Europe remains ill-prepared for a large-scale Russian drone attack and must move quickly to integrate Ukraine’s battlefield experience into its own air and air-defence planning, EU Defence Commissioner Andrius Kubilius has warned.
Speaking in Vilnius, Kubilius said the European Union had reacted too slowly to the transformation of warfare over Ukraine and was still not able to detect and neutralise hostile drones in a reliable and cost-effective way. His comments follow incidents in September when Russian drones entered Polish airspace, prompting Nato jets to shoot several of them down and triggering an allied reinforcement of the eastern flank.
“Why did it take us more than two years and the trigger of the Russian provocation with drones against Poland, and also against Baltic states and Romania, to understand that we are not ready to detect Russian drones and to destroy them with cost-effective means?” Kubilius asked. “The Russians are learning. Are we?”
The Commissioner’s intervention comes as the 27-nation bloc works on what officials describe as a layered “drone and air-defence shield” stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Front-line EU states agreed in September on the need for a so-called “drone wall”, combining radar, electro-optical sensors, jamming equipment and a mix of kinetic and non-kinetic interceptors to track and engage unmanned aircraft.
Details of that system, including how it will be financed and integrated with Nato’s own air-defence architecture, remain under discussion. Kubilius has previously said he expects heads of state and government to take decisions on funding tools as part of wider talks on the EU’s long-term budget and the “Readiness 2030” defence industrial plan, which is intended to scale up European production of missiles, drones and ammunition.
In Vilnius, Kubilius argued that any credible European air-defence concept must formally bring Ukraine into the picture, pointing to Kyiv’s rapid adaptation to drone warfare since 2022. Ukraine has developed large fleets of reconnaissance, strike and long-range maritime drones, as well as dense local jamming and sensor networks, in response to Russian attacks. He said those capabilities, and the Ukrainian armed forces’ experience in deploying them under fire, should be treated as an integral element of Europe’s wider security system rather than as an external add-on.
“If we do not do that, we shall make a historical mistake, which shall leave us weaker. And which shall leave Ukraine weaker,” he said, calling for closer integration of Ukrainian units and industry into EU defence planning and procurement.
Kubilius’s remarks also reflect growing concern in European capitals about the trajectory of Russia’s military posture. Intelligence services in several member states, including Germany, Denmark and Finland, have warned that Moscow could rebuild sufficient conventional capacity to consider an attack on a Nato country within the next decade, with some assessments speaking of a window as early as the late 2020s.
Kubilius cited these assessments, saying that the Baltic region in particular could be tested if the Kremlin decides to probe the credibility of Nato’s Article 5 mutual defence clause once large-scale operations in Ukraine subside. His view aligns with recent comments from senior Nato officers, who have pointed to Russian plans to expand its armed forces and increase weapons production despite continued fighting in Ukraine.
Nato, for its part, has already reinforced its eastern flank with additional air-defence assets and quick-reaction aircraft following the drone incursions over Poland and reported overflights near Romania and the Baltic states. Alliance officials describe the flights as part of a wider pattern of hybrid activity, including sabotage and cyber operations, aimed at testing allied responses and exploiting gaps in surveillance coverage.
For the EU, the debate now centres on how quickly member states can move from declarations to implemented capability. Kubilius has argued that Europe needs common standards for drone and counter-drone systems, joint procurement to avoid market fragmentation, and a closer link between defence industrial policy and operational planning. He has also repeatedly stated that any future “drone wall” or Eastern Flank Watch will only be credible if it can draw directly on Ukrainian experience and, in the longer term, on Ukraine’s integration into Europe’s security structures.
