Andrius Kubilius: Europe’s New Defence Czar is Armed with Ambition, Short on Ammo

Facing an increasingly assertive Russia, a prolonged war in Ukraine, and uncertainty regarding the United States’ commitment to European security, Ursula von der Leyen, newly re-appointed as President of the European Commission, has introduced a new post: Andrius Kubilius will become the EU’s first European defence commissioner.

The role is tasked with addressing Europe’s growing defence challenges, but the scope and feasibility of this initiative are already being questioned.

The European defence landscape is complex and fraught with shortcomings. The war in Ukraine has highlighted the inadequacies of Europe’s ability to defend itself.

Despite rising geopolitical threats, many European armies remain small, underfunded, and poorly equipped.

Efforts to bolster military spending have been sluggish at best, particularly when it comes to increasing the production of essential defence equipment such as artillery shells, ammunition, and air defence systems.

Europe continues to rely heavily on the United States for much of its military support, including key equipment and financial backing. This dependency raises critical concerns about the continent’s ability to sustain its defence independently.

The newly appointed defence commissioner, Andrius Kubilius, a former prime minister of Lithuania, faces an uphill battle.
Critics argue that the role lacks clear definition and, more importantly, is severely underfunded.

Instead of being a position that can meaningfully influence European defence strategy, many see it as a symbolic gesture, questioning whether Europe is genuinely committed to taking control of its own defence matters.

The EU does not have a unified army, as defence remains primarily a responsibility of individual member states. Among the EU’s 27 members, 23 are also part of the NATO alliance, meaning that much of Europe’s defence coordination happens through NATO, rather than the EU itself.

Kubilius task will be to push for greater standardisation in the production of arms across European nations, seeking cooperative purchasing power and more streamlined production processes. This would be an important step toward enhancing the capabilities of European defence industries, but it does little to address the more significant structural issues in Europe’s defence posture.

An inconvenient truth.

Prior to his resignation, Thierry Breton, the former commissioner responsible for industry and security, estimated that Europe would need to spend in the region of €100 billion annually on defence to meet its needs.

The reality is that €1.5 billion has been allocated for the years 2025 to 2027 under the EU’s current budgetary strategy.
Christian Mölling, deputy director of the German Council on Foreign Relations, has expressed skepticism about the EU’s ability to reform its defence structure without substantial financial support.

Mölling remarked that without significantly more resources, Europe might as well be looking for a “wizard” rather than a defence commissioner to resolve these issues. He likened the role to “a king without a kingdom.”

The European Commission lacks the financial means to effect meaningful change.

Diplomatic circles share Mölling’s skepticism, also noting that the European Commission lacks the financial means to effect real change. A senior European diplomat argued that member states themselves, rather than Brussels, would be better suited to coordinating military capabilities.

Some believe that while the defence commissioner role could be a catalyst for necessary reforms and improvements in coordination, past efforts in this area have failed to deliver meaningful results.

The European Commission also faces internal challenges, as the defence commissioner’s responsibilities overlap with those of other existing roles.

Kaja Kallas, the incoming vice president in charge of European foreign affairs and security policy, is one such example.
Meanwhile, Stéphane Séjourné, who will succeed Breton, will continue overseeing industrial strategy, further complicating the defence commissioner’s portfolio. This redundancy raises questions about the utility of the new role and whether it is truly necessary.

Mario Draghi’s vision of funding military projects through EU bonds to address Europe’s defence funding shortfall was dismissed by key member states, such as Germany and the Netherlands, who remain opposed to collective European debt.
Without significant financial backing, the defence commissioner’s ambitions may fall short.

Kubilius would need to help the EU provide more timely, efficient, and coordinated support to Ukraine while simultaneously replenishing depleted military stocks in Europe.

Who wins?

The EU was often likened by the late Soviet dissident Vladimir Bukovsky to a bicycle. As long as it is moving, it remains upright. The EU, Bukovsky correctly argued, needs to keep expanding in order to survive.

Von der Leyen’s re-appointment as President of the Commission was not as widely welcomed as the institution would like to present.

However, creating yet another highly expensive institution would be since as a major achievement for her, and would likely be considered as her legacy.

However, it would be worth remembering that her tenure as German Federal Defence Minister (2013-19) is largely remembered as something of a disaster.