The European Union’s next phase of euro enlargement remains stalled after the European Commission found that Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Sweden are still not ready to adopt the single currency.
The Commission’s 2026 Convergence Report, published on 24 June, assessed the five EU member states that remain legally committed to joining the euro area but have not yet done so. Denmark, which also remains outside the eurozone, is not covered by the assessment because it has a formal opt-out.
The result points to a continuing gap between EU treaty obligations and national political choices. Under EU rules, all member states except Denmark are expected to join the euro once they meet the conditions. In practice, several countries have remained outside the single currency for years, either because they do not satisfy the economic criteria or because their governments have avoided the procedural steps required to move towards membership.
The euro is now used by 21 of the EU’s 27 member states. Bulgaria became the latest country to join the euro area at the start of 2026, following Croatia’s entry in 2023. That left five legally committed countries outside the currency union: Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Sweden.
The Commission assessment examines whether those countries meet the so-called convergence criteria. These include price stability, sound public finances, exchange-rate stability, long-term interest-rate convergence and legal compatibility between national central-bank legislation and the requirements of the European System of Central Banks. The Commission’s general explanation of the convergence-report process makes clear that the assessment must be carried out at least every two years.
The 2026 findings show little immediate prospect of another eurozone enlargement. None of the five assessed countries meets all the required conditions. In some cases, the obstacle is mainly economic. In others, it is also political and legal.
Romania continues to fall short on several economic indicators, including inflation and public-finance requirements, although its debt position is comparatively less problematic. Hungary also remains outside the required parameters, despite the fact that support for adopting the euro appears stronger there than in several other non-euro countries. Poland meets the debt criterion but has made no clear political move towards euro entry.
Sweden and Czechia are different cases. Both meet several of the relevant conditions, but neither participates in the Exchange Rate Mechanism II, the pre-accession currency-stability framework that a country must join before adopting the euro. Their central-bank laws also remain out of line with euro-accession requirements. This means that even where economic convergence is closer, the institutional steps required for entry have not been taken.
The European Central Bank also published its own convergence assessment on 24 June. Its conclusions reinforced the Commission’s finding that little progress has been made by the remaining euro outsiders. The ECB pointed to fiscal deterioration, inflation pressures, exchange-rate volatility and legal shortcomings as barriers to membership.
The political implications are larger than the technical criteria suggest. Euro adoption is not simply a monetary change. It transfers a country’s interest-rate policy to the ECB, removes the national currency as an adjustment tool and places the state more deeply inside the EU’s economic-governance framework. For governments that want to preserve domestic monetary flexibility, delay can be preferable to entry.
That is particularly relevant in Central Europe. Poland and Czechia have long maintained political caution over euro adoption, despite their treaty obligations. In Sweden, public and political reluctance has remained a barrier since the country rejected euro membership in a 2003 referendum. Hungary presents a different case: the question has become tied to wider arguments over the country’s relationship with the EU and its economic direction.
The Commission report therefore does not merely record technical non-compliance. It shows that euro enlargement is now a slow and politically managed process. The legal obligation remains, but there is no automatic timetable. A country can stay outside the euro area for a long period if it does not enter ERM II or align its legislation with eurozone rules.
For Brussels, this creates an awkward institutional position. The euro is a central element of EU integration, and the treaties envisage eventual membership for all non-opt-out states. Yet the EU has limited practical means to force reluctant countries to move quickly. As long as governments avoid the necessary preparatory steps, accession remains distant.
The economic context also complicates the picture. The eurozone itself has faced inflation shocks, interest-rate pressures and political disagreements over fiscal discipline in recent years. For some non-euro governments, those pressures provide an argument for caution. For others, euro membership may still offer long-term advantages, including lower currency risk, deeper financial integration and a stronger place inside the EU’s economic core.
The 2026 convergence assessment confirms that Bulgaria’s accession has not triggered a wider wave of euro enlargement. Instead, the EU is left with a smaller but more politically difficult group of holdouts. The formal direction remains unchanged: Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Sweden are still expected to join the euro one day. The practical message from Brussels is different. None is ready now, and several appear in no hurry to get there.
