Securing Peace: The Imperative of Denuclearisation of Russia for Global Security, by Yury Fedorov

“As a nuclear aggressor state that has attacked a nuclear-free state, threatened to use nuclear weapons, seized nuclear energy facilities risking a large-scale nuclear accident, undermined the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and accelerated the development of such weapons in threshold countries, the demilitarisation and denuclearisation of Russia should be a vital component of the international community’s response.

“The need to denuclearise Russia is dictated by the unprecedented attack by a nuclear state on a non-nuclear NPT signatory country, which voluntarily gave up its nuclear weapons.

“We believe that the United States, as the leading nuclear power, and other members of the “nuclear club” such as the United Kingdom, France and China — as countries responsible for the fate of the world — should initiate the process of the denuclearisation of the Russian Federation.

“Denuclearisation should be a precondition for the lifting of sanctions on Russia, and any attempts at evading denuclearisation should lead to their strengthening up to the point of complete economic isolation of Russia as a potential threat to peace in Europe.”  – Sustainable Peace Manifesto, Never Again 2.0.

Denuclearisation of Russia is a necessary element of post-war security architecture in Europe.

One of the lessons from Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is that Moscow views nuclear weapons as a practical means of waging war (threats to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine) and as an instrument of nuclear blackmail to prevent assistance to the victim of aggression by “third countries” (threats to start a nuclear war if the West crosses certain “red lines”).

This applies not only to Ukraine but also to all countries that are potential targets of Russian military and political expansion and aggression, such as the Baltic states, Poland, other NATO members, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and so on.

Russian analysts close to the government openly talk not only about the possibility of Russia using nuclear weapons if it finds itself on the brink of existence, but also about the feasibility of delivering nuclear strikes against Western countries to weaken them radically.

“…this military operation cannot end with a decisive victory without forcing the West to retreat strategically, or even surrender…” –  Sergey Karaganov, Political Scientist, Head of the Russian Council for Foreign and Defence Policy.

To do this, Karaganov muses, “We will have to make nuclear deterrence a convincing argument again by lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons set unacceptably high, and by rapidly but prudently moving up the deterrence-escalation ladder… The enemy must know that we are ready to deliver a preemptive strike in retaliation for all of its current and past acts of aggression…”

To blackmail the West, he suggests, it is best to move up the escalatory ladder.

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Read also: Paralysis of will: What happened to the West? asks Yury Fedorov

“The West is not ready to fully support Ukraine in the war with Russia, nor Israel in the war with Hamas terrorists.

“This has already happened in the history of the West of course – on the eve of World War II”

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

This escalation ladder can include statements of intentions to use nuclear weapons, transferring nuclear weapons to the troops, bringing them to full combat readiness, and subsequent actual use, initially singularly, then en masse.

Karaganov’s revelations could be considered the ramblings of someone not entirely mentally sound.

However, similar ideas are propagated by individuals who belong to the elite of Russian political analysts, such as Fyodor Lukyanov and Dmitry Trenin, who, until recently, were considered in the West the most knowledgeable interpreters of Russian foreign policy.

“… It is necessary to urgently start a dialogue with the leading countries of the world majority on the possibility (advisability, inevitability) of delivering limited nuclear strikes against countries that support the war in Ukraine, primarily against NATO. Continuing this war will reduce resistance to this idea. It is necessary to promote this trend actively,” they wrote together with political scientist Karaganov and Ambassador Alexander Kramarenko in an analytical memorandum sent to the president’s administration.

Trenin does not consider it necessary to hide that a Russian nuclear “strike on the territory of Ukraine will not stop anyone at all; a strike on the territory of Europe will not be seen as critically important, as critically dangerous. It’s a different matter to strike the territory of the United States.”

This is another confirmation that Russian aggression against Ukraine is viewed in Moscow as the first step in a “great war” with the West, in which Russia plans to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

Thus, Russia’s attack on Ukraine, and before that, on Georgia, confirms that as long as Russia remains in its current state, there is a real threat of its military aggression against neighbouring countries and, accordingly, the danger of nuclear escalation with all the ensuing consequences of regional and global proportions.

