With Hungary due to vote on 12 April, officials in Brussels and other EU capitals are watching closely for the first serious prospect in years that Viktor Orbán’s government could be replaced. The interest is less about a dramatic ideological realignment than about whether a new administration in Budapest would stop obstructing EU decisions on Ukraine, sanctions and broader common policy.
As Hungary enters the final phase before its parliamentary election on 12 April, many officials across the European Union are openly, if often privately, weighing what a change of government in Budapest could mean for decision-making in Brussels. The immediate issue is not Hungary’s domestic politics in itself, but the repeated use by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán of Hungary’s veto and blocking power on major EU files, above all those connected to Ukraine.
Many EU officials would welcome Orbán’s defeat, seeing it as a possible end to years of obstruction on policy areas where unanimity or near-unanimity still matters. Hungary has frequently been at odds with other member states over support for Ukraine, sanctions on Russia and wider questions of the EU’s political direction. The frustration in Brussels has deepened in recent months as the bloc has tried to maintain a coherent common line while managing both the war in Ukraine and renewed uncertainty in the transatlantic relationship.
The political interest in the election has intensified because Orbán now faces his most serious challenge in 16 years in office. His nationalist Fidesz party is under pressure from the centre-right Tisza party led by Peter Magyar, a former insider who has positioned himself as a conservative but more clearly pro-European alternative. A Reuters report on 25 March cited a Median poll showing Tisza on 58 per cent among decided voters, against 35 per cent for Fidesz, though Reuters also noted that Fidesz points to other surveys suggesting a narrower race or a possible win for Orbán.
That does not mean Brussels is expecting a complete transformation in Hungarian policy if Orbán were to lose. Diplomats and officials remain cautious about assuming radical change under Magyar, who is also seen as conservative on migration and some enlargement questions. The expectation in many capitals is more limited and more practical: a different tone in Brussels, fewer deliberate blockages, and a stronger effort by Budapest to rebuild relations with EU institutions and key member states.
Magyar has said he wants to anchor Hungary firmly within the EU and NATO and to secure the release of frozen EU funds. He has pledged to represent Hungarian interests in Brussels rather than Russian ones, a formulation aimed at drawing a direct contrast with Orbán’s long-standing alignment with Moscow on several strategic questions. Orbán’s government has repeatedly clashed with the EU not only over Ukraine but also over rule-of-law concerns that have led to the withholding of substantial EU funding. Reuters said Magyar hopes to unlock about €17 billion currently frozen.
The wider significance for Brussels lies in procedure as much as politics. Under the EU treaties, key decisions in areas such as sanctions still require unanimity. The Council notes that Article 7 exists as a mechanism to address a serious and persistent breach of EU values, including the potential suspension of certain rights of a member state, but it also requires very high thresholds and is politically difficult to carry through. In practice, that has meant the EU has often had to work around Hungarian resistance rather than remove it.
That frustration has been particularly visible on Ukraine. Hungary blocked a €90 billion EU aid package to Kyiv, prompting other leaders and the Commission to look for alternative ways to honour commitments. Those episodes have reinforced the view in several capitals that the question raised by Hungary’s election is not theoretical. It goes to the EU’s ability to act collectively in a period of war on its eastern flank and continuing instability across its wider neighbourhood.
For that reason, the Hungarian election is being watched closely well beyond Budapest. A change of government would not automatically turn Hungary into a uniformly mainstream voice inside the EU, nor would it erase domestic divisions or end disputes over migration, sovereignty or social policy. But for Brussels, even a narrower outcome would matter: a Hungary that still argues its corner, but does so from within the common process rather than by repeatedly paralysing it. On that measure, the election has become one of the more consequential political tests for the EU this spring.
