Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has criticised the European Union’s latest package of sanctions against Russia, calling it insufficient and lacking the necessary measures to significantly constrain the Kremlin’s wartime economy.
His remarks, delivered during the Ukraine–South-East Europe Summit, underline growing concerns in Kyiv and among European analysts that the EU’s current sanctions strategy is failing to deliver meaningful disruption to Russia’s capacity to wage war.
The 18th sanctions package was initially presented by Brussels as a firm and principled response to Russia’s ongoing aggression. However, its scope and implementation mechanisms have drawn increasing scrutiny. The package introduces additional restrictions on Russian banks, expands the blacklist of vessels associated with the so-called shadow fleet, and proposes further limits on Russia’s access to financial services. Yet many of these measures appear to be either partial in nature or too easily circumvented.
Limited Financial Disconnection
A key shortcoming lies in the financial sector. Although several Russian banks have been removed from the SWIFT system under previous and current sanctions, more than 300 institutions remain operational, many of which continue to process foreign transactions. The disconnection of only a portion of the system has left Russia with enough flexibility to reroute financial operations through second- and third-tier banks, effectively preserving a channel for international trade.
This piecemeal approach has allowed Russian financial actors to adapt and reorient their operations, mitigating the intended economic pressure. The broader Western consensus that a complete financial cut-off would harm the general population continues to deter stronger action.
Maritime Enforcement Weaknesses
Efforts to disrupt Russia’s oil exports have encountered similar limitations. The sanctions list includes hundreds of tankers said to be part of the shadow fleet. These vessels—often registered under flags of convenience—are ostensibly targeted to impede Russia’s ability to circumvent the oil price cap and continue crude exports. However, in practice, enforcement remains inconsistent.
Few of these ships have been detained, and those that were, such as a drifting tanker intercepted off Germany’s coast due to mechanical failure, were not seized on the basis of their inclusion in sanctions lists. Other attempts to halt sanctioned vessels have been aborted or reversed following inspections, and naval operations aimed at enforcement have been met with Russian military resistance, including the recent case of an Estonian naval unit forced to retreat by a Russian fighter aircraft.
The lack of a functioning enforcement mechanism, particularly at sea, has led to widespread doubts over the efficacy of the EU’s maritime restrictions.
Circumvention of Oil Price Caps
The oil price cap mechanism has also proven vulnerable to manipulation. Officially set at $60 per barrel, enforcement relies on transparency in commercial contracts—yet such documents are generally protected under commercial confidentiality. Without the authority to examine contract pricing, regulators are unable to verify compliance.
Compounding this is a decree issued by the Russian government prohibiting its companies from entering contracts that explicitly reference price caps. This has effectively eliminated the possibility of direct enforcement, allowing transactions to continue under opaque terms, often with larger discounts negotiated off the record.
As a result, while Russian oil trades at lower rates, these reductions have not been driven by sanctions compliance, but rather by market factors and buyer leverage. The continued flow of oil revenues, albeit reduced, has enabled Moscow to maintain military expenditure and increase production of military equipment.
Lack of Coordination and Erosion of Consensus
Another point of concern is the apparent divergence between US and EU sanctions policies. While coordination mechanisms technically remain in place, practical alignment has weakened. Independent measures taken by each side have not always been mutually reinforcing, and differing priorities have led to a dilution of the collective impact.
Recent developments suggest a broader erosion of the international sanctions regime. Japan, previously cautious, has recently received Russian oil shipments despite a general ban. Elsewhere, lobbying activity aimed at separating economic interests from political action continues to gain traction. The message promoted by some business circles—that war and commerce can be compartmentalised—runs counter to the intended effects of comprehensive sanctions.
Structural Obstacles Within the EU
Internal EU dynamics have also complicated enforcement. A significant number of ships in Russia’s shadow fleet are owned or operated by entities in EU Member States, particularly Greece. These fleets continue to operate with little interference, and attempts to regulate or penalise them have been sporadic at best.
While the European Commission has maintained a strong position against any effort to revive the Nord Stream gas pipelines—particularly following lobbying attempts to restore at least one operational route—this resolve remains one of few clear lines drawn in the broader sanctions architecture.
Economic Effects and Strategic Consequences
Russian budgetary data suggests that oil and gas revenues have declined, with current weekly earnings reportedly falling to around $1.2 billion per week —the lowest since 2023. However, this reduction is primarily attributed to falling global oil prices, not direct sanctions enforcement. Forecasts suggest that even with a 15–29% reduction in annual hydrocarbon income, Russia can continue to sustain its war effort, particularly given its ability to convert earnings into yuan, rupees, and other non-dollar currencies.
The Kremlin has made clear its directive: regardless of price fluctuations or external pressures, military funding is to be prioritised. The current sanctions regime, as implemented, does not appear capable of altering that equation in the short term.
A Call for Strategic Reassessment
The prevailing view among Ukrainian and some European analysts is that the EU’s current “package-by-package” approach lacks strategic depth. While sanctions have imposed financial costs and disrupted certain sectors, they have not produced a decisive effect on Russia’s ability to wage war.
To achieve this, a fundamental shift in approach would be required: from incremental and consensus-based packages to a policy of full economic isolation. This would involve cutting all remaining financial channels, enforcing a maritime embargo, and coordinating across the Atlantic with renewed purpose.
Until such a shift occurs, EU sanctions are likely to remain a source of political symbolism more than an instrument of strategic pressure.
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