As the Strait of Hormuz remains unstable on 20 April, Europe is trying to shape a practical response based on naval coordination, legal legitimacy and commercial confidence, while Donald Trump’s unilateral approach leaves unresolved the central question of how to keep a vital global energy route safely open.
By the morning of 20 April 2026, the Strait of Hormuz still looked less like a restored trade corridor than a waterway in suspended animation. Overnight, the immediate trigger for fresh tension was the US seizure of an Iranian cargo ship, an incident that cast further doubt over the ceasefire and helped drive oil higher again.
That matters because the Strait is not simply another regional flashpoint. It is the most important oil chokepoint in the world. Around 20 million barrels a day passed through Hormuz in 2024, equal to roughly a fifth of global petroleum liquids consumption. More than a quarter of global seaborne oil trade and about a fifth of global LNG trade also relied on the route. A waterway of that scale, and of such narrow physical limits, cannot be secured by slogans, improvised brinkmanship or the vanity of any single leader.
The geography of Hormuz favours obstruction. Reuters reported on 17 April that the threat from naval mines in parts of the Strait was “not fully understood”, according to a US naval advisory, and that mariners were urged to consider avoiding the established traffic separation scheme. Another Reuters report said shipping companies remained cautious even after Iran said the Strait was open, because uncertainty over mines, navigation lanes and safety guarantees persisted. In other words, the problem is not simply whether a ceasefire exists on paper. It is whether shipowners, insurers and crews believe passage is genuinely safe.
This is precisely where Europe has a role, and perhaps a more useful one than Washington at present. On 17 April, France and Britain convened 51 countries in Paris for an international summit on the Strait of Hormuz. The joint statement was serious and properly framed: freedom of navigation, international law, global economic stability and energy security were all explicitly placed at the centre of the discussion. The statement called for the Strait to be reopened “unconditionally, unrestrictedly, and immediately” and stressed that transit passage through international straits cannot be subject to restrictions or tolls. More than a dozen countries signalled willingness to contribute to a future defensive mission once conditions allow.
This already tells us what Europe can do. It cannot conquer geography, and it cannot by itself impose order on the Gulf. But it can organise a coalition around the things that actually matter at sea: escort, surveillance, mine-countermeasure planning, legal clarity, shipping coordination and insurance confidence. The British government said the Paris process included work on security cooperation, critical supply chains and support to industry. The IMO, for its part, has called for international support to secure safe passage, clear hazards and protect seafarers. Around 20,000 seafarers and nearly 2,000 vessels remain affected in the region, according to the IMO.
That is the practical agenda. It is also a rebuke to Donald Trump’s preferred style of politics. Trump told allies he did not need their help, even as European capitals were trying to shape a broader mission. This is classic Trump: the performance of strength taking precedence over the architecture of strategy. Yet Hormuz is not a place where prestige alone achieves very much. The Strait does not reopen because a US president posts a warning. It reopens when naval risk is reduced, insurers can price passage, mines are cleared or mapped, shipping lanes are understood and commercial operators trust the route again.
Europe’s advantage is not hard-power supremacy. It plainly does not possess that. Its advantage is that it is approaching the problem in the correct register. The legal position is straightforward. Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, transit passage through straits used for international navigation must not be hampered or suspended. The IMO said again this month that the principle of freedom of navigation is “not negotiable” and that there is no legal basis for tolls or arbitrary restrictions in such waters. Europe can build a mission and a diplomatic case around that principle in a way that is broader, steadier and more internationally saleable than Trump’s bilateral coercion.
There are limits, and they should be admitted plainly. Europe cannot reopen Hormuz alone if the United States and Iran continue to escalate directly. Nor can it guarantee unity inside its own camp. But it can do something necessary and overdue: replace theatrical unilateralism with coalition management. The latest Reuters shipping data offered one small sign of that need. More than 20 vessels transited Hormuz on Saturday, the highest single-day figure since 1 March, but that is still a tentative test rather than a return to normality. Passage is resuming, if at all, in fragments and under duress.
So the question for Europe is not whether it can dominate Hormuz. It cannot. The question is whether it can help make the Strait usable again. That means mine-clearing capability, defensive naval presence, legal consistency, political stamina and close work with the shipping industry. It is not a glamorous answer. But it is a serious one. And in Hormuz, seriousness is in shorter supply than rhetoric.
