In a major shift that could reverberate across Europe’s security landscape, Poland is poised to lay anti-personnel mines along its eastern border within 48 hours of formally exiting the Ottawa Convention, the international treaty that for nearly three decades has set a global norm against such weapons.
The withdrawal, which takes effect on 20th February 2026, marks a profound strategic realignment for Warsaw amid growing tensions on NATO’s eastern flank.
Addressing reporters in Warsaw this week, Prime Minister Donald Tusk underscored that the accelerated capability to deploy minefields — effectively ready within two days of exit — is designed as a deterrent measure rather than a reflex to imminent conflict. The move, he said, forms part of a broader defensive architecture, code-named “East Shield”, conceived to harden Poland’s borders with Belarus and Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave against what Warsaw perceives as an increasingly unpredictable strategic environment.
“We are finalising this mine project, which is crucial for our security, for the security of our territory and border,” Mr Tusk remarked, emphasising the procedural nature of the deployment rather than its inevitability. His comments signal a careful calibration between asserting sovereign defence prerogatives and assuaging international concerns about the humanitarian legacy of mines.
A Treaty Once Universal
The Ottawa Treaty, formally the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, was adopted in 1997 and came into force in 1999 with the aim of eliminating an entire class of weapons that have maimed and killed civilians long after hostilities have ceased. Signatories pledged to cease production, use, transfer and stockpiling of anti-personnel mines. At its height, the treaty was hailed as a landmark in humanitarian arms control, with more than 160 nations committing to its terms and co-operating on demining efforts worldwide.
Poland itself acceded to the agreement in 2012, aligning with allied states supportive of broad disarmament norms. However, the geopolitical calculus underpinning that commitment has shifted materially since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the subsequent military build-up along Europe’s eastern margins.
Warsaw’s decision to withdraw reflects this altered landscape, one in which Moscow has never been a signatory and where its extensive, and often indiscriminate, use of mines during the Ukraine war has become a point of contention.
Europe’s Eastern Flank: A New Defensive Consensus
Poland’s departure from the mine ban has not occurred in isolation. A number of Russia’s European neighbours — including the Baltic states — have undertaken similar withdrawal procedures, arguing that the presence of a treaty banning landmines offers limited practical security in the face of real military threats from their large eastern neighbour. Norway remains a notable exception on the continent.
The East Shield strategy represents Poland’s effort to marry readiness with deterrence. By restoring the legal capacity to produce and deploy anti-personnel mines for the first time since the Cold War — a capability that was dormant for decades — Warsaw is signalling a determination to fortify an 800-kilometre stretch of frontier that runs from Belarus down to the vicinity of Ukraine.
Deputy Defence Minister Paweł Zalewski has previously indicated that domestic production could rapidly resume once the treaty’s six-month withdrawal period concludes, with state-owned firm Belma ready to manufacture millions of munitions. Officials have even floated the possibility of supplying surplus stocks to Ukraine, which is also in the process of withdrawing from the treaty.
Contours of a Contested Doctrine
Critics of Poland’s policy warn that reversing nearly 30 years of disarmament norms risks undermining humanitarian protections long associated with the Ottawa regime. The indiscriminate nature of anti-personnel mines, and the long-term danger they pose to civilians, was precisely why early signatories embraced the ban, and why demining efforts remain a priority in post-conflict zones across the world.
Yet Warsaw’s leadership insists that its posture is defensive. In public statements, officials have stressed that capability does not equate to immediate use. Instead, the focus is on deterrence: preserving the ability to react swiftly to coercion or aggression on a frontier where hybrid threats — from missile incursions to irregular crossings — have increasingly featured in national security assessments.
From a strategic perspective, this represents a watershed moment for Europe’s security doctrine. The conventional wisdom that saw multilateral treaties as bulwarks of stability has been tested by resurgent geopolitical rivalry. Poland’s recalibration illustrates the tension between humanitarian commitments and realpolitik defence imperatives in an era of renewed great-power confrontation.
Whether other NATO members will follow Poland’s lead, or whether this marks a unique case of recalibrated norms on Europe’s eastern periphery, remains to be seen. What is unmistakable, however, is that Warsaw’s decision signals a profound rethinking of deterrence on the alliance’s most exposed flank — a stance born of complex security imperatives and one certain to prompt debate in capitals from Vilnius to Brussels and beyond.
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Main Image: Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=607018
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