Repeated air alerts in Poland and Romania this week, coupled with NATO’s launch of the Eastern Sentry mission, underscore an alliance still reacting to events rather than shaping them.
On 9–10 September, Poland became the first NATO member state to shoot down Russian drones that crossed its airspace; on 13 September it again scrambled aircraft and temporarily closed Lublin airport. Romania the same day launched F-16s after a drone entered its airspace near Tulcea, tracking it until it disappeared towards Ukraine.
NATO’s response has been to add a modest package of forces along a vast front from the High North to the Black Sea. Secretary-General Mark Rutte announced Eastern Sentry on 12 September, describing the drone incursions as “reckless and unacceptable” and stressing a flexible posture. Initial national contributions include French Rafales, German Eurofighters, and Danish assets—two F-16s and a frigate—augmenting existing air policing. The alliance has not set an end date.
The scale of the deployments invites comparison with the threat. Russia and Belarus began Zapad-2025 on 12 September. Moscow publicised a Zircon hypersonic cruise-missile launch from the frigate Admiral Golovko and flew MiG-31s with Kinzhal missiles over the Barents Sea. Such signalling is routine in Zapad cycles, but this year it coincides with drone violations of NATO airspace and has sharpened allied concern.
Operationally, the recent incidents underline known difficulties of using fast jets against small, slow, low-flying drones. Romania’s defence ministry said its F-16s detected a drone flying very low before it dropped off radar near Chilia Veche; the aircraft did not engage before it exited national airspace. Bucharest has updated its legal framework to allow peacetime downing of unauthorised drones, though some enforcement rules remain pending.
There is also a cost problem. Russia’s one-way attack drones (Shahed/Geran) are built to stress air defences through mass and persistence. Estimates put unit costs in the tens of thousands of dollars, far below many Western interceptors. Analysts at CSIS note the “cruel attritional logic” of these systems: even low hit rates can be cost-effective for the attacker if defenders expend scarce, expensive munitions. The Polish case—fighters and ground defences mobilised against small drones—illustrates the dilemma.
Eastern Sentry therefore risks being an interim reassurance rather than a denial posture. A handful of jets and a frigate spread across thousands of kilometres cannot sustainably police daily incursions or saturation raids. The measure of success will be whether NATO shifts from episodic scrambling to a layered, affordable counter-drone architecture in the border regions and approaches that stop threats before they reach allied airspace.
There are practical steps—some already in train—that would tighten the response:
Layered, low-cost defence. Expand networks of guns, electronic-warfare systems and interceptor drones, reserving high-end missiles for ballistic and cruise threats. Ukraine’s experience points to the value of such mixes against Shahed-type targets.
Forward ground-based air defence. Thicken ground batteries and sensors along the Polish, Romanian and Baltic sectors to reduce reliance on costly quick-reaction scrambles for slow aerial targets. Recent Polish measures and NATO’s stated intent to “beef up” the eastern flank are baselines, not end states.
Cross-border coordination with Ukraine. With Kyiv’s consent, consider intercepting drones over a defined belt of Ukrainian airspace contiguous with NATO territory using ground-based systems placed on NATO soil. This would reduce debris risk over allied settlements while avoiding alliance aircraft operating inside Ukraine. (NATO has not adopted this approach.)
Clarify strike authorities. Some allies still retain limits on the use of Western-supplied long-range weapons against targets inside Russia; reporting in August indicated fresh constraints on ATACMS employment. Critics argue that residual restrictions blunt deterrence by leaving Russian launch nodes untouched.
Civil protection and alerts. Poland’s temporary closure of Lublin airport and Romania’s shelter warnings in Tulcea show procedures are evolving. Building routine, accurate public warning and debris-hazard protocols will matter if alerts become frequent.
The strategic context is not static. Poland has asked allies to treat the incursions as a test of NATO’s resolve. NATO’s leaders say Eastern Sentry is designed to be agile and scalable. Yet agility must be matched by density. As Zapad-2025 showcases Russian strike options and drones probe allied airspace, a posture centred on monitoring and ad-hoc scrambles will leave the cost and tempo advantage with the attacker.
The past week’s events—shoot-downs over Poland, a scramble over Romania, and limited reinforcements—suggest an alliance still calibrating. To prevent normalisation of air alerts along its frontier, NATO will need to move from reassurance to routine denial: more sensors, more low-cost shooters, firmer cross-border rules with Ukraine, and fewer seams for Moscow to exploit. Otherwise, the next wave will look much like the last, only larger.
First published on defencematters.eu
After drone incursions, Poland halts Lublin flights and deploys fighter patrols
