Home FEATURED The New Nature of War Has Changed the Foundations of Global Security: The Ukrainian Experience and the Future World Order

The New Nature of War Has Changed the Foundations of Global Security: The Ukrainian Experience and the Future World Order

by EUToday Correspondents
Zaluzhny: NATO Is Not Ready for the War That Has Already Begun

Address by General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (2021–2024), at the Ukraine–United Kingdom Defence Technology Forum, organised by RUSI.

25 April 2025

It is a great honour to once again speak within the walls of this distinguished British think tank, dedicated to issues of international security and military affairs. And it is precisely these subjects we shall address today—more relevant now than ever.

First, it is clear to all present here that we are living through an era of global transformation. This is not merely my personal assessment, which I voiced last year at Chatham House, but a result of a host of factors that have emerged in the 21st century. Chief among them is the war in Ukraine, which has become not only the bloodiest act of violence in Europe in recent history, but also a catalyst for shifts that have altered the global order. This change has already occurred—whether today’s political leaders are willing to acknowledge it or not.

Second, in a world already transformed—and continuing to evolve, regardless of political will—the global security system has also undergone change. This transformation is not only driven by geopolitical developments, but also by the shift in the very nature of power upon which that system was built, brought about by the war in Ukraine.

Believe it or not, whether you have contracts for tanks and helicopters for the next decade or merely plan to sign them, the nature of military power has changed. Regrettably, this is well understood in Ukraine, Russia, and China—but not in many other places. I shall not name them; it no longer matters.

So, we shall speak today about modern military technologies. Who will require them beyond Ukraine is a decision for politicians. My role is to outline what these technologies entail and how they function.

That said, I must emphasise that these technologies are especially pertinent now for strengthening Europe’s defence capabilities—chiefly due to the ongoing reconfiguration of the Euro-Atlantic security space.

Now, to the technologies themselves.

The Russia–Ukraine war has entirely altered the nature of warfare. One morning in the summer of 2023, as Ukrainian forces advanced metre by metre through enemy lines using existing doctrines and weaponry, the sky filled with drones on a scale that redefined the entire architecture of combat.

Reconnaissance drones, strike drones, and drones supporting artillery fire, all integrated into a situational awareness system, rendered the battlefield completely transparent. This enabled limitless precision strikes at the tactical level.

Gradually, as with the First World War, this war reached a state of deadlock. By 2024, rapid advancements in science and technology allowed drones to strike targets not only along the front line but deep within operational depth. This rendered any equipment, firepower, or reserves vulnerable—even far from the front.

Precision strikes on logistics routes have now become routine. Moreover, such strikes are now part of the standard tactic for forcing enemy withdrawal.

Consequently, an area of death 10–15 kilometres deep has formed in front of the line of contact due to this battlefield transparency. It is no longer unusual for a drone to pursue not a group target or armoured vehicle, but a single soldier. Notably, this kill zone is continually expanding, as is the likelihood of destruction within it.

Why has this become possible? The key reasons are:

First, the rapid development of electronic warfare (EW). Thanks to EW, satellite-based technologies and GPS-guided munitions have been neutralised at the operational level. The effectiveness of expensive rockets and precision shells has dropped to zero.

Second, the battlefield is now saturated with visual reconnaissance and tactical and operational-level strike drones.

As a result, tactics and operational art have undergone significant transformation.

At the operational level, the war has reached an impasse. Deep manoeuvres and strikes into operational depth are no longer feasible, largely due to the ongoing contest between unmanned systems on one side and EW and air defence on the other. Classical offensive operations have not only lost effectiveness but have become near-suicidal.

Even the offensives of small, high-mobility, technologically equipped tactical groups, closely coordinated with situational awareness systems, support, EW, and air defences, have lost efficacy.

Thus, it can be stated with certainty:

Thanks to unmanned systems and digital technologies, traditional weapons that defined warfare for decades now belong to history. They are no longer viable.

