Poland’s closure of all crossing points with Belarus has severed the principal overland handover on the China–EU rail corridor, disrupting scheduled freight from Yiwu that would normally enter the European Union at Brest–Terespol.
The decision, which took effect at midnight on 12 September, was linked by Warsaw to the Russian–Belarusian “Zapad-2025” exercises and to an incursion of Russian drones into Polish airspace. The Interior Ministry has said the measure is open-ended and will remain “until further notice.”
On 18 September the European Commission said it was “closely” monitoring potential economic effects, stressing that the corridor is a traditional route for EU–China trade. “There is a trade impact when a border is shut down along which trade routes flow,” deputy chief spokesperson Olof Gill told reporters, while underlining that the driver of events is security. The Commission avoided any suggestion of criticism towards Warsaw.
The immediate operational choke point is the Poland–Belarus rail interface. With that link suspended, China–Europe Railway Express services routed via Belarus have faced postponements at border terminals or cancellation, while operators examine detours through the Baltics, southern alignments via Kazakhstan and Turkey, or limited road trans-shipments. Each option adds time, complexity and cost compared with the pre-closure handover. Poland has indicated that carriers may consider the Belarus–Lithuania crossing; however, capacity and scheduling constraints limit the value of this alternative.
Placing the disruption in context is essential for shippers sourcing from Yiwu. The Yiwu–Xinjiang–Europe Railway (launched in 2014) has become a useful middle option—typically 15–20 days door-to-door—between ocean lead times and the cost of air freight. Yet by volume it remains a minority mode: the preponderance of Yiwu-origin goods moves by sea through nearby deep-sea gateways. For time-sensitive consignments such as electronics, machinery and higher-value consumer goods, rail offered speed without air’s price premium; those flows are now the most exposed. (Industry profiles of the Yiwu corridor and contemporary logistics guidance highlight both the role of rail and its limited share relative to maritime transport.)
Polish authorities frame the decision squarely as a security response. The shutdown followed Zapad-2025 activity near NATO territory and what officials described as an unprecedented night-time incursion of around 19–21 Russian drones on 9–10 September. Warsaw has stated that the crossings will remain closed after the drills, with any reassessment dependent on the threat environment. Reuters and other outlets have reported continued heightened vigilance along the border.
At EU level, the policy backdrop is a structurally imbalanced commercial relationship with China. According to the Commission and Eurostat, bilateral goods trade reached €732 billion in 2024, mostly carried by sea. Within that total, the EU’s goods deficit with China peaked at almost €400 billion in 2022 before narrowing in 2023. Against this scale, estimates that the rail closure affects on the order of €25 billion annually illustrate why the system-wide impact is limited even if certain supply chains face short-term pain.
For importers and retailers in Europe, the practical implications divide along modal lines. Rail-reliant shipments from Yiwu that would have reached the EU in just over two weeks now face delay or rerouting, with added handling and customs friction. By contrast, the maritime backbone of Yiwu trade—via Shanghai and Ningbo-Zhoushan—continues to operate at scale, providing ample lift for most cargo profiles. In operational terms, this means extending lead times for diverted consignments while preserving overall availability of space for ocean bookings into the fourth quarter. (Port throughput data underline the order-of-magnitude difference between ocean capacity and Eurasian rail volumes.)
Beijing’s posture has been low-key. A 15 September meeting in Warsaw between Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski focused on bilateral ties and trade in general terms; the Chinese read-out did not explicitly reference the Polish closure. It remains unclear whether the Commission is conducting parallel technical contacts with Chinese counterparts on the logistics spill-overs.
In the near term, three variables will shape outcomes. First, the security picture on NATO’s north-eastern flank: a sustained reduction in drone incidents and hybrid activity would be a precondition for reopening. Second, logistics resilience: the speed at which forwarders re-optimise schedules—shifting rail-intended cargo to ocean, using split-modal solutions, or tapping constrained detours—will determine delivery performance into the pre-Christmas period. Third, policy signalling: Brussels will continue to align with Warsaw’s security framing while monitoring trade effects, a stance reflected in its public messaging this week.
For now, the position is unchanged: all Polish crossing points with Belarus are closed, the principal land bridge for Yiwu-Europe rail is suspended, and ocean freight remains the primary channel keeping goods moving between China and the EU. Firms most exposed to rail should add buffer time, secure ocean capacity early, and, where necessary, use limited air uplift to bridge inventory gaps. The Commission’s line remains that any trade-related challenges are a consequence of the security situation rather than a policy measure aimed at commerce.
Jets scramble, policy hesitates: NATO response to Poland incursions underwhelms
