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Viktor Orbán’s claim that Ukraine is trying to influence Hungary’s election has surfaced at a moment when European Union leaders are openly discussing how far the bloc should go in reshaping itself into a more coherent geopolitical actor.
On 26 January, Hungary’s prime minister said Hungary would summon Ukraine’s ambassador, alleging a “coordinated attempt” by Kyiv to interfere in Hungary’s parliamentary election on 12 April. Orbán linked the allegation to domestic politics, including his main opponent, Péter Magyar.
The dispute followed a week of high-level meetings after the World Economic Forum in Davos, and an informal meeting of EU leaders in Brussels on 22 January that focused on transatlantic relations, Greenland and trade. António Costa, the European Council president, said Denmark and Greenland had the EU’s full support and that only Denmark and Greenland could decide on matters concerning them; he also said Washington had announced there would be no new US tariffs on Europe.
The Greenland episode was one of the immediate triggers. Donald Trump had threatened tariffs linked to his demand to “acquire” Greenland, before stepping back after talks in Davos that involved Nato’s secretary-general, Mark Rutte, and a proposed framework for strengthening Arctic security. Rutte said the deal implied allies would need to “step up” on Arctic security during 2026, while negotiations on Greenland would continue between the United States, Denmark and Greenland.
In Brussels, the argument is increasingly framed as one of scale and resilience. Kaja Kallas, the EU’s foreign policy chief, said on 28 January that Europe was no longer Washington’s centre of gravity and that Nato “needs to become more European”, while stressing that transatlantic ties remained important.
This push for greater autonomy has practical implications: money, rules and enlargement. The Council has already created new tools aimed at accelerating defence procurement. The SAFE instrument, adopted in May 2025, allows up to €150 billion in long-maturity loans to fund common procurement and bolster the European defence industrial base, and explicitly allows Ukraine and EEA-EFTA countries to participate on the same terms as member states in joint procurement.
Trade has also become part of the security conversation. The EU’s anti-coercion instrument, designed to respond to economic pressure by third countries, can be triggered through EU procedures that do not require unanimity. It has been discussed in Brussels in the context of tariff threats linked to Greenland.
Europe’s Fearsome Trade Bazooka Is Still in the Drawer (Awaiting Further Discussion)
At the centre of the enlargement debate sits Ukraine. Zelenskyy has continued to press the case for EU membership by 2027, presenting it as a strategic anchor for both Kyiv and Europe. The 2027 date also appears in a draft peace proposal, which envisages Ukraine joining the EU by 1 January 2027.
The Commission has been examining “quick but limited” membership ideas that would bring Ukraine in politically while staging access to voting rights and other full-member privileges as reforms are completed. Reuters reported on 16 January that officials have discussed a “reversed membership” concept: early entry followed by incremental rights as conditions are met, including rule-of-law safeguards and anti-corruption measures.
Those discussions cut across a long-standing institutional constraint: key steps in accession require unanimity among the 27. Orbán has repeatedly opposed moves he says would deepen Hungary’s involvement in the war and has resisted EU financial and political measures linked to Ukraine. In practice, EU leaders have increasingly issued joint texts without Hungary, including a statement in August 2025 backed by 26 leaders.
The shift away from unanimity is visible beyond Ukraine policy. This week, the EU finalised legislation to ban Russian gas imports by late 2027, adopted by reinforced qualified majority despite opposition from Hungary and Slovakia.
Enlargement remains politically sensitive, not least because it forces decisions on subsidies and budget transfers, and raises questions about governance inside a larger bloc. The Commission’s own list of candidates and potential candidates spans the Western Balkans, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Türkiye. Some European governments have also been watching the Nordic debate: Euractiv reported in January that Icelandic polling in 2025 showed narrow support for EU membership amid renewed strategic anxiety in the Arctic.
Orbán’s allegation of Ukrainian election interference therefore lands in a wider contest over direction. Brussels is trying to keep the promise of enlargement credible while preparing for a harsher transatlantic and security environment. Hungary’s objections, and the effort to work around them, are now part of the same argument about whether the EU can move faster — and act as a single power — without rewriting its own rules.
