European governments have often treated dialogue with Beijing as a practical channel in foreign policy, including in managing risks linked to Russia’s war against Ukraine.
A recent investigation by The Telegraph has prompted a different focus: whether Chinese-origin industrial equipment and dual-use components are helping Russia expand production of advanced missile systems, including the “Oreshnik” hypersonic missile that Moscow has used in strikes near the EU’s eastern frontier.
A missile message to Europe: what Russia’s Oreshnik strike was meant to signal
On 9 January, Russia fired an “Oreshnik” missile at a target in Ukraine’s Lviv region, close to the Polish border, in what both Kyiv and Moscow described as a significant escalation in the type of weapon employed. Ukraine said the missile travelled at roughly 13,000 km/h (8,000 mph). Russia said the strike hit facilities linked to energy and drone production, and described it as retaliation for an alleged Ukrainian attempt to strike a residence used by President Vladimir Putin, a claim Ukraine denied.
“Oreshnik” is described as nuclear-capable in the sense that it can be configured to carry either a nuclear or a conventional warhead; there was no indication that the January strike involved a nuclear payload. Putin has claimed the missile is difficult to intercept, while Ukrainian officials have said its use has implications beyond the immediate battlefield.
The Telegraph’s 28 January report by Sophia Yan said Russia’s ability to increase production of the missile and related systems has been supported by specialised manufacturing machine tools supplied from China. The investigation cited trade data and analysis indicating that China has sent about $10.3 billion worth of technology and advanced equipment to Russia to expand production of military-grade equipment and precision weapons.
A central example cited in the reporting is a computer numerical control (CNC) “carousel lathe” manufactured in China, identified by Ukrainian defence intelligence at Russia’s state-owned Votkinsk plant, a major missile production site. The Telegraph account said the plant manufactures “Oreshnik” as well as Iskander-M ballistic missiles and Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missiles, and that the CNC lathe supports production of missile warheads by turning and cutting metal with high precision.
The report’s wider point is that the supply chain extends beyond one machine. It described a flow of components that Russia either cannot manufacture domestically or cannot produce in sufficient volumes. Items highlighted include microchips and memory boards, ball bearings, mounted piezoelectric crystals used in radar and electronic warfare systems, and telescopic sights. In the Telegraph investigation, the value of microchips and memory boards supplied from China to Russia was put at at least $4.9 billion, based on analysis using Import Genius trade data.
The same reporting placed ball-bearing shipments at $130 million and mounted piezoelectric crystals at $97 million, with telescopic sights valued at $42 million. Michael Kofman, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment, told the paper that ball bearings are critical across defence manufacturing because any moving system relies on them, and that precision manufacturing is essential for their use in aircraft and other platforms.
China has not signed up to Western sanctions on Russia, and the investigation described these exports as a way for Moscow to sustain production despite restrictions agreed among sanctioning states. It referred to a list of 50 “high-priority” goods that multiple countries have sought to prevent from reaching Russia’s military-industrial base, while stating that China continues to supply several categories of such goods.
Nick Reynolds, a research fellow at RUSI, told the Telegraph that a persistent constraint for Russia’s defence industry has been production speed, and that imports have taken on increased importance as Russia seeks to modernise or expand output across older factory infrastructure. The analysis also pointed to testing instruments, including multimeters and oscilloscopes, used to verify microelectronics, radar performance and electronic warfare functions—equipment the report said is supplied by Chinese manufacturers.
The drone sector was highlighted as well. The Telegraph report referred to a 2025 investigation which found Chinese companies directly supplied at least $55 million in parts and materials to Russia’s wartime drone industry in 2023–24, a period when Russia was building logistics capacity for domestic production. The investigation said these figures were likely underestimates, citing gaps in reporting and the increasing use of third countries, shell companies and intermediary logistics to obscure purchasing chains and re-export sensitive goods.
For European policymakers, the immediate issue is less rhetorical than practical: whether enforcement can be tightened on the trade routes and intermediaries that move dual-use goods into Russia’s weapons sector, and how far European capitals are prepared to confront Beijing over industrial inputs that, while often civilian in form, may have direct military application.
