Western faith in multilateralism and “value-based realism” conceals a deeper strategic crisis, Hanna Hopko argues, as Ukraine and other “in-between” states become the decisive battleground in an emerging global confrontation.
Finnish President Alexander Stubb wrote an article for Foreign Affairs on the transformation of the world order. The piece is well-written, conceptual, and diplomatically measured. But that is also the problem. Stubb writes as the leader of a country that has just joined NATO and wants to preserve faith in the system. For Ukrainians who have been resisting the aggressor for 11 years, and after the full-scale invasion, which became a genocide of the Ukrainian people – resisting the entire axis of evil, we must truthfully describe the reality. After nearly four intense years of advocacy, I want to write as an analyst who sees the system as it truly is – dead. As Garry Kasparov said during a panel discussion at Halifax security forum 2025, bluntly but truthfully:
“NATO is weak. NATO does not exist. It’s a fake. The reason you are still sitting here celebrating (NATO’s anniversary) is that Ukraine is dying every minute. It’s a massive sacrifice! If not for Ukraine, if not for Ukraine standing, Russian tanks would already be in Poland.”
Most Ukrainians do not believe in Article 5. True security guarantees will come only through the de-imperialisation of Russia. More details about this are available in my speech at Halifax security forum.
Earlier, after the disappointment in NATO’s capabilities following the Vilnius summit, I wrote about 10 reasons to act unconventionally: why Ukraine should offer Europe security guarantees of its own. To begin with, Stubb proposes a triangle of power: the Global West, the Global East, and the Global South. It is a neat and elegant concept, clear, visually appealing, and perfectly suited for publication in Foreign Affairs. The problem is that it does not work. The author deliberately overlooks the most important players: the so-called “in-between” countries, the geopolitical swing states. Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Serbia and the countries of Central Asia are not on the periphery of the great game; they are the very playing field on which it is unfolding. Whoever controls these territories gains a strategic advantage. Zbigniew Brzeziński understood this perfectly when he described Ukraine as a “geopolitical pivot.”
These countries do not choose between the three poles, they are chosen by the great powers. They are not defined by agency but by geography. And it is on these lands, not in the offices of Brussels or at G20 summits, that the future of the world order will be decided. The President of Finland describes the Global South as the arbiter between West and East. But in reality, the true arbiters will be those who control the space between them. And that space is burning.
Their behaviour will always be shaped by those who show strength, not by those who deliver elegant speeches about democracy, the rule of law, or reforming multilateral institutions.
Ukrainian diplomats and politicians have seen this Western mistake for years. The most effective strategy for engaging the Global South is not to persuade it of the West’s morality or to lecture on decolonisation. The most effective strategy is to demonstrate victory over Russia. In a world where respect is earned through strength, it is the defeat of the aggressor that will send the signal that countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America will follow. I drew this conclusion after visiting India’s capital ahead of the 2024 G20 summit.
Today, the West often appears weak: it buys Russian energy in larger volumes than it provides aid to Ukraine; it delays decisions on asset confiscation; fearing the “escalation” that Putin himself uses as a pressure tool. For the Global South, this is a marker of unreliability. Strength attracts far more than declarations of values.
Next comes “value-based realism.” Stubb presents it as a synthesis of idealism and pragmatism, a response to the challenges of our time. It sounds appealing. But there is one detail he delicately sidesteps. Value-based realism, when faced with an opponent unconstrained by any values, is not strength – it is weakness. And it leads to defeat.
Putin does not care about human rights, international law, or public opinion. He deports, kills, threatens with nuclear weapons, lies 24/7, and mocks those who try to play by the rules. The asymmetry has already determined the outcome: the West fears escalation, and Putin counts on it. The West seeks compromise; Putin sees weakness. Stubb understands this, otherwise, he would not have written about the danger of Finlandisation for Ukraine. Yet he does not dare to say it outright: all else being equal, value-based realism loses to unprincipled cynicism. This must be understood, not as a reason to abandon values, but to recognise their cost in a real war.
Russia and China are constrained by neither human rights, nor international law, nor reputational risks.
This asymmetry is particularly evident in the handling of Russian asset confiscation. Western diplomats continue to talk about “values” and the “rule of law,” refusing to acknowledge that they themselves could become the next target of authoritarian regimes if they fail to demonstrate political will. This is yet another illusion: the West seeks to avoid direct confrontation, but history shows that such a strategy most often leads to major wars.
The most far-fetched proposals of the Finnish President concern UN reform: permanent representation for Africa and Latin America on the Security Council, the abolition of the veto, and the suspension of aggressor states’ membership. Stubb himself writes that this “may sound unrealistic.” May sound? It doesn’t sound – it is unrealistic. The permanent members of the Security Council will never voluntarily give up their veto. Never. Achieving this would require a new founding conference after a catastrophic war. And here, the author approaches the most frightening question, one he carefully avoids addressing.
He outlines three scenarios for the future: the preservation of disorder, a complete systemic collapse, or a rebalanced order through cooperation. But where is the fourth scenario, an open war of revisionists for the global order? A Third World War? History makes this crystal clear: systemic change occurs through major wars. Versailles after World War I. Yalta after the Second. There are plenty of triggers for escalation – Ukraine, Taiwan, the South China Sea, the Balkans. The list goes on, especially after recent talks in Seoul, Tokyo, and Taipei, where it is understood that no one is immune to attack. Anyone could fire the first shot.
