Bulgaria will suspend the transit and use of Russian natural gas under short-term contracts from 2026, Prime Minister Rosen Zhelyazkov has said, positioning Sofia with European Union efforts to end Russian gas imports ahead of the previously signalled 2027 deadline.
Zhelyazkov told Bulgaria’s state news agency BTA that, as an EU member, the country would “join the decision to suspend, in the short term, in 2026, contracts for the use or transit of Russian natural gas,” with a full phase-out targeted by 2028.
The EU originally envisaged cutting off Russian gas by end-2027. Officials have since discussed bringing the timetable forward by a year and are working on a legal route to do so. Any sanctions package requires unanimous backing by member states, and capitals reliant on Russian pipeline supplies have already signalled resistance. Hungary and Slovakia have said they will oppose additional energy sanctions affecting pipeline gas, underscoring the political hurdles to a bloc-wide measure.
Zhelyazkov, who has led Bulgaria’s government since January 2025, framed the move as part of a wider diversification strategy launched after Moscow curtailed supplies to EU states in 2022. Bulgaria, once fully dependent on Russian gas, has since shifted its supply balance towards pipeline gas from Azerbaijan and liquefied natural gas (LNG) landing in Greece and flowing north via interconnectors. The prime minister’s comments were echoed by Energy Minister Zhecho Stankov, who said the end of Russian short-term arrangements would create scope for Bulgaria “to become a major transit country” for gas sourced from US LNG terminals. Stankov added that two US-origin LNG cargoes had been confirmed for delivery in November and December for domestic consumption.
Sofia’s announcement touches directly on the TurkStream/Balkan Stream corridor, which carries Russian gas across Bulgaria to Serbia and onwards to Hungary. The reference to “short-term contracts” matters in practice: the European Commission’s evolving proposal distinguishes between new or short-term agreements, which would be curtailed sooner, and legacy long-term contracts, which would be allowed to run down on a longer track before a full ban takes effect. That structure is designed to reduce legal exposure and manage system impacts while maintaining pressure on Russian supplies.
The stance has drawn close attention in Budapest and Bratislava, where governments have argued that alternatives remain costlier or less certain. Slovakia this week reiterated it is not ready to unwind Russian energy purchases rapidly, citing infrastructure constraints and the costs of switching. Hungary, meanwhile, has continued to emphasise security of supply and has sought assurances on uninterrupted transit. Bulgaria has said it will remain a reliable transit partner for neighbours, even as it aligns with the EU’s tightening framework.
Bulgaria’s diversification has been underpinned by the Greece–Bulgaria interconnector (IGB), enabling Azeri volumes and LNG from Greek terminals to enter the Bulgarian system, and by procurement moves for the 2025–26 heating season. Market notices in September pointed to a series of LNG tenders to secure winter coverage, consistent with Stankov’s indication of scheduled US-origin cargoes for late 2025. These developments have reduced Bulgaria’s exposure to Russian pipeline gas while preserving optionality for onward flows to the Western Balkans and Central Europe.
For the EU, Sofia’s decision is notable on three counts. First, it signals that a frontline transit state on a key Russian route is preparing to implement the accelerated timetable, strengthening the Commission’s hand as it seeks unanimity. Secondly, it highlights the extent to which the regional gas system has adapted since 2022, with Southern Corridor and LNG infrastructure now capable of backfilling a larger share of demand. Thirdly, it underscores the continuing fault line within the bloc between states able to pivot quickly and those whose legacy contracts and network topology make a faster phase-out more difficult.
The practical impact in 2026 will depend on the legal text the EU ultimately adopts, the definition of “short-term” in national implementation, and the status of any grandfathered long-term arrangements until the 2028 end-date. Traders will also watch whether transit restrictions alter Russian nominations along the TurkStream route, and how much incremental LNG is committed into the region as replacement. If Bulgaria captures additional transit of non-Russian gas, as suggested by Stankov, that could partially offset any loss of fees from reduced Russian flows.
Political dynamics will remain central. Hungary and Slovakia have indicated their opposition to new energy sanctions and have sought engagement with Washington on the pace and scope of any phase-out. Whether compromises emerge—such as tailored derogations for landlocked states or extended glide paths for specific contracts—will shape the risk profile for 2026–28. For now, Sofia’s signal adds momentum to the EU’s push to compress the timetable, while confirming that member states with enhanced interconnections and access to LNG are prepared to move first.
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