“Mindichgate” and the dismissal of Andriy Yermak have created a unique historical chance for a deep cleansing. But it is impossible without the participation of our partners.
Perhaps the authorities will want to quickly pretend that the problems have already been solved and everything is fine now. But this is definitely not enough for Ukrainian citizens.
“Mindichgate” revealed that corruption and shady schemes in the energy, defence and financial sectors are still rampant. Offshore companies, “Cyprus intermediaries”, arrangements and money laundering are still our reality, just as they were in the days of Leonid Kuchma.
To avoid giving the impression that Yermak and ten people from his entourage were the only evil, we will tell you a story. It is about those who have been plundering Ukraine for years and are now successfully hiding from justice under the noses of the US and EU.
The Cyprus incident
On Saturday, 22 November 2025, when all of Ukraine was vigorously discussing Trump’s peace plan, unknown persons tried to kidnap a 51-year-old man in Cyprus. The kidnapping victim turned out to be Volodymyr Demchyshyn, who held the post of the Minister for Energy of Ukraine 10 years ago.
It turned out that Volodymyr Demchyshyn was a permanent resident of Cyprus and was engaged in the land use business. Athos Kotsonis, 42, a resident of Larnaca, and Dmitry Abramov, 44, a Russian citizen, were wanted in connection with the attempted kidnapping. The attackers were detained, and one of them turned out to be a Russian citizen, which demonstrates the victim’s connections with the Russian Federation.
We do not know the reasons for the attack. It is unclear what kind of land management Demchyshyn was involved in in Cyprus. It is quite possible that he provided money laundering for Russian clients. It can’t be ruled out that the former minister even continues to cooperate with ICU and their clients. This is quite possible, given Demchyshyn’s previous history.
The first fact is that in 2021, Demchyshyn was allowed to flee abroad. Today, one of the key investigations of the last ten years is falling apart without him. Demchyshyn is a defendant in the so-called “coal case”, in which former President Petro Poroshenko is being tried right now.
According to the investigation, in 2014 Poroshenko organised a scheme to supply coal from the Russian-occupied territories. First, he blocked more profitable coal supplies from South Africa, and then spent billions on buying “bloody” coal from the occupied Donbas. Demchyshyn was an accomplice in this scheme. As Minister for Energy, he signed documents. On his orders, Ukraine not only imported coal from the occupied territories, but also paid for it. In fact, Ukrainian budget money was used to sponsor separatism in the Donbas and the war against Ukraine.
The scheme was not just criminal, it clearly contradicted official statements by Poroshenko, who had fiercely criticised the Kremlin for occupying Crimea and parts of the Donbas. It was not just corruption; investigators regard the ‘coal scheme’ as high treason, and it is no coincidence that Poroshenko is under Ukrainian sanctions. One must consider that former French President Nicolas Sarkozy is in prison for much less.
This is how the story ends: Demchyshyn did not testify in court. But he was granted safe haven in Cyprus. It sounds like a success story. For a year or two, one can take part in the schemes, and then take the money and have an honourable retirement in warm countries. It is quite possible that Demchyshyn continued to conduct fraudulent transactions, but this time from Cyprus, which has the status of a favourite offshore jurisdiction of Russian and Ukrainian oligarchs. Moreover, his alma mater, the Investment Capital Ukraine (ICU) group, has its headquarters in Cyprus.
The second telling fact is that Demchyshyn was not just allowed to escape, he was warned well in advance.
When the court seized the former minister’s property in the “coal case”, it was in for a surprise. Demchyshyn no longer had any property. Less than a year before his escape, he managed to re-register everything. Among other things, he sold a 10% stake in ICU Group. In Ukrainian realities, this means that Demchyshyn and ICU were warned several months before the events, and the investigators “did not notice”. This is a very telling fact.
How could this happen? At that time, the president of Ukraine was no longer Petro Poroshenko, but Volodymyr Zelensky. It seemed that he was interested in getting the “coal case” moving, as Poroshenko was his main political opponent. If you are familiar with how post-Soviet law enforcement agencies work, you know: This is impossible. Demchyshyn was definitely under special control. How did he manage to get rid of his property in such circumstances? The only answer to this is that he received the tacit consent of the authorities.