Armoured vehicles, central to offensive operations since 1915, are defenceless against inexpensive drones and are no longer usable in any form of combat.

Precision-guided weapons reliant on GPS have lost their effectiveness due to EW advancements.

Air defence systems are undergoing perhaps the most radical transformation. The proliferation of cheap, small drones has made the use of expensive interceptor missiles economically unviable.

The airspace above the battlefield has become inaccessible to piloted aircraft, relegating them to a supporting role in air defence. Air forces must now modernise to conduct reconnaissance and strike operations from far greater distances.

The maritime domain is increasingly occupied by naval drones. As a result, large warships remain hidden in fortified ports.

This is not simply about technology. It requires a complete rethinking of how force is employed—leading to doctrinal revision and, ultimately, restructuring of armed forces and defence planning.

How long this will take is unknown. I estimate our adversaries will achieve this within three years—five at most, factoring in scalability.

Victory on the battlefield now fully depends on the ability to outpace the enemy in technological development. The transformation must follow the chain: science (development) – production – application. The strength of this chain will determine innovation.

Manufacturers must be flexible and adaptive, ready to alter hardware solutions swiftly. If these are hindered by bureaucracy or corruption, the chain breaks—and the enemy gains the advantage.

We must develop:

  • Strike drones, proven highly effective amid artillery ammunition shortages;

  • Reconnaissance drones;

  • Anti-air drones;

  • Ground-based unmanned systems;

  • Universal combat platforms;

  • Maritime unmanned systems.

Moreover, civilian or dual-use technologies now form the foundation of combat capabilities, including:

  • Commercial satellites for reconnaissance;

  • 3D printing to produce spare parts in field conditions;

  • Social media for intelligence gathering;

  • Improvised EW systems from commercial components;

  • Civilian encrypted messaging apps for data exchange;

  • Cloud computing solutions.

These capabilities now allow smaller players—states, agencies, even units—to achieve remarkable results using relatively inexpensive, asymmetric methods.

In conclusion, the revolution in military technology, grounded in unmanned systems and artificial intelligence, has fundamentally changed the nature of war and continues to evolve. The speed at which innovations are adopted now directly enhances a state’s chances of victory.

Future high-tech warfare will be won by the side that adapts faster to technological conditions. Whoever first makes a comprehensive transition to the new military-technological paradigm will gain a strategic advantage and impose its will on the adversary.

As long as the enemy retains resources, forces, and means to launch attacks on our territory and attempt offensives, it will do so. This is a war of attrition—enabled by today’s geopolitical reality, in which no one can yet stop the aggressor.

The only way to end this is to destroy the enemy’s capacity to wage war—its military-economic potential. Its collapse would undermine the ability to maintain even an occupation force.

At this stage, survival and victory depend entirely on building a new military-technological system. This must be achieved within the current technological cycle, which may last no more than 3–5 years.

Internationally, the way forward lies not only in adapting to new threats, but in shaping a new global security reality—one in which Ukraine is already a full and active participant. Ukraine is no longer merely a recipient of support—we are a source of experience, technology, and solutions of strategic relevance.

This is not just about supporting Ukraine. It is about collective readiness for a new era of war—dominated by technology, information, and automated decision-making. Ukraine’s experience is unique: we were the first forced to overhaul our military, industry, and strategy in response to threats others are only beginning to recognise.

These are not just Ukraine’s challenges. They are global. International security is no longer anchored in old guarantees—it is founded on dynamism, technology, and adaptability. We have made our choice and pay a high price daily, but in doing so we have secured a chance for survival. We invite you to make that choice with us—not only to endure, but to prevail. Not just today, but in everything that lies ahead.

Valerii Zaluzhnyi

Read also:

Valerii Zaluzhnyi Warns: “Europe Must Recognise Ukraine’s Role in Its Own Security”

You may also like

Leave a Comment

EU Today brings you the latest news and commentary from across the EU and beyond.

Editors' Picks

Latest Posts