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Europe’s security debate is shifting from the language of “hybrid harassment” to that of a low-intensity war.
A recent Financial Times analysis argues that Russia is conducting a systematic campaign of sabotage across the continent, using parcel bombs, arson, cyber attacks and proxy operatives, and that European governments are only slowly adjusting their assumptions to this reality.
The most visible incidents have involved incendiary parcels sent through commercial couriers. In 2024, fires at DHL and DPD logistics centres in Germany, the UK and Poland were traced to parcels that ignited shortly before loading onto or after unloading from cargo aircraft. Lithuanian and German investigations now link those consignments to Russian citizens with ties to military intelligence, and describe them as test runs for possible attacks on air freight to North America.
These cases are part of a wider pattern. Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, European authorities have recorded dozens of incidents involving arson against commercial premises, suspected attempts to derail trains, damage to energy and water infrastructure, and cyber intrusions aimed at airports and ports. Many more cases remain classified. Security services in several EU states have publicly said that what is visible amounts only to the “tip of the iceberg” of suspected Russian activity.
What has changed, according to officials quoted by the FT, is the interpretation of these acts. A year ago many governments still viewed them as low-level harassment. Today, European and NATO assessments increasingly see them as part of a deliberate pre-war phase: an effort to probe critical infrastructure, map vulnerabilities and accustom public opinion to a higher level of disruption. Recent German and allied intelligence reporting warns that Russia is rebuilding its armed forces with a view to having the option of a conventional confrontation with NATO by the late 2020s.
Analysts point to continuities with Soviet doctrine, in which sabotage, “reconnaissance by combat” and the targeting of logistics were seen as integral to preparing the ground for any major war in Europe. The International Institute for Strategic Studies recently described Russia as “waging an unconventional war on Europe” through a mix of sabotage, vandalism, espionage and covert action designed to erode resilience and political cohesion.
One striking feature of the current campaign is its human infrastructure. After mass expulsions of declared and undeclared Russian intelligence officers in 2022–23, Moscow has relied far more on deniable intermediaries. Investigations into the parcel plots and other attacks describe a “gig economy” of sabotage: young men with Schengen visas, often without strong ideological motivation, recruited via social media or encrypted messaging, tasked via Telegram and paid in cryptocurrency. They may never know whether they are ultimately working for the FSB, the GRU or criminal brokers acting on their behalf.
The cumulative impact is now shaping NATO’s internal debate. Admiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone, chair of the alliance’s Military Committee, told the Financial Times that NATO is considering moving from a purely reactive posture to a more “proactive” or even pre-emptive approach against operators behind hybrid attacks, while stressing legal and political constraints. Other senior NATO commanders have warned that the alliance must be ready to counter sabotage, cyber operations and irregular tactics alongside any conventional threat.
This reassessment coincides with a marked divergence in transatlantic threat perceptions. The Trump administration’s new National Security Strategy devotes more critical language to Europe than to Russia, depicting the European Union as facing “civilisational erasure” and treating Moscow primarily as a problem for European, not American, security. The document and accompanying commentary have caused open concern in EU capitals, where officials read it as signalling that Washington no longer sees European security as a core US interest.
European governments are responding on two tracks. Within NATO, they have agreed to raise defence spending towards 5 per cent of GDP by 2035 and to strengthen deterrence measures on the eastern flank. In the EU, leaders have for the first time held a dedicated defence “retreat” and are debating large-scale initiatives such as the Commission’s Readiness 2030 plan to build up defence industry and infrastructure. These efforts are driven both by Russia’s actions in Ukraine and by doubts about the long-term reliability of US guarantees.
Ukraine remains central to this picture. For Kyiv, the sabotage campaign in Europe is an extension of the same war that has destroyed its own critical infrastructure since 2022. For many European policymakers, Ukraine’s ability to hold the line is now seen as directly connected to the level of risk faced by NATO territory later in the decade. Intelligence assessments that Russia is preparing at least the option of a wider conflict, combined with evidence of a continent-wide sabotage network, are pushing Europe towards a more sober view of its own security – and towards more active measures to defend it.
