Moldova could consider unification with neighbouring Romania if its path towards European Union membership is blocked or delayed after 2028, according to a senior Moldovan government official.
Eugen Osmochescu, Moldova’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economic Development and Digitalisation, described the scenario as a possible “Plan B” in the event that the country’s EU accession process fails to advance within the timeframe set by Chisinau. His remarks underline the political pressure facing Moldova’s pro-European leadership as it seeks visible progress from Brussels.
Moldova’s official objective remains the signing of an EU accession treaty by the end of 2028. Osmochescu stressed that this remained the government’s priority, and that alternative options would only be considered seriously if the accession process came to a halt after that date.
The statement is politically sensitive. Moldova and Romania share linguistic, cultural and historical ties, and Moldova was part of Romania before its incorporation into the Soviet Union during the Second World War. Since independence in 1991, the idea of unification has remained present in Moldovan politics, but it has not commanded a consistent majority among Moldovan voters.
President Maia Sandu has previously said that, if a referendum on unification with Romania were held, she would vote in favour. At the same time, she has acknowledged that there is currently no majority in Moldova for such a step, while there is a broader public mandate for EU accession. Romanian President Nicușor Dan has also said that unification would only become possible when a majority in Moldova wanted it.
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The renewed discussion comes as Moldova seeks to consolidate its European trajectory amid continued security and political pressure from Russia. Since Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Chisinau has repeatedly accused Russia of conducting hybrid operations aimed at destabilising the country, influencing elections, spreading disinformation and weakening public support for European integration.
Moldova applied for EU membership in March 2022, shortly after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It was granted candidate status in June that year, alongside Ukraine. Formal accession negotiations opened in June 2024, marking a significant shift in the EU’s approach to enlargement in Eastern Europe.
The European Commission has assessed Moldova’s reform progress positively, while also making clear that further work is required in areas including rule of law, democratic institutions, public administration and economic governance. In its 2025 enlargement assessment, the Commission described Moldova’s objective of provisionally closing negotiations by early 2028 as ambitious but achievable, provided that reforms accelerate.
For Chisinau, the problem is not only technical compliance with EU standards. The accession process also depends on political agreement among all EU member states. Moldova’s application has often been linked to Ukraine’s, creating concern that political obstacles to Kyiv’s accession could also affect Chisinau. Osmochescu said enlargement should remain merit-based, but added that Moldova urgently needed a clear signal from Brussels to sustain domestic support.
That concern reflects a broader strategic calculation. Moldova is a small state situated between Ukraine and Romania, with the breakaway region of Transnistria still hosting Russian troops. Its economy remains vulnerable, and its political system has been repeatedly targeted by influence operations. The government argues that EU accession is not only a foreign policy objective, but a framework for economic resilience, institutional reform and national security.
Unification with Romania would, in theory, place Moldova inside the EU through union with an existing member state. However, such a scenario would carry major constitutional, legal, diplomatic and security implications. It would require democratic consent in Moldova and Romania, and would almost certainly raise complex questions within the EU and NATO, particularly because of Transnistria.
For this reason, the “Plan B” formulation appears less a near-term policy proposal than a political warning: if the EU does not offer credible movement, Moldovan leaders may face pressure to consider other routes to European integration.
The primary route remains accession as a sovereign state. Moldova has invested heavily in that process, and the EU has increased political, financial and security support for Chisinau. Brussels has also treated Moldova as a test case for whether the enlargement process can respond to geopolitical urgency while maintaining reform conditionality.
Osmochescu’s remarks therefore point to a tension at the centre of the current enlargement debate. Moldova is being asked to maintain reforms, resist external pressure and convince its population that EU membership is achievable. In return, Chisinau wants the EU to demonstrate that the accession process can produce concrete results within a politically meaningful timeframe.
If that does not happen, the question of union with Romania may move from the margins of political debate into a more prominent position. For now, however, Moldova’s government continues to present EU accession by 2028 as its main strategic objective.
