The 28-point “peace plan” on ending the Russian-Ukrainian war entered the public debate not through an official announcement, but via a leak on the Telegram channel of Ukrainian MP Oleksiy Goncharenko.
He published what he described as the full text of a proposal prepared in Washington and circulated between US and Russian interlocutors, after earlier US media reports had already referred to a 28-point framework being discussed in the Trump administration. Since then, the document has been reproduced and dissected across Ukrainian and international outlets, but it has not been formally confirmed or endorsed by either Washington, Kyiv or Moscow.
According to these leaked materials, the plan is presented as a flexible “framework of ideas” rather than a finished treaty text. Nonetheless, its structure and content are sufficiently detailed to allow political and legal scrutiny. It seeks to redefine Ukraine’s security status, fix new territorial lines, open the way for Russia’s reintegration into the global economy and create extensive US-Ukrainian and US-Russian economic arrangements, all under the umbrella of a ceasefire and broader settlement.
Security architecture and Ukrainian neutrality
The opening clauses formally “confirm” Ukraine’s sovereignty, then immediately qualify it through a trilateral non-aggression pact between Russia, Ukraine and the EU, and a blanket declaration that all “ambiguities” of the last 30 years are settled. What this formula means in legal terms is undefined, particularly as regards Russia’s occupation of Ukrainian territory.
A core element is a mutual freeze: Russia would pledge not to invade neighbouring states, while NATO would commit not to expand further and to inscribe in its statute that Ukraine will never be admitted. Ukraine, in turn, would entrench its non-alignment in the constitution, cap its armed forces at 600,000 personnel and accept a permanent ban on NATO troops on its soil. These are concrete, verifiable obligations for Kyiv and the Alliance; the equivalent Russian commitments are political declarations with no clear enforcement mechanism.
The plan offers Ukraine “reliable security guarantees”, but does not specify whether these resemble NATO’s Article 5, a looser coalition-of-the-willing model, or something closer to the Budapest Memorandum, which Moscow has already violated. Sanctions snap-back is envisaged if Russia again invades Ukraine, but the document itself concedes that Russia has already sustained years of sanctions while waging the current war. An additional clause stating that Ukrainian missile strikes on Moscow or St Petersburg would void Western guarantees is notable for its asymmetry: it singles out two Russian cities for special protection while saying nothing about Ukrainian urban centres repeatedly targeted by Russian missiles.
Territorial settlement and frozen conflict
The territorial chapter would effectively lock in major Russian gains. Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk are described as de facto Russian, with recognition explicitly extending to the United States. Zaporizhzhia and Kherson would be “frozen” along the present line of contact, amounting to de facto recognition of partition there as well. Russia would withdraw from other occupied areas, but Ukrainian forces would pull back from parts of Donetsk they currently control, which would become a demilitarised buffer zone internationally acknowledged as Russian territory.
This is an unusual construction: a zone without Russian troops, but formally counted as part of the Russian Federation. It would institutionalise a permanent grey area open to renewed military pressure and would require Ukraine to amend constitutional provisions on its territorial integrity and to contradict UN General Assembly resolutions that reject Russia’s annexations. In practice, the plan aligns closely with Russia’s stated conditions that Ukraine abandon claims to four partially occupied regions and renounce NATO membership.
Economic reconstruction, sanctions and frozen assets
The economic section is highly developed. It envisages a substantial global reconstruction package, a Ukraine Development Fund targeting high-growth sectors such as technology and artificial intelligence, and extensive US-Ukrainian cooperation over gas pipelines, storage and other infrastructure. Parallel clauses promise Russia “reintegration” into the world economy, phased lifting of sanctions and a formal invitation back to an expanded G8.
Central to this architecture is the use of frozen Russian assets. According to the leaked text, $100bn of Russian funds would be channelled into Ukraine’s reconstruction under US leadership, with the United States receiving 50% of the profits generated; EU states would be expected to add a further $100bn without such a return. The remaining frozen assets would flow into a joint US-Russian investment vehicle financing projects in energy, rare earths, data centres and the Arctic. This goes well beyond existing G7 discussions, which centre on using Russian assets exclusively for Ukraine’s benefit, and would create powerful incentives for Washington and Moscow to deepen economic ties even as Ukraine accepts territorial losses.
Governance, justice and humanitarian provisions
Several points address softer issues. Both states would commit to educational programmes on tolerance and anti-racism, to guarantees for media and language rights, and to “rejecting Nazi ideology” – language that closely echoes Russian official rhetoric about “denazification”. Ukraine is asked to “adopt EU rules” on religious and linguistic minorities, despite already aligning its legislation with relevant European instruments.
Humanitarian clauses provide for a committee to deal with open issues, an “all for all” exchange of prisoners and bodies, the return of civilian hostages and deported children, and facilitation of family reunification. Navigation on the Dnipro and grain exports via the Black Sea would be safeguarded by agreement. These elements converge with Ukrainian priorities, but they are coupled to a sweeping political amnesty: all actors would receive full immunity for conduct during the war, and the parties would renounce future claims. That would sit uneasily with Ukraine’s obligations under international humanitarian law and with the work of the International Criminal Court.
Finally, Ukraine would hold elections within 100 days of a ceasefire and implementation would be overseen by a “peace council” chaired by Trump. This would give Washington, and personally the US president, a continuing supervisory role inside Ukraine’s political system.
Feasibility and political context
Politically, the plan faces resistance on all fronts. Ukrainian officials and much of civil society reject territorial concessions, major force reductions and an amnesty for war-time atrocities. Leaks have been described in Western and Ukrainian media as a framework built on Ukrainian capitulation and designed to divide Kyiv from its allies.
European capitals, largely excluded from the drafting, are wary of an arrangement that restores Russia to the G8, reopens its economic opportunities and uses European money to underwrite a settlement negotiated bilaterally between Washington and Moscow. The Kremlin, for its part, has publicly played down reports of a new US plan and continues large-scale military operations, suggesting no immediate readiness to accept even favourable terms.
The sequencing is also problematic. The document envisages a detailed memorandum being agreed first, with a ceasefire following only once all points are settled. Given 28 contentious clauses, that process could take many months while fighting and civilian casualties continue.
Taken together, the 28 points amount to an attempt to formalise a ceasefire on conditions close to Russia’s maximalist demands, while offering Ukraine economic support and a notional EU track and offering Russia sanctions relief and reintegration. In the absence of Russian buy-in, with strong opposition in Kyiv and unease in Europe, the plan currently looks more like a diplomatic instrument in US-Russian manoeuvring than a realistic basis for ending the war.