In light of this, the denuclearisation of Russia belongs to the key security interests not only of the countries surrounding it, but also of the “collective West” and, essentially, the entire world community.

This is important because the nuclear disarmament of Russia can only be achieved through the collective efforts of a number of states.

It is also important to understand that Russia’s aggressiveness is not dependent on the form of its state structure and the ruling regime within it.

It stems from the deep-seated characteristics of the public consciousness and political thinking of Russian society, which are affected by a paranoid syndrome, leading to the pursuit of external expansion, the reconstruction of an empire, and the establishment of a belt of dependent countries and territories around it as an integral goal and characteristic of Russian state foreign policy.

A strategy for denuclearisation.

The strategy for denuclearising Russia depends on the specific results of the Russian-Ukrainian war, or more precisely, on the state where Russia will find itself after its inevitable defeat. There are three options:

Russia disintegrates into several state and quasi-state entities due to power struggles in Moscow after the departure or removal of Vladimir Putin. This scenario results from the paralysis of the decision-making center, the breakdown of the centralized state apparatus, and ultimately the transfer of real power to regional elites.

• 1. Russia disintegrates into several state and quasi-state entities due to power struggles in Moscow after the departure or removal of Vladimir Putin. This scenario results from the paralysis of the decision-making center, the breakdown of the centralized state apparatus, and ultimately the transfer of real power to regional elites.
  2. Russia remains a single state but is severely weakened and has become keenly interested in normalizing relations with the Western world. Having lost the war, the military loses political influence, and power shifts to ideologically neutral technocrats.
  3. Russia emerges from the war retaining a military machine, a relatively effective military-industrial complex, and a system of state management. Its political system can vary from an authoritarian military-fascist regime to a semi-democratic republic with predominant influence from army generals and intelligence services. It’s also not ruled out that Putin remains the highest-ranking official.

The first option is often seen as the most dangerous by many Western leaders and political forces because it poses the risk of nuclear weapons, both tactical and strategic, falling into the hands of irresponsible, possibly criminal groups and their proliferation.

Denying the possibility of such events, though just a possibility, is not advisable. It’s also important to consider that preventing the collapse of the bureaucratic system through external measures is unrealistic.

Processes like this, as seen in 1990-91, have their own logic and develop according to their own rules.

At the same time, the weakening, up to the collapse, of the management apparatus and law enforcement agencies will allow to take control of the “objects “S” of the Russian Ministry of Defence (centralised storage bases for nuclear weapons), command centres of the Strategic Missile Forces, long-range aviation, as well as the units of the military-maritime strategic forces, communication centres, and other key facilities for managing nuclear forces through airborne operations.

The locations of these objects are well-known and are under constant surveillance by U.S. intelligence services and several other Western states (such as members of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance). It’s also possible to simply buy nuclear weapons from those who control them.

In the event of a significant weakening of Russia resulting from its defeat in the war with Ukraine, the nuclear disarmament of Russia should become one of the conditions or agreements for its capitulation, a prerequisite for normalising relations with the victorious coalition of Ukraine and its Western allies.

There is no doubt that Russia’s nuclear disarmament will face resistance from parts of its political class, state apparatus, and public opinion.

However, this resistance is unlikely to be decisive in a situation where the population and elites in Russia will primarily be concerned with their own survival and/or maintaining their positions in the social system rather than preserving their nuclear status.

In these two scenarios, a useful technical measure and the first step in the denuclearization of Russia could be the introduction of an additional “nuclear key” (the “Cheget” terminal) into the “Kazbek” system, through which commands for the use of Russian strategic nuclear weapons are transmitted.

This system’s operation mechanism is strictly classified, but according to some information, turning the “nuclear key” could unlock the system for transmitting commands to launch strategic nuclear forces and, secondly, issue the corresponding command.

Consequently, introducing an additional terminal under international control could reduce the risk of Russia using strategic (but not tactical) nuclear weapons.

The most challenging scenario.