The third fact is that for many years, the Ukrainian investigating authorities pretended not to know where Demchyshyn was. In the register of wanted persons on the website of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, the place of disappearance was unknown, and the country of residence was being “ascertained”.
It turned out that Demchyshyn was in Cyprus, which is part of the EU. It was enough to involve official EU bodies to “identify” an important witness. Cyprus willingly extradites citizens who are suspected of crimes to Ukraine.
What did they do instead? In 2021, Demchyshyn fled abroad. It was only in 2022 that Ukraine put Demchyshyn on the international wanted list – and nothing happened. There is a question begging to be asked: why did they wait until 2022? Why didn’t they look further?
Later, Ukraine requested the extradition of the 51-year-old from the Cypriot authorities. But the Attorney General of Cyprus refused. He stated that an exception to the European Convention on Extradition applied. He did not go into details and did not say whether the exception was due to the potentially political nature of the case or other parameters.
It seems as if the Ukrainian law enforcement agencies first allowed Demchyshyn to keep his property and leave the country, and then “forgot” to find him in Cyprus and request his extradition. And this is despite the huge resonance of the ‘coal case’.
Parallels with Mindichgate
All of the above applies specifically to Demchyshyn. But in himself he is not that interesting. The processes involving the former minister are much more interesting.
There are two aspects to this. The first is the parallels with Mindichgate. The second is the involvement of ICU Group in servicing the government.
It should be remembered that in 2025, Oleksii Chernyshov and Timur Mindich left Ukraine in exactly the same way (on the eve of being served with a suspicion). At various times, the former headed Naftogaz of Ukraine and the Ministry of Strategic Industries, and was also Deputy Prime Minister. The latter was considered to be the shadow curator of schemes at Energoatom, defence procurement and the nationalised Sense Bank.
There is a striking similarity between the scenarios. All these people were building schemes for years, and then left the country without any hindrance.
However, while Mindich and Chernyshov are considered being close to the authorities, Demchyshyn is very far from the current president. Moreover, he is an ideal witness for the “coal case”. Why are the scenarios so similar?
The answer is to be found in the history of the Investment Capital Ukraine (ICU) group. In 2014, Poroshenko appointed Demchyshyn as Minister for Energy. Until then, Demchyshyn was not an employee at ICU, but a junior partner of Makar Paseniuk, Valeriia Gontareva and Kostiantyn Stetsenko. He owned 9.99% of Avangard Bank, 9.99% of ICU Holdings Limited, 9.99% of Westal Holdings Ltd, and stakes in other group companies. Demchyshyn was involved in the distribution of profits and probably in key decision-making. He must have been aware of the company’s biggest deals and knew about the secrets of Yanukovych and Poroshenko. However, he knew how to keep quiet, which is the key virtue of financiers. The ability to keep quiet explains the huge trust in the group.
In particular, Yanukovych’s trust allowed ICU to manage the money of the criminal authorities. Poroshenko’s trust has turned ICU into a “personnel forge” for the former president of Ukraine. Demchyshyn became Minister for Energy. Gontareva became the head of the National Bank. A hired employee, Dmytro Vovk, became the head of the National Commission for Regulation of Electricity and Utilities in Ukraine. Subsequently, all these people were charged with multi-billion dollar violations. Simply put, all of them were involved in the theft of Ukraine; they were Poroshenko’s junior partners.
Of course, Demchyshyn was not the main person in ICU. Makar Paseniuk, Senior Partner at ICU, took a leading position in the former president’s entourage. He was referred to as Poroshenko’s “right-hand man” and “financial shadow”. It was he who, together with Rothschild, was in charge of the “blind trust” to which the former president transferred his assets.
Paseniuk was involved in numerous secret negotiations on the purchase of TV channels and energy companies. He was in charge of issues relating to Poroshenko’s enterprises in Russia. And, according to sources familiar with the matter, ICU also handled the money flow of Poroshenko and his entourage through offshore companies. What is this if not an element of corruption?
