It has taken a war on Europe’s doorstep to rouse Berlin from its post-Cold War slumber. Now, in a move unthinkable just a few years ago, Germany’s Defence Minister Boris Pistorius arrives in Washington this week with a clear message: Berlin is finally serious about pulling its weight. But whether America is still willing to listen is quite another matter.
The trip comes at a critical juncture. The war in Ukraine grinds on, NATO’s cohesion is under pressure, and uncertainty looms over Washington’s future leadership. In this context, Pistorius’s mission is part reassurance tour, part arms-brokering operation, and part insurance policy.
He wants clarity on three key issues: the future of U.S. troop deployments in Germany, the timetable and scope of Patriot air defence systems headed to Europe, and how Berlin’s pledge to spend 3.5 per cent of GDP on defence by 2029 can be leveraged to restore trust with its closest ally.
This is no mere bureaucratic junket. It is a visible pivot by Germany from pacifist instincts to hard-nosed realism – decades late, some would argue, but not a moment too soon.
Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Germany has undergone what Chancellor Olaf Scholz famously called a Zeitenwende – a turning point in its security posture. For years, Berlin dragged its feet on NATO spending targets, neglected its Bundeswehr, and preferred the comforts of diplomatic multilateralism to the gritty business of deterrence. Now, faced with a resurgent Kremlin and doubts about America’s long-term commitment, Germany is scrambling to build a credible defence policy – and fast.
The numbers are startling. A proposed ramp-up to 3.5 per cent of GDP on defence by 2029 would catapult Germany to the top of European military spenders – far above NATO’s 2 per cent benchmark, and higher than Britain or France. This would amount to more than €130 billion annually, a tenfold increase from the anaemic levels of the late Merkel years.
But for Washington, promises are not enough. The Americans want delivery – in hardware, capability, and resolve. Hence the central question of this visit: will the U.S. continue to station tens of thousands of troops in Germany, or is a strategic decoupling now underway? With Donald Trump’s return to the campaign trail and his known scepticism towards NATO, Berlin is increasingly nervous.
Germany is still home to around 35,000 U.S. troops and key command centres like EUCOM and AFRICOM. Losing these assets would not only dent NATO’s deterrence but symbolise a shift in the alliance’s gravitational centre.
Pistorius hopes to forestall that by demonstrating seriousness. One of his main goals is to secure an accelerated deployment of Patriot missile batteries, not only to bolster Germany’s own air defences but to signal that it can serve as a security hub for Europe’s heartland. The recent spate of Russian missile attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure – many of them perilously close to NATO’s eastern frontier – has renewed calls for a continent-wide integrated air defence network.
Germany’s past foot-dragging on missile procurement is now being replaced by urgency. Alongside the European Sky Shield Initiative – a 21-nation project launched by Berlin to build a multi-tiered missile defence system – the arrival of U.S. Patriots would plug critical gaps. But these are complex systems with limited availability and high demand. Israel, Taiwan, Poland and Ukraine are all in the queue. Germany will need more than good intentions to secure them.
The Pentagon, for its part, is treading carefully. Officials remain wary of German defence planning, still scarred by years of underinvestment and political hedging. The Bundeswehr is riddled with outdated equipment, hollowed-out logistics, and procurement delays. Critics note that Berlin’s pledge to meet NATO targets has been made – and missed – before. They also point to domestic political resistance, especially from the Greens and parts of the SPD, to anything that smacks of militarism.
Nevertheless, Pistorius has emerged as one of the few German ministers with credibility on defence. A plain-speaking Social Democrat with little time for platitudes, he has earned respect both in Brussels and Washington for his pragmatic approach. His advocacy for conscription, hard power, and alliance reliability marks a sharp departure from the woolly pacifism of previous decades.
There is another layer to the trip: industrial strategy. Germany wants to ensure that its massive defence spending bonanza benefits its own arms manufacturers – Rheinmetall, Hensoldt, and Diehl Defence – rather than simply importing American systems wholesale. That will be a tricky balancing act. Washington, facing pressure to support its own military-industrial complex, expects reciprocal purchases. Pistorius will have to persuade the Americans that Germany can contribute not just troops and cash, but real capabilities.
The stakes could hardly be higher. As Europe edges closer to a world in which the U.S. may no longer be a reliable anchor, Germany is being pushed – reluctantly – into a leadership role it has long avoided. The sight of a German minister in Washington lobbying for air defence systems, strategic basing rights, and joint force planning would once have been inconceivable. It is now the new normal.
And yet the question lingers: is this reinvention real, or another rhetorical sleight of hand? The Americans will want proof, not posture. Pistorius may leave Washington with a handshake and a photo-op. But unless Germany delivers – in capability, resolve, and leadership – it may find that history, once again, overtakes good intentions.
Berlin has finally woken up to the realities of power. Now comes the harder part: exercising it.
