Russia is receiving an immediate fiscal benefit from the latest surge in global oil prices, with the rise in crude benchmarks lifting the value of its exports and, by extension, the tax take flowing into the federal budget.
The Financial Times reported that Moscow is earning roughly $110 million to $160 million a day in additional budget revenue from higher oil prices, adding up to an estimated $1.3 billion to $1.9 billion in the first twelve days of the rally. If current conditions were to persist through March, the same analysis suggested the windfall could reach roughly $3.3 billion to $5 billion.
Reuters, using its own calculations, reached a similar conclusion on the scale of the budgetary gain. It reported that proceeds from Russia’s mineral extraction tax on crude oil, the single largest oil tax in the country, could almost double this month if prices remain near current levels. Reuters estimated that this tax alone could bring in about 590 billion roubles, or $7.43 billion, in March, compared with an expected 300 billion roubles in February and 314 billion roubles in January.
The immediate driver is the disruption to Middle Eastern supply routes and the resulting jump in international crude prices. Reuters reported that Brent rose above $100 a barrel during the latest market turbulence, after having climbed sharply on fears of prolonged disruption to oil flows. In that environment, Russian crude has become more attractive to buyers seeking available barrels outside the Gulf.
The uplift is also visible in the price of Urals crude. Reuters reported on 10 March that Urals from Russian ports was being offered at about $76 a barrel on a free-on-board basis, up from about $45 two weeks earlier. A separate Reuters report on 6 March said Urals had moved above the G7 price cap of $60 a barrel at the port of loading for the first time since July and had also risen above the newer EU cap of $44.10.
At the same time, Washington has introduced a temporary measure that further cushions Russian export flows. On 12 March, the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control issued Russia-related General License 134, authorising the delivery and sale of Russian crude oil and petroleum products loaded on vessels on or before 12 March 2026. The waiver runs until midnight Washington time on 11 April, effectively creating a 30-day window for cargoes already at sea.
According to Reuters, Kirill Dmitriev said the measure would affect about 100 million barrels of Russian crude. The same report said the licence was part of a broader effort by the Trump administration to stabilise energy markets after the latest Middle East shock sent oil prices sharply higher. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent described the move as narrowly tailored and short term, but the effect is nonetheless to preserve a substantial volume of Russian exports that might otherwise have faced greater disruption.
There is evidence that Asian demand is already adjusting in Russia’s favour. Reuters reported on 4 March that Russia was prepared to divert more crude to India as Middle Eastern flows came under pressure, with about 9.5 million barrels already near Indian waters and the possibility of raising Russia’s share of Indian crude imports to 40 per cent from 30 per cent. Another Reuters report noted that Russia’s oil sales to India had come under pressure earlier this year, making the present rebound particularly important for the Kremlin. China, meanwhile, remains Russia’s largest crude customer, and Reuters reported this week that Chinese crude imports rose 15.8 per cent year on year in January and February, reflecting robust refinery demand and stockpiling.
That said, Russia’s ability to exploit higher prices is not unlimited. Reuters, citing the IEA, reported that Russian crude production fell by 710,000 barrels a day in February to 8.6 million barrels a day, about 1 million barrels below Russia’s OPEC+ quota. This broadly supports the point that Moscow has recently been unable to produce at the level theoretically available to it. Higher prices therefore strengthen revenues immediately, but they do not automatically translate into a large increase in physical output.
The result is a mixed strategic picture. In the short term, the Kremlin is benefiting from exactly the combination Ukraine’s partners have sought to avoid: higher oil prices, firmer Asian demand and a temporary US licence allowing stranded cargoes to be delivered. In the longer term, however, sanctions, production constraints and limited upstream capacity still restrict how far Russia can turn a market shock into a sustained expansion of exports. For now, the revenue effect is real, measurable and politically consequential.