In particular, the money legalised through Cyprus and other jurisdictions could be invested in various schemes, such as the scheme with Eurobonds of leading Ukrainian enterprises. They may have even invested in “Yaresko’s warrants”. There are still strong grounds to suspect that ICU is fronting for representatives of the former and/or current Ukrainian authorities who have bought up their own country’s debts. If this is the case, it is pointless to wait for an investigation by the Ukrainian authorities. No one would wish to get a lead pointing to themselves, and they don’t have access to the necessary information.
A much better solution would be a US and/or EU investigation. They have access to protected data, including from offshore jurisdictions. Disclosure of sensitive information would greatly help fight corruption in Ukraine.
What the US and EU could have discovered
Ideally, the investigation should go back to the early 2010s. Initially, ICU provided special services to Poroshenko. It turns out that few people knew more about the affairs of the two former presidents than ICU. But they [ICU] remain immune. The group’s business profile has probably remained the same. ICU continues to specialise in trust operations and investments in international capital markets. In exchange, they enjoy special privileges that can only be granted by the central government of Ukraine.
The immunity is largely evidenced by the scale of money transactions and large-scale connections in the government.
Here are a few episodes that will spark your imagination:
The sanctions imposed on Poroshenko and Russian oligarch Konstantin Grigorishin have not affected ICU in any way. However, the group has worked with all of these people, and continues to work with some of them (probably). In particular, ICU played the role of a nominee holder of a stake in Vinnytsiaoblenergo, the majority of which is held by Grigorishin. It can be assumed that the group holds its 25% either in the interests of Grigorishin or in the interests of Poroshenko. This is equally bad because both are under sanctions. So, ICU would have had trouble with the law. But they have none.
Next, even the history of joint business with the Russian state-owned VTB group has not affected ICU in any way. VTB has been under US and EU sanctions since 2014 and under Ukrainian sanctions since 2015. After the 2022 invasion, sanctions were intensified.
Despite the sanctions, the Ukrainian group continued to run joint projects with VTB even after 2014. For example, they still jointly own Burger King Russia. In 2018, when VTB was already under EU and US sanctions, ICU Group bought an additional stake in Burger King Russia from VTB, increasing its shareholding to 35%. After February 2022, Investment Capital Ukraine announced that it wanted to exit the business, but this has not yet happened.
In 2017, VTB Bank in Ukraine sold the rights to claim on Donetskstal/DMZ loans to ICU. It may well have been a friendly deal. Having bought out debts from VTB and Sberbank (another Russian state-owned megabank), ICU has recovered UAH 2.75 billion through the courts from Donetskstal alone. This is a traditional ICU strategy of buying up distressed debts/NPLs in order to collect much larger amounts debts later (using administrative resources). It is possible that part of the profit went to VTB.
In March 2017, when sanctions were already in place, ICU advised on the sale of the Ukrainian subsidiaries of Sberbank and VTB to potential buyers.
Even after February 2022, ICU could interact with structures close to VTB through the British FPP Asset Management LLP and the joint SPAC project Emerging Markets Horizon Corp.
FPP was also involved in a joint SPAC project with VTB Capital, and among its partners was Kirill Zimarin, the former CEO of RCB Bank, a Cypriot bank that was part of the VTB Group. Today, Zimarin is the owner of the financial company Finstella, which RCB Bank was transformed into due to the sanctions. Just one day before the imposition of anti-Russian sanctions, Zimarin bought VTB’s stake in the bank.
According to our information, ICU Group also had joint operations with Finstella after 2014. Moreover, ICU still holds the accounts of its numerous subsidiaries and related companies there. It is likely that Finstella is one of VTB’s proxies, and its task is to mitigate the effects of sanctions on Russians. In this case, ICU is subject to the consequences of working with sanctioned banks of Russia, the aggressor state. An objective investigation by the US and EU would help clarify this point.
Thus, there are several levels of interaction between ICU and VTB. Even negligent Ukrainian law enforcement officers cannot “overlook” this. We can assume that they were instructed to “overlook” the old sins of ICU.
Thus, on the surface, there is a confrontation between ICU and the Ukrainian government. In reality, there is a tacit regime of support. Probably in exchange for assistance in servicing corrupt capital.
All of the above has been virtually pushed out of the information field, although all open sources are still available. They would have gone unnoticed if the attack on Volodymyr Demchyshyn had not been carried out in Cyprus. This event reminded us of the immunity of ICU in general.
