Valerii Zaluzhnyi, now Ukraine’s ambassador to the United Kingdom and formerly Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, has set out one of the starkest assessments yet of the war and its political context.
In a long essay for the Kyiv outlet LIGA.net, he argues that Ukraine has been fighting largely without a clearly defined political goal – and that this omission has strategic consequences not only for Kyiv, but for Europe as a whole.
His central contention is drawn directly from Clausewitz: war is the continuation of politics by other means, and “strategy cannot have a rational basis until the political goal is clearly defined.” In his view, Ukraine entered and then endured full-scale war without such a goal being properly articulated by the country’s leadership. The result, he suggests, has been a gap between battlefield heroism and coherent long-term planning, particularly on mobilisation, economic policy and relations with partners.
Zaluzhnyi frames the conflict as a struggle that has “increasingly taken on the features of a world war”, not in terms of casualties, but in its global economic and security impact. For him, the issue is no longer confined to Ukrainian territory. It is about the future shape of the European security order – and whether that order will be determined in Kyiv and Warsaw, or in Moscow.
A key part of his essay is an attempt to reconstruct Russia’s political aim. Here he is blunt: “The number one target for Russia is Ukraine – its subjectivity, independence and all its potential.” Moscow, he argues, is not ultimately interested in particular regions such as Donetsk or Luhansk except for their manpower; the objective is to end Ukraine’s existence as an independent state and to use its territory as a “gateway to Europe”. That reading implies that any settlement which leaves Ukraine weak, fragmented or outside a robust security framework would not end the conflict, but simply re-stage it later, potentially further west.
He also traces how Russia shifted from an initial strategy of rapid “annihilation” – the drive on Kyiv in early 2022 – to a long war of attrition once that failed. In such a war, the decisive blows are not necessarily territorial gains but the gradual erosion of the opponent’s capacity to resist: through sustained strikes on infrastructure, grinding combat, economic pressure and information operations designed to sap public support. For Ukraine, he warns, the ultimate “decisive blow” in a war of attrition could be internal: a slide towards political breakdown or even civil conflict if the state cannot align military, economic and political fronts.
For Europe, this diagnosis has uncomfortable implications. First, Zaluzhnyi’s analysis challenges any remaining belief that a quick, face-saving peace in Ukraine could restore stability at low cost. He notes that while Western politicians “drew rosy scenarios” of reconstruction and elections, the line of contact moved steadily towards the Dnipro and then towards Zaporizhzhia and Kharkiv. The suggestion is that mis-reading Russia’s political objectives – and treating the war primarily as a territorial dispute – has already allowed Moscow to improve its position.
Secondly, his description of Russia’s mobilisation – shifting its economy onto a war footing, expanding defence production, tightening legislation and propaganda – highlights the asymmetry with both Ukraine and many European states. Whereas Moscow is structuring its economy and society for a protracted conflict, EU countries are still debating incremental aid packages and struggling to expand ammunition and air-defence production at scale. If, as Zaluzhnyi argues, the war has moved firmly into a phase of industrial-scale attrition, then the decisive arena is now the combined economic and technological capacity of Ukraine and its partners against that of Russia and its backers.
Security guarantees are another area where his essay intersects directly with European debate. Zaluzhnyi lists three credible long-term guarantees for Ukraine: NATO membership, stationing nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory, or the permanent deployment of a major foreign military contingent capable of deterring Russia. He notes that none of these options is currently on the table. In a parallel commentary for The Telegraph, he argues that “peace, even in anticipation of the next war, provides a chance for political change, deep reforms, full recovery and economic growth.”
Taken together, these arguments point to a difficult conclusion for Europe: a ceasefire or “frozen” conflict without hard security guarantees for Ukraine may provide temporary respite, but will not resolve the underlying confrontation. Nor would it necessarily reduce risks to EU states. A Russia that has survived sanctions, re-armed and successfully absorbed occupied territory would be better placed to exert pressure on Moldova, the Western Balkans, or even NATO’s eastern members.
Zaluzhnyi’s definition of outcomes is similarly stark: “Victory is the collapse of the Russian empire; defeat is the full occupation of Ukraine through its disintegration. Everything else is simply the continuation of war.” This is not a policy prescription for Europe, but it clarifies how the Ukrainian military elite understand the stakes. From that perspective, European discussions about “war fatigue” or “security vs prosperity” appear detached from the strategic logic of the conflict.
For EU governments, the practical effect of his analysis is to narrow the range of sustainable choices. If Russia’s goal is the elimination of Ukrainian statehood, and if it has adapted to a long war of attrition, then policies that aim merely to “manage” the conflict at lower cost are unlikely to succeed. Instead, Europe faces a binary strategic task: either to support Ukraine at a level sufficient to prevent its political collapse and to constrain Russia’s war-making capacity, or to accept a higher probability of renewed, possibly wider war later.
Zaluzhnyi presents war as a test of political clarity, not simply of courage or matériel. His message to Kyiv is that Ukraine must define a political goal that unites its military, economic and societal efforts. His message to Europe is implicit but direct: the same is now true for the EU and its allies. Without a clear political aim for the continent’s response to Russian aggression – and the resources to match it – Europe risks allowing Moscow to shape its security order by default.
