Budapest’s reported readiness to lift its long-standing objection could allow the EU to blacklist the head of the Russian Orthodox Church and move more quickly against vessels used to evade oil restrictions.
Hungary’s new government has signalled that it may no longer block European Union sanctions against Patriarch Kirill, the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, in a move that could mark a significant change in Budapest’s position on Russia-related measures.
According to Euronews, a limited sanctions proposal is being prepared for discussion by EU ambassadors this week. The package is expected to target around ten individuals previously shielded by Viktor Orbán’s government, as well as several Russian vessels linked to Moscow’s so-called “shadow fleet”.
Patriarch Kirill has long been one of the most politically sensitive names on the EU’s sanctions agenda. The bloc first attempted to blacklist him in 2022, accusing him of supporting Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and promoting Kremlin narratives. Hungary objected at the time, arguing that the measure raised questions of religious freedom. He was later removed from the sanctions list before the EU adopted its sixth package against Russia, as reported at the time by Euronews.
The reported shift follows the departure of Orbán and the arrival of Péter Magyar as Hungary’s prime minister. Magyar has sought to distinguish his government from Orbán’s repeated use of veto power in EU foreign policy, particularly on measures linked to Ukraine and Russia.
Márton Hajdu, a close ally of Magyar and chair of the Hungarian parliament’s foreign affairs committee, told Euronews that sanctions affecting Hungary’s economic stability remained unacceptable. However, he added that where the previous government had used state power to pursue “private deals”, the new administration should not block joint EU efforts to increase pressure on Russia to end the war.
The change could also reopen the question of other Russian figures previously removed or protected during sanctions negotiations. These include Sports Minister Mikhail Degtyaryov and oligarch Viatcheslav Kantor, whose names may return to the EU’s sanctions discussions if member states agree to revisit earlier exemptions.
The proposal remains at an early stage and, as with all EU sanctions, requires unanimity among the 27 member states. Slovakia may also be relevant to the negotiations, as Prime Minister Robert Fico has previously used his veto leverage in Russia-related sanctions talks. However, Fico was not in office when the EU first attempted to sanction Patriarch Kirill in 2022.
Alongside the proposed individual designations, the EU is preparing to intensify action against Russia’s shadow fleet. The term refers to tankers and related vessels used to transport Russian oil while avoiding Western restrictions, including the G7 oil price cap. The Council has already used sanctions to target vessels involved in circumvention, with its most recent measures adding dozens of ships to the EU list, according to the Council of the European Union.
Risk in European Waters: The Shadow Fleet, Sanctions Evasion and Safety Gaps
The latest proposal would add further vessels on a rolling basis rather than waiting for a large sanctions package. EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas has supported this approach, saying after a recent Foreign Affairs Council meeting that the bloc should act “on a rolling basis” where sanctions can help deprive Russia of funds used to finance the war, according to the European External Action Service.
The change would be procedural as well as political. EU sanctions have usually been grouped into broader packages requiring lengthy negotiations across energy, finance, trade and individual listings. A rolling mechanism for vessels would allow Brussels to respond more quickly when ships are identified as helping Russia circumvent restrictions.
The shadow fleet has become a growing concern for EU governments because it combines sanctions evasion with maritime security risks. Suspected vessels have been accused of using opaque ownership structures, inadequate insurance cover and false or shifting flags. Several European countries have also stepped up inspections and boarding operations in recent months, reflecting concern over environmental risks and possible sabotage activity.
The limited package is expected to be discussed by EU ambassadors on Friday, with the aim of adoption at the Foreign Affairs Council on 15 June. A broader 21st sanctions package is expected to be presented in June, with EU officials aiming for final approval by mid-July.
The reported Hungarian shift may also reopen a wider institutional question: how often EU sanctions should require renewal. Current Russia sanctions are renewed every six months, a timetable that has repeatedly given individual member states opportunities to extract concessions or delay agreement. Brussels is now considering extending the renewal period to one year, a change Orbán had previously opposed because it would reduce Hungary’s veto leverage.
For the EU, the immediate significance of the new proposal lies less in its size than in the political signal it sends. If Hungary allows the listing of Patriarch Kirill and other previously protected figures, it would remove one of the most visible symbols of Budapest’s resistance to EU pressure on Moscow.
It would not end divisions within the bloc over sanctions policy. However, it would suggest that the post-Orbán government is prepared to narrow the use of Hungary’s veto and allow Brussels to move more quickly on measures that do not directly affect Hungarian economic interests.