Stubb deliberately leaves things unsaid. It is understandable, no president can publicly speak about the inevitability of a major war. But such caution does a disservice. The West is unprepared for this scenario, neither mentally nor materially. And it is the most likely scenario. Russia, China, and Iran seek to revise the existing order. North Korea’s ambitions, bolstered by valuable experience fighting alongside Russia in modern warfare, are also rising. The ANTS network presented its report The Russian war in Europe as a global laboratory for modern warfare: lessons and strategic recommendations from Ukraine. The West is not ready to concede. The question is not if war will happen, but when and in what form. Both sides may believe time is on their side, a classic recipe for catastrophe.
Why hasn’t the genocide against Ukraine become a Rubicon? After serious discussions in capitals Seoul, Tokyo, Taipei, and during the security forum in Halifax, Canada, with officials at various levels, defence ministers, generals, and experts, I have become increasingly aware that a global war is unavoidable, and that it will involve the European continent as part of the confrontation. Not a hybrid war, as we see now, but a hot one.
In leading democracies, awareness is growing of the risk of simultaneous escalations in multiple regions, from Europe to the Indo-Pacific region. Yet between this awareness and practical action, a dangerous gap remains.
There is a noticeable tectonic shift in the perception of Ukraine’s geopolitical transformation, from a recipient to a provider of security. At every meeting, our partners know their dependence on us and demonstrated a willingness to adopt our cutting-edge experience in drone warfare.
Russia’s genocide against Ukraine, with daily losses, has not pushed the democratic world to cross the Rubicon and prepare seriously for war. Yet there is no resolve to change strategies or economic approaches that could help win the race for modern weaponry. And such measures could have served as a deterrent against a major confrontation.
The democratic world is still avoiding strategic self-determination.
Instead of shifting to a war economy, there is political inertia.
A lack of political imagination.
Most governments cannot imagine a full-scale war on NATO territory, even though it is already happening in part – Russian drones over EU countries, attacks on critical infrastructure.
Dependence on short electoral cycles.
Authoritarian regimes plan for decades; democracies plan for one to four years.
The false belief in deterrence through weak, Western-economy-friendly sanctions and “crisis management.”
But authoritarian regimes read weakness, not deterrence.
The comparison with Helsinki-75 does not hold up to scrutiny. In 1975, there was a stable balance of power, two poles, clear spheres of influence, mutual deterrence. Both superpowers feared nuclear war existentially. Today, there is no balance.
The U.S. is losing dominance but is not ready to acknowledge it. China is rising and seeks a redistribution of power. Russia is in decline and therefore acts aggressively, its weakness makes it more dangerous. There is no trust. No shared interests. No fear of nuclear war, Putin has normalised nuclear blackmail.
Stubb paints appealing pictures of the Global South as an arbiter between West and East. But he lumps Brazil, India, Saudi Arabia, and Nigeria into a single category. They have nothing in common, neither interests, values, nor level of development. India plays its own game, Saudi Arabia focuses on its region, Brazil is absorbed in domestic issues. Calling this a single bloc is an analytical mistake.
And the main paradox: these countries do not want to defend the “liberal world order.” They want more power, more money, more respect. But why should they fight for a system the West built for itself? They will bargain between West and East, choosing the best terms. Meanwhile, the West thinks it can persuade them with elegant words about democracy and the rule of law. Naivety.
Kremlin Calling: The Strategic Risks Behind India’s RT Tie-Up
As for international institutions, they are already dead. The UN did not stop Russian aggression because the aggressor sits on the Security Council. The OSCE has become a club of observers, powerless to prevent violations. NATO and the EU are transforming, but not in the direction the author hopes. They are becoming transactional rather than institutional. Multilateral diplomacy no longer exists. It is ceremonial, a façade, like constitutional monarchies: beautiful, historical, but powerless.
For Ukraine, Stubb’s text is both encouraging and troubling. Encouraging because he understands the unacceptability of Finlandisation. Troubling because he still believes in reforms, dialogue, and gradual improvements. Ukraine is fighting for survival right now. A reformed UN in twenty years will not help us. What we need are weapons, sanctions against the aggressor, and clear security guarantees. Yet the West still thinks it can “manage escalation” and avoid direct confrontation. History shows that strategy does not work.
The President of Finland writes from the perspective of a small country that has just joined NATO and seeks peace. He projects the Finnish experience onto the global level, where the logic is different. The U.S., China, and Russia are not playing multilateral diplomacy. They are playing for geopolitical dominance. No rules. No morality. Only the balance of power.
Stubb calls for dialogue, cooperation, and reform. He writes of the “last chance for the West.” But the last chance is not a chance to convince anyone of the merits of multilateralism. It is a chance to prepare for the inevitable confrontation with those who do not believe in any dialogue. Putin does not compromise, he advances on Kyiv. Xi Jinping does not wait for UN reform, he builds military bases on reefs. Iran does not heed calls for restraint, it supplies drones to Russia.
And the West still believes it can get by without war. That agreements can be reached. That international institutions will save the day. Stubb is part of this illusion. He is more honest than many; he understands more. Yet he does not dare to say the main point: the system is dead, war is inevitable, and we must prepare, not write memoranda about reforms.
Ukraine is now on the front line of this coming major war. We are not the periphery; we are the epicenter. Stubb understands this, but he does not say it outright. For us, there is no longer room for understatement.
