Poland’s new president, Karol Nawrocki, has signalled that Warsaw wants to participate in NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangements and to develop “its own nuclear capabilities — energy, civilian and military”.
Speaking in a televised interview with France’s LCI on 16–17 September, Mr Nawrocki said Poland should be ready to host allied nuclear weapons and indicated France as a potential partner.
The comments follow a series of Russian drone incursions into NATO airspace in early and mid-September, including episodes over Poland and Romania, which European governments described as deliberate provocations. Berlin has linked the incidents to a broader pattern of Russian “sabotage and boundary testing”. NATO states scrambled aircraft in response and the EU has accelerated work on a “drone wall” along its eastern flank using Ukrainian-tested technologies.
Mr Nawrocki, inaugurated on 6 August 2025, is Poland’s head of state alongside Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s government. His election followed a closely fought contest and marked a shift at the presidency after two terms under Andrzej Duda.
Debate in Warsaw over the role of nuclear deterrence has intensified this year. In March, Mr Tusk told parliament that “we would be safer if we had our own nuclear arsenal,” while Mr Duda publicly urged the United States to consider moving nuclear warheads to Polish territory under existing NATO arrangements. Those remarks pre-dated Mr Nawrocki’s tenure but set the tone for a cross-party discussion on nuclear options amid uncertainty over the durability of U.S. security guarantees.
France’s position forms part of the backdrop. President Emmanuel Macron used a major Europe speech in April 2024 to encourage a debate on a European role in nuclear deterrence, with France’s force de frappe presented as a potential pillar alongside allied capabilities. Analysts have since outlined how a French “offer” might complement, rather than replace, U.S. extended deterrence in Europe. Paris and Berlin have also moved to narrow differences over nuclear energy and defence cooperation since late August and early September.
Poland is not part of NATO’s current nuclear-sharing group, which includes Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Türkiye. Any Polish participation would require political agreement within the Alliance and, depending on the model, consent from the United States or France. Mr Nawrocki did not say whether Warsaw seeks a national nuclear weapons programme; his emphasis on joining nuclear sharing and building domestic nuclear-energy and related capabilities suggests Warsaw is exploring multiple avenues within alliance frameworks.
The latest drone incidents have sharpened the discussion. On 10 September, Poland reported that Russian projectiles and drones crossed its airspace during strikes on Ukraine, an episode condemned by Warsaw and regional partners as unprecedented in scope. Moscow dismissed the criticism as “nothing new”. Subsequent days saw heightened security measures in Poland, including arrests in an unrelated drone overflight near government buildings in Warsaw.
European responses are evolving. The European Commission has backed a programme to co-develop cost-effective counter-drone systems with Ukraine, while NATO has launched the “Eastern Sentry” posture to reinforce air and sea defences along the eastern flank. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz told the Bundestag on 17 September that Russian incursions form part of a “long trend” of hybrid activity aimed at destabilisation.
Strategically, the Polish debate intersects with wider questions over transatlantic burden-sharing and the reliability of Article 5. European leaders have voiced concern that the United States could be more reluctant to escalate directly with Russia, prompting renewed attention to European-led deterrence options. In this context, Mr Nawrocki’s reference to France is notable: any arrangement involving French nuclear forces would require political decisions in Paris and consultations with EU and NATO partners. France maintains an independent deterrent and has historically kept it outside NATO’s nuclear planning structures.
Timelines remain uncertain. Paris and Berlin have only recently reopened structured talks touching on nuclear issues within a broader defence agenda, and experts caution that any practical mechanism for extending French nuclear assurances — whether declaratory, consultative, or basing-related — would take sustained negotiations. Warsaw’s potential entry into NATO nuclear sharing, if pursued with the United States, would likewise involve infrastructure, certification and alliance approvals that cannot be completed quickly.
