Sanctions covers EU restrictive measures from proposal to implementation. Reporting includes CFSP decisions and EU regulations, listings and delistings, asset freezes and travel bans, export controls and services restrictions, enforcement and anti-circumvention, licensing and compliance guidance, court challenges and case law, coordination with partners (UK, US, G7, UN), sectoral and regional impacts, and data on effectiveness.
A year after the Russian general cargo ship Ursa Major sank in the western Mediterranean, a Spanish newspaper investigation has put fresh focus on Russia–North Korea military cooperation and the methods used to move sensitive matériel under sanctions.
The vessel went down late on 23 December 2024 (around 23:22 UTC) in waters between Spain and Algeria, roughly 60 nautical miles south of Cartagena, after an emergency that left 14 crew rescued and two missing. At the time, the ship’s owner, Oboronlogistika — a state-linked logistics operator associated with Russia’s defence establishment — said the incident involved multiple explosions and described it as sabotage. Spanish maritime rescue services brought survivors to Cartagena.
A new line of reporting by La Verdad claims Spanish investigators came to believe the ship was transporting two naval nuclear reactor casings potentially intended for North Korea, hidden in two large blue-covered containers carried on the open aft deck. The components are described as associated with VM-4SG reactors, a Soviet-era naval reactor design used in Russia’s submarine fleet. The reporting does not suggest nuclear fuel was being shipped, but focuses on reactor housings and related hardware.
According to the same accounts, the declared voyage was from St Petersburg to Vladivostok, a route that would normally not require passage through the Mediterranean unless the ship was taking a southern track in winter. The alleged destination for the undeclared cargo is identified as Rason, a North Korean port close to the Russian border, where heavy-lift equipment would be required to handle extremely large loads.
The most contentious element is the question of how the ship was lost. In December 2024, reporting centred on an explosion affecting the engine room and a rapid deterioration in the ship’s condition. The owner later claimed three explosions and said damage was on the starboard side.
The recent investigation claims Spanish examiners were struck by a distinct breach to the hull, with deformation consistent with an external strike. Some coverage cites specialist assessments that the hole could match damage associated with a torpedo-sized impact.
La Verdad’s reporting also alleges that a Russian Navy landing ship, Ivan Gren, was in the area during the rescue phase and attempted to limit access by Spanish units. One account says flares were fired that could interfere with infrared observation, alongside demands for Spanish patrol craft to withdraw. These claims point to a Russian effort to control the scene and the ship’s cargo narrative.
The stakes extend beyond the Mediterranean incident itself. North Korea has long pursued a nuclear-powered submarine capability, and in late December 2025 state media imagery and external reporting suggested progress on a large submarine hull that North Korea presents as linked to nuclear propulsion and strategic weapons. Analysts quoted in recent coverage have raised the possibility of foreign technical support amid deepening ties with Moscow.
Russia and North Korea’s relationship has expanded since the signing of a comprehensive partnership treaty in June 2024. Western governments and multilateral bodies have repeatedly cited concerns about arms transfers and sanctions evasion. In late 2024, Security Council discussions included references to reported transfers of ballistic missiles and artillery from North Korea to Russia, while a separate multinational monitoring mechanism has published detailed claims of large-scale munitions shipments.
If the Ursa Major cargo allegation is substantiated, it would represent a qualitatively different form of assistance: not simply the movement of conventional munitions, but the transfer of key industrial components that could support a nuclear-powered naval platform. That, in turn, would sharpen questions about enforcement of maritime sanctions, the use of “shadow fleet” practices, and the ability of coastal states to investigate and document suspected proliferation-linked shipments when incidents occur in international waters.
First published on defencematters.eu