This case also illustrates the persistence of corruption in Ukraine. The government changes, but the “schemes” and professionals servicing it are passed down as inheritance. “Schemers” first plunder Ukraine, and then use the services of professionals like ICU to legalise the money. As the latest corruption scandal surrounding Timur Mindich has shown, “schemes” are flourishing even in war-torn Ukraine. This means that the Mindich case and the “coal case” are much more closely related than it might seem at first glance.
It’s amazing how Ukraine has managed to wage a war for ten years against an enemy that is far superior in strength.
Why now is the best time
Real investigations by the US and EU are needed right now. If not now, when?
We should ask ourselves why official Ukraine is silent. Nor can we explain why the official bodies of the United States, Britain and the EU do not respond to numerous scandals involving ICU and other defendants. We might assume that they are waiting for the right moment. The moment has come, gentlemen. Mindichgate and Yermak’s dismissal are clear evidence of this.
Ukraine’s history contains too many dark spots. But it seems that it is an exercise in futility to shed some light on them in the name of justice within Ukraine. We need a powerful lever, and that is external influence. Only they can use such a tool as finance. As detectives often say, follow the money. The disclosure of financial information about ICU could explain many unclear moments in the history of Ukraine. In particular, why, even after the full-scale invasion, Ukraine managed to keep servicing its external debts for a long time. Or why negotiations on Yaresko’s warrants are always so unsuccessful for Ukraine. Of course, these and other facts concern not just ICU, but they present a very vivid example.
Let’s assume Yanukovych was the last openly pro-Russian president and that a different era began in 2014, when the United States and the European Union effectively took Ukraine under their wing.It can appear that, having assumed that role, they publicly promised to purge the system of entrenched corruption and impose clearer, more “civilised” rules of the game. The creation of NABU and SAPO, the elevation of activist networks into positions of influence, the spread of supervisory boards with substantial foreign involvement, the steady stream of conditionality and benchmarks from the IMF and the European Commission, and the prominence of grant-funded structures are often cited as evidence of how that promise was meant to be enforced. In that framing, the implied assurance is that corrupt officials will not go unpunished — unless this reading is mistaken.
Nevertheless, offshore structures, Cyprus-registered shell companies, opaque financial schemes and recurring corruption scandals have not disappeared. In practice, the anti-corruption drive appears to have made little difference to those able to operate through well-established networks. That raises an obvious question: what was the exercise intended to achieve? For sceptics, it can look less like systemic reform than a narrative designed to reassure the public.
It is time, in this view, for Western partners to clarify where they stand. Critics argue that the United States and the European Union have become entangled in Ukraine’s existing patronage networks while offering only rhetorical commitment to reform. Do they genuinely intend to support Ukraine’s convergence with European standards, or merely to manage the status quo? Framed this way, tougher external conditionality is presented not as interference in the affairs of a sovereign state, but as a practical form of assistance — aimed at protecting ordinary citizens from a system that continues to reward impunity.
Do Western partners have the capacity to act? On this reading, yes. The United States exerts enormous leverage through the dollar-based financial system and its reach into global payments and compliance networks, while the European Union has comparable influence through the euro area and European supervisory architecture. Both have access, directly or indirectly, to depository, banking and transactional data that can reveal beneficial ownership and money flows. The implication is that Washington and Brussels can identify actors and structures behind theft and corruption in Ukraine in ways that Ukrainian investigators either cannot — or do not — pursue.
From this standpoint, US law enforcement, including the FBI, should bring relevant findings into the open. Even if it triggers an international scandal, proponents argue it would serve a corrective purpose. Ordinary Ukrainians did not siphon funds from energy or defence budgets; many instead donated privately to support the armed forces, compensating for losses attributed to state-level theft. A disclosure, the argument goes, would accelerate a political reset and reinforce the principle that punishment is real, not performative.
If that does not happen, sceptics warn that the public will draw the opposite conclusion: that Western partners, anti-corruption activism, and repeated promises of movement towards EU integration are largely rhetorical. In that perception, the rhetoric masks co-existence with — or accommodation of — the very officials and networks said to be responsible for systemic corruption.
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