While once upon a time peace treaties were struck based on the visible and concrete—port access, cattle, or advantageous marriages—today, peace is often negotiated on the promise of future economic security.
As U.S.-Russia peace talks kick off in Riyadh–without either Europe or Ukraine having a seat at the table–Ukraine’s President Zelensky is likely wishing for the simplicity of past negotiations rather than the current reality: a draft agreement from the U.S. that ties military support to control over half of Ukraine’s rare earth minerals.
Despite Washington’s insistence, Zelensky has so far refused to sign. U.S. officials are floating a narrative that securing mineral access is the key to continued military backing. Zelensky himself had first floated the idea to Trump of offering American companies access to Ukrainian minerals as part of a hypothetical peace plan–yet, as European and Ukrainian officials recently told the FT, Zelensky may have made a strategic miscalculation by not including specifics from the get-go, including a total value and requiring ironclad American security guarantees in exchange.
It’s a lacuna that Washington is now eager to exploit. Just last week, President Trump bluntly stated that the U.S. would require $500 billion worth of Ukrainian minerals as repayment for its military and civilian aid since the war began.
The significance of this demand is hard to overstate. Of the 50 materials the U.S. deems critical, Ukraine holds deposits of 22, including graphite, lithium, titanium, beryllium, and uranium—key resources for batteries, radar systems, and armor. Access to such a substantial stock of key minerals could be a game changer for the U.S., which–like the EU–is seeking any avenue to reduce its dependence on China, which currently dominates rare earth production and processing.
What about Europe?
While Trump openly couples military aid with resource access, German Chancellor Scholz presents a different vision. He recently criticized Trump’s approach as “egotistical and self-serving,” arguing that Ukraine should retain its natural resources to finance post-war reconstruction rather than use them as collateral for military support. This stance, while principled, raises an important question: where does this leave Europe, which needs access to many of the same minerals? As the U.S. pushes ahead with its own self-interested mineral strategy, Europe risks being left behind, without a clear plan to secure its own supply chains.
Meanwhile, China has built a near-monopoly over critical minerals, producing 60% of the world’s rare earth elements and processing 90% of them. This reality underscores Europe’s fragile position. The EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act, intended to reduce dependency on external suppliers, is a step in the right direction but lacks the necessary investment and strategic clarity to make a real impact. Europe speaks of resilience while Washington and Beijing act.
Against this backdrop of European hesitancy, Mongolia’s evolving resource strategy offers a revealing contrast. The landlocked country, rich in copper, uranium, fluorspar, and rare earth elements, has emerged as a key player in the global critical minerals landscape. Just a few years ago, Mongolia appeared ready to adopt resource nationalism, taking an increasingly hardline stance that risked putting off Western investors. The Oyu Tolgoi mining project – once marketed as a flagship collaboration – left Mongolia burdened with debt and delayed profits, fueling domestic discontent and demands for greater autonomy over national resources.
However, the combination of mounting international pressure and Mongolia’s economic vulnerabilities signaled for a significant recalibration. The recent investment agreement between the Mongolian government and France’s Orano signals this shift: by securing preferential shares and royalties amounting to 19% of Orano’s revenue, Mongolia prioritized steady revenue flow over outright ownership. It is a pragmatic compromise aimed at balancing foreign investment with national benefit.
The evolution of Mongolia’s approach highlights two important realities. Firstly, resource-rich nations are increasingly emboldened by what they see as Western indecision, and secondly, the global scarcity of critical raw materials caps how far such assertiveness can go. The example of Mongolia reads as a cautionary tale for both resource holders and import-dependant countries. For Europe, it underlines the risks of strategic passivity; for Ukraine, it illustrates the delicate equilibrium between leveraging natural wealth and preserving long-term sovereignty.
Europe’s response has so far been slow and fragmented. The EU’s Global Gateway initiative and efforts to negotiate new trade agreements with resource-rich nations signal intent, but execution remains slow. Without a coherent industrial strategy, Europe risks becoming an observer while other global players secure their economic futures.
The stakes are high. Industries dependent on rare earth minerals—defense, renewable energy, consumer electronics—are facing increasing global competition. As the EU’s energy transition accelerates, demand for materials like lithium and rare earth elements will continue to rise. Without a concrete plan, Europe may find itself at the mercy of geopolitical shifts and resource diplomacy – a position that Ukraine’s mineral wealth could help mitigate if managed strategically.
Future-proofing Europe: looking forward
Europe must also contend with its own internal fragmentation. Unlike the U.S., which can coordinate a unified resource strategy, the EU is constrained by competing national interests and a slow-moving bureaucratic framework. While countries like France and Germany have pushed for greater resource independence, smaller member states remain hesitant to commit to centralized procurement efforts. The result is a disjointed approach that leaves the bloc vulnerable to supply disruptions.
Moreover, geopolitical uncertainties continue to challenge Europe’s ability to forge reliable partnerships. Many resource-rich nations, wary of their historical experiences with Western exploitation, are reluctant to enter agreements that do not offer clear and immediate benefits. Mongolia’s partnership with Orano worked because it acknowledged past mistakes and structured a deal that provided long-term financial stability without the burden of debt. European leaders would do well to take note.
If Europe wants to secure its place in the new economic order, it must be willing to act with the same pragmatism and urgency as its global competitors. That means creating investment mechanisms that attract resource-rich nations, removing bureaucratic roadblocks, and offering mutually beneficial agreements that go beyond regulatory oversight.
While the U.S. and China consolidate their supply chains, Europe must decide whether it will take a proactive role in securing the resources it needs or continue to lag behind in a world increasingly shaped by mineral diplomacy. The longer Europe hesitates, the more its technological and economic future will be dictated by others.
