushion. In the first nine months of 2025, Europe’s LNG imports rose by about 27% to roughly 108 bcm, with U.S. cargoes accounting for approximately 63%, according to industry analysis cited by Reuters. Analysts also expect a larger call on LNG this winter given lower storage levels and reduced pipeline inflows.
Price signals reflect a more comfortable balance than in 2022. The Dutch TTF benchmark has been trading close to the low-€30s per megawatt hour in recent sessions, far below the 2022 peak above €300/MWh. Nevertheless, additional spot demand—whether weather-driven or linked to Ukrainian imports—can lift prompt prices and volatility.
Weather remains the main uncertainty. A mild winter would ease withdrawals and enable Europe to accommodate Ukrainian needs without significant market stress. A colder scenario would tighten the balance and increase the call on flexible LNG, with storage trajectories already lower than last year’s.
Infrastructure and policy factors will also be in focus. Continued strikes on Ukrainian upstream and grid assets could complicate domestic transmission and storage drawdown, while the EU’s expanded regasification capacity and interconnectors provide redundancy compared with 2022. Ongoing measures under REPowerEU and related proposals to limit remaining Russian gas exposures will shape procurement and flow patterns across the bloc.
In summary, intensified Russian attacks on Ukraine’s gas system increase Kyiv’s import requirement and tighten the European balance at the margin. The region’s enlarged LNG cushion and diversified supply mix should moderate price effects under normal winter conditions, but outcomes will depend on the persistence of infrastructure damage, weather, and the continuity of global LNG supply.