The most challenging scenario for the denuclearisation of Russia is if it emerges from the war with a significant part of its armed forces intact, along with the ability to restore its military potential taking into account the experience of the Russian-Ukrainian war.

This option, however paradoxical it may seem, is considered by some political circles in Western countries as the most desirable since it “allows Putin to save face” and avoid a deep restructuring of the existing system of international relations in Europe.

However, in reality,  it is the most dangerous. 

A lost war breeds revanchist sentiments, and the remaining military-industrial and nuclear potential creates the material prerequisites for a repeat of aggression against Ukraine or NATO member states, especially the Baltic states and Poland.

Therefore, in this case, nuclear disarmament of Russia is particularly necessary. 

To achieve the denuclearisation of Russia in such a scenario, it is possible to convince its political leadership and military command, firstly, of the futility of nuclear blackmail, in other words, that the West, primarily NATO countries, in the event of a threat of the use of nuclear weapons by Russia, will use all available means at their disposal to eliminate this threat.

Secondly, continuing the policy of intimidation of real and potential adversaries and preparations for nuclear war will have serious consequences.

This will result in a new arms race, which Russia is likely to lose, including due to its increasing technological lag.

The success of such a strategy is supported by the experience of resolving the “missile crisis” in Europe in the 1980s.

The deployment of intermediate-range SS-20 (Pioneer) missiles in the Soviet Union was aimed at acquiring the potential for a limited nuclear war in Europe.

Pershing-2 test launch.

After NATO and the United States concluded that it was impossible to halt the deployment of these missiles and reduce their numbers through negotiations and diplomatic measures, it was decided to deploy American intermediate-range missiles, such as “Tomahawk” and “Pershing-2,” in Europe.

Ultimately, Moscow was convinced that these missiles could deliver not only a disarming but also a decapitating strike, and the Soviet Union had to agree to the destruction of the entire class of corresponding nuclear weapons.

In other words, once the Soviet elite realised that the West had the technical capabilities to defeat the Soviet Union in a nuclear war and, more importantly, the political will to do so, it agreed to real nuclear disarmament.

It seems that the logic of nuclear thinking of the current Russian leadership and especially the military command, does not fundamentally differ from that of their Soviet predecessors.

It is precisely at this time and in the near future after the end of the war against Ukraine that it is necessary to convince Russia that its refusal to nuclear disarmament will compel the West to:

● Enhance the readiness of strategic forces of ground and air deployment (for example, by deploying two additional warheads to the Minuteman III ICBM);

● Create and deploy nuclear and high-precision non-nuclear weapons on the European theater of operations capable of pre-emptively eliminating command centres, Russian nuclear weapons, and their delivery systems intended for use against European NATO countries as well as non-NATO countries.

Such weapons include, in particular, Mid-Range Capability weapons, namely:

● The mobile ground-based missile system “Typhoon” (launching cruise missiles “Tomahawk” with a range of up to 1,800 km and SM-6 anti-air missiles with a range of up to 460 km against ground targets), already delivered to the US Army.

● Precision Strike Missile with a range of 499-550 km (with prospects up to 1,000 km) is in advanced stages of development.

● The prospective hypersonic medium-range ground-based missile complex LRHW (Long Range Hypersonic Weapon) with a declared range of over 2,775 km.

The task of destroying Russian nuclear weapons, both tactical and, in certain cases, strategic, can also be addressed by multi-role F-35 fighter jets and stealthy B-2 Spirit bombers, which are undetectable by radars.

It is also essential to make it clear to Moscow that the West has the political will to preemptively use these means if Russia is found preparing to use nuclear weapons.

A critical factor for the success of Russia’s denuclearisation is the determination of the West to defeat Russia through the preemptive use of nuclear and high-precision non-nuclear weapons.

This includes revisiting certain fundamental principles of strategic doctrines and nuclear policies aimed at maintaining strategic parity.

Denuclearisation of Russia, necessary for global and European security, will become a reality only after Russia is convinced of the West’s determination to achieve strategic nuclear superiority.