Turkish oil refiners are moving to curb purchases of Russian crude after the United States imposed full blocking sanctions on Russia’s two largest oil producers, Rosneft and Lukoil.
Industry sources indicate that Tupras, Turkey’s biggest refiner, has increased orders of non-Russian grades similar to Urals—particularly Iraqi blends—to maintain exports to Europe without breaching sanctions. The shift has not been widely reported previously and follows the latest US measures unveiled in late October.
Washington’s October action placed property-blocking sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil under Executive Order 14024, extending restrictions to entities they own by 50 per cent or more. Legal advisories note carve-outs remain—for example, transactions related to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium and Tengizchevroil are authorised under an amended general licence—yet the core effect is to expose counterparties to heightened secondary-sanctions risk if they deal with the newly blocked firms.
Turkey’s energy sector is tightly integrated with Western finance and trade flows. That integration limits the scope for refiners to continue openly buying Russian oil from newly designated suppliers, given the danger of losing access to US dollar clearing and European banking services. The US Treasury has previously paired company designations with action against oil-carrying vessels and opaque traders linked to the so-called “shadow fleet”, signalling an enforcement approach aimed at both producers and logistics.
The Turkish response resembles developments in India, where refiners paused or re-routed purchases as they reviewed exposure to sanctioned sellers. Indian refiners were poised to sharply curtail imports from the sanctioned producers; one private refiner has since said it stopped buying Russian crude altogether. Others signal they will continue sourcing Russian barrels via non-sanctioned intermediaries where possible, underscoring that the measures are targeted at named firms rather than a blanket ban on all Russian-origin oil.
For Ankara, the immediate practical adjustment is a rebalancing of the crude slate. Tupras has been increasing purchases of alternatives to Urals to keep product exports compliant with Western regimes. This substitution can lift feedstock costs and complicate refinery optimisation, but it reduces exposure to secondary sanctions and banking disruptions. Whether this becomes a lasting shift depends on the durability of enforcement and the availability of competitive non-Russian grades.
Sanctions history suggests that trade may not cease so much as be rerouted. Previous rounds against other Russian oil companies prompted the growth of ship-to-ship transfers, re-flagging, and blending schemes designed to mask origin before delivery to hubs including India and Turkey. Policy analysts argue that sustained pressure requires a mix of primary and secondary measures, tighter information-sharing with partners, and vigilant monitoring of shipping, insurance, and price-cap compliance.
The October designations build on a January package that targeted revenue channels and an unprecedented number of oil-carrying vessels linked to Russia’s energy trade. That earlier action broadened the focus beyond producers to logistics and service providers, laying groundwork for the later, more direct hit on Rosneft and Lukoil. Together, the measures raise the cost of visible transactions with sanctioned entities and nudge refiners towards cleaner supply chains.
Questions remain over scale and duration. Turkish refiners may continue to source Russian crude from non-designated sellers, seek discounts to compensate for sanctions risk, or engage in refined-product exports that meet compliance tests regardless of input origin. Market participants will weigh price advantages against the risk of account closures or loss of trade finance. The presence of a general licence for specific pipeline-linked projects also introduces nuance that traders will parse to avoid breaching rules while maintaining flows where permitted.
Enforcement will be decisive. If monitoring of vessel ownership, AIS behaviour, port state controls and insurance coverage tightens, the shadow fleet’s operating room shrinks; if not, some flows may continue via less transparent channels. The efficacy depends on follow-through rather than just listings. For Turkey, whose refiners export significant volumes of diesel and other products to Europe, the commercial incentive is to align with the rules governing those destination markets.
In the near term, Turkey’s pivot towards non-Russian barrels indicates that financial and regulatory exposure outweighs the allure of discounted supplies from sanctioned sellers. The adjustment mirrors Indian refiners’ recent caution and suggests a broader recalibration among buyers deeply connected to Western banking and trade systems. How far and how long this shift runs will hinge on sustained enforcement and the economics of alternative grades, but the immediate direction of travel is clear.
Risk in European Waters: The Shadow Fleet, Sanctions Evasion and Safety Gaps
