Belgium’s decision to issue one-day visas to a Taliban delegation for technical migration talks in Brussels has turned the EU’s tougher return policy into a credibility test over recognition, human rights and deportations to Afghanistan.
Belgium has issued one-day visas to a Taliban delegation invited to Brussels for technical EU talks on deportation and readmission of Afghan nationals, exposing the legal and political tension at the heart of Europe’s tougher migration policy.
Reuters reported on 22 June that Belgium issued five visas for Taliban representatives to attend a technical meeting in Brussels on 23 June. The visas were valid for one day and limited to Belgian territory. El Pais reported that the delegation was invited for talks linked to the return of Afghans without legal residence permits, including those considered security risks.
The meeting has triggered fierce criticism because the European Union does not recognise the Taliban as Afghanistan’s legitimate government. The Guardian reported that activists and MEPs warned the invitation risks normalising a regime accused of systematic repression, especially against women and girls.
The issue is not only whether EU officials speak to the Taliban. It is whether Europe’s return policy is pushing Brussels into operational dealings with a regime it refuses to recognise.
A technical meeting with political weight
The European Commission and member states have argued that contacts with Taliban officials are technical and do not amount to diplomatic recognition. That distinction matters. The EU has maintained channels on humanitarian access, consular questions and practical issues since the Taliban returned to power in 2021, while avoiding formal recognition.
But migration returns are different. Readmission talks require cooperation with authorities who control borders, documents, airports and detention systems. If the EU wants to deport Afghan nationals, it needs someone in Kabul to receive, identify or process them. In today’s Afghanistan, that means dealing with Taliban officials.
That is why the Brussels meeting carries political weight even if it is formally described as technical. Visas, meeting rooms and official contacts create a visible relationship. Critics argue that such steps can normalise the Taliban incrementally without a formal recognition decision.
Return policy meets non-recognition
The controversy comes as the EU is hardening its approach to returns. Several member states have pushed for faster deportations, more effective readmission arrangements and stronger tools against people without legal residence permits who are deemed security threats.
EU Today recently examined how the EU Migration Pact faces a return-hub test, with governments seeking ways to remove rejected asylum seekers while avoiding new legal and diplomatic exposure. The Taliban visa case is a sharper version of the same problem. The EU wants more effective returns, but return policy often requires cooperation with governments or de facto authorities whose human rights records make such cooperation politically and legally fraught.
Afghanistan is one of the hardest cases. Since returning to power, the Taliban have imposed sweeping restrictions on women and girls, limited education and employment, and used coercive controls over public life. The Guardian noted that two senior Taliban leaders are subject to International Criminal Court arrest warrants over alleged crimes against humanity linked to persecution of women and girls.
The non-refoulement question
The legal risk is also clear. Under international and European human rights law, states must not return people to places where they face a real risk of persecution, torture or inhuman treatment. This principle of non-refoulement is not optional.
Human rights groups argue that deportations to Taliban-controlled Afghanistan would be unsafe for many people, particularly women, activists, former officials, minorities, journalists and people associated with Western institutions. The Guardian cited warnings that returnees could face arbitrary arrest, detention, torture or worse.
That does not mean every Afghan national in Europe has an automatic right to remain. It does mean each return case must be assessed against the risk in Afghanistan. If the EU creates a practical deportation channel with the Taliban, it will face intense scrutiny over whether individual safeguards are credible.
Belgium’s role
Belgium’s decision to issue limited visas places the host state in a sensitive position. The visas were not Schengen-wide travel permissions and were reportedly restricted to one day in Belgium. That limitation appears designed to minimise political and legal exposure.
But the decision still has symbolic force. A Taliban delegation entering Brussels for EU migration talks creates the image of European institutions negotiating returns with a regime that the EU says it does not recognise.
Ursula von Der Leyen Risks Handing the Taliban a Propaganda Victory
For Belgian authorities, the argument will be that the visas were necessary to allow a narrowly defined technical meeting. For critics, the limitation does not resolve the underlying contradiction: the EU is willing to engage the Taliban when it wants deportations, while condemning the regime’s abuses in other settings.
Credibility and leverage
The EU’s credibility problem is twofold. First, it must explain how its migration-enforcement agenda fits with its human rights commitments. Second, it must avoid giving the Taliban political gains without extracting meaningful protections for returnees.
If the EU engages the Taliban only to facilitate removals, it risks appearing to prioritise deportation targets over Afghan rights. If it refuses all contact, it may struggle to manage difficult cases involving people considered security risks. The gap between those positions is where the current controversy sits.
Brussels may insist that the meeting is technical. But technical engagement can still have strategic consequences. The Taliban seek international legitimacy. Even limited official contacts in Brussels can be used domestically and diplomatically to suggest that the regime is being treated as unavoidable.
The wider migration turn
The Taliban visa case also illustrates how far the EU migration debate has moved. Return hubs, tougher deportation rules, external partnerships and cooperation with authoritarian governments are no longer marginal ideas. They are moving into operational policy.
That shift may satisfy governments under domestic pressure to show control over migration. But it creates a new credibility test for the Union. The more the EU relies on difficult partners to enforce returns, the more it must prove that its legal safeguards are real rather than rhetorical.
The Brussels meeting is therefore not a procedural footnote. It is a warning about the direction of EU migration policy. If enforcement requires dealing with regimes the EU does not recognise, the Union will need a clearer answer to a basic question: how far is it willing to go to make returns happen?
