Mass protests over Bulgaria’s 2026 budget have plunged the country into yet another political crisis, with Prime Minister Rosen Zhelyazkov’s minority government facing a no-confidence vote, a mass petition demanding its resignation and the prospect of an eighth early parliamentary election in five years.
The dispute comes just weeks before Bulgaria is due to adopt the euro on 1st January 2026 and risks overshadowing what was intended to be a landmark step in the country’s European integration.
The immediate trigger for the unrest was the draft 2026 budget, which envisaged a deficit of 3% of GDP alongside increases in taxes and mandatory social security contributions. As the first budget prepared in euro ahead of the currency switch, it was presented by the government as a necessary framework for the transition. Opponents, however, argued that the plan placed the burden on households and businesses while leaving entrenched political patronage networks intact. The controversy has revived long-standing public anger over corruption and inequality.
The crisis unfolds against the backdrop of chronic instability. Bulgaria has held seven elections since 2021, with parties struggling to construct durable coalitions. The most recent polls, in October 2024, returned former long-time prime minister Boyko Borissov’s GERB as the largest force and eventually produced the current government led formally by Zhelyazkov.
Critics contend that real influence is shared between Borissov and Delyan Peevski, the sanctioned media and business figure who leads the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS). Although DPS is not officially part of the governing coalition, its votes in parliament are essential, reinforcing the perception that Peevski exerts significant leverage over the cabinet.
Tensions inside the coalition escalated in October when Borissov abruptly demanded that junior partners – the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) and There Is Such a People (ITN) – surrender ministerial posts to enable DPS to enter government. Both parties had previously pledged to keep DPS away from executive power and rejected the demand, but the episode damaged trust within the coalition and further eroded public confidence. It also provided a clear target for the pro-European opposition alliance Continue the Change – Democratic Bulgaria (CC–DB), which has framed the cabinet as an extension of what it calls the “Borissov–Peevski model” of governance.
The budget dispute turned into a street confrontation on 26 November, when CC–DB called a protest to coincide with a key meeting of the parliamentary budget committee. The committee session was repeatedly rescheduled and eventually brought forward to midday. CC–DB co-leader Asen Vassilev disrupted the proceedings inside parliament, buying time for thousands of demonstrators to gather outside.
Around 30,000 people eventually surrounded the building, following the committee debate on screens and chanting against tax rises and perceived abuses in public spending. A second, larger wave of demonstrations on 1 December, organised under the slogan “Stop the plundering of the budget”, drew tens of thousands more and was backed by President Rumen Radev, who has become one of the government’s most prominent critics. Under growing pressure, the cabinet abandoned plans to press ahead with the existing budget text and pledged to draft a new proposal.
Despite this tactical retreat, the confrontation is intensifying. CC–DB has tabled a no-confidence motion and called a new nationwide protest for 10 December under the slogan “Government resign”. An associated petition demanding the cabinet’s departure had collected about 80,000 signatures by 6 December. According to polling by the Mya agency, some 71.3% of Bulgarians support the protests, nearly half favour the government’s resignation and 48% back new early elections. While the arithmetic in the National Assembly still makes an immediate change of government unlikely, the pressure on coalition parties is considerable.
The timing is particularly sensitive because of the euro timetable. After meeting the convergence criteria, Bulgaria received EU approval earlier this year to adopt the single currency from 1st January 2026 and has already completed the necessary legal steps. The budget stand-off raises the possibility that the country could enter the first year of euro circulation operating under a rolled-over framework from 2025 rather than a fully updated plan in euros, complicating fiscal management and communication with the public.
Political actors are now seeking to turn the budget row to their advantage. CC–DB aims to convert a broadly popular socio-economic grievance into a direct challenge to the current power structure and to force early elections, potentially to be held alongside the 2026 presidential vote. At the same time, openly pro-Russian forces are trying to link the unpopular fiscal measures to euro adoption itself.
The far-right Revival party, which has campaigned against joining the euro and maintains formal ties with Russia’s ruling United Russia party, has relaunched agitation for halting entry into the eurozone. Within the BSP, senior figures have called for funds earmarked for military assistance to Ukraine to be redirected to domestic social programmes, tying the budget dispute to Bulgaria’s foreign and security policy.
The outcome has significance beyond Bulgaria’s borders. In recent years the country has become an important source and transit hub for ammunition supplied to Ukraine and to other EU partners. That role is expected to grow after Sofia and German defence group Rheinmetall agreed a joint venture worth about €1 billion to build a new plant producing gunpowder and 155mm artillery shells, with planned annual capacity of around 100,000 rounds. The investment is part of a wider European effort to expand production of NATO-standard artillery munitions in response to Russia’s war.
If early elections lead to a weakening of Euro-Atlantic forces in Sofia and a stronger showing for parties sceptical of military aid to Kyiv, both the new industrial projects and existing supply channels could be reassessed or delayed. That would affect not only Ukraine’s ability to sustain high-intensity operations but also the EU’s attempt to build a more resilient defence-industrial base.
Bulgaria’s internal budget dispute has therefore acquired a broader European dimension: its resolution will help determine whether a key Black Sea partner enters the eurozone as a stable contributor to collective security, or as another site of political volatility at a critical moment for the Union.
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