French authorities’ interception of the tanker known as Pushpa/Boracay off Saint-Nazaire has brought the EU’s fight against Russia’s “shadow fleet” into sharper relief.
President Emmanuel Macron publicly backed the investigation, while French media detailed questions over the vessel’s nationality and history of identity changes.
The operation signals a shift from listings and advisories to on-water enforcement. It also highlights the legal hooks—flag irregularities and documentary gaps—most likely to trigger interdictions in EU waters. The case underscores a broader policy question: whether Brussels will combine vessel blacklists with targeted listings on EU-based enablers.
Greece’s government has consistently aligned with EU policy on Ukraine, and Athens has reiterated support for sanctions on Russia. The present debate concerns not state policy but the conduct of individual market actors and the sufficiency of EU-level enforcement tools. Open- source investigations and shipping data indicate that EU-linked owners continue to appear in trades that remain lawful under the price-cap regime, even as shadow-fleet tonnage expands outside Western insurance and class. The enforcement challenge is to distinguish compliant trades from sanction-busting practices—particularly where ships change flags, names and ownership chains.
“Together with my colleagues at the European Parliament we reached out to Kyriakos Mitsotakis, the Prime Minister of Greece. We urged him and his government to prevent Greek-owned ships from ending up in Russia’s shadow fleet. We were assured that the situation was under control,” Lithuanian MEP Petras Auštrevičius told EU Today.
“However, events have shown that we were given misleading information. It is crucial that we address the issue of restricting the activities of private shipowners, as the shadow fleet poses a threat not only to Ukraine by supporting Russia’s war machine, but also to the rest of Europe by using the shadow fleet in hybrid operations against us,” the MEP concluded.
The MEP, a member of the Renew Europe Group, is understood to have raised the matter with the European Commission.
In 2024–25, media and NGO-supported investigations documented extensive sales of ageing tankers from Western owners to opaque buyers later active in Russia-linked trades. One collaborative probe estimated at least US$6.3 billion in such sales, while Greek, UK and German sellers featured prominently.
Another investigation focused on former Greek-owned ships entering the shadow fleet via complex resale routes, citing 14 vessels in 2024 with an aggregate value of about US$480 million, and named several well-known groups among the sellers. These findings point to a concentrated pipeline of assets moving from regulated service ecosystems into higher-risk operations.
As price dynamics shifted in 2025, Greek operators re-entered trades within the G7 cap, citing compliance with attestation rules. Reuters reported renewed participation in Urals liftings as prices fell below the threshold, and industry sources said Greek fleets expected to continue carrying “approved” Russian exports after new EU measures. This illustrates a residual lawful space that complicates public scrutiny, even as regulators target circumvention.
Several Greek-linked companies have been named in media coverage and by civil society for past involvement in Russia-related trades, while disputing any breach of sanctions. Reporting in Greek outlets and advocacy sites has alleged that Okeanis Eco Tankers and Kyklades Maritime—companies associated with the Alafouzos family—continued transporting Russian oil under the cap; corporate materials emphasise compliance and do not concede wrongdoing.
Trade press has carried denials from other owners named in investigations, including George Economou of TMS Tankers. These claims, which rely on voyage tracking and port calls, remain contested and require careful evidentiary assessment by authorities.
Ukraine’s National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP) placed several foreign firms on its ‘International Sponsors of War’ list in 2023, including companies linked to shipowner George Economou.
On the regulatory side, the EU has progressively shifted from broad embargoes to targeted maritime measures. The 17th package (20 May 2025) listed almost 200 additional vessels tied to the shadow fleet and broadened anti-circumvention tools. The 18th package (18 July 2025) added further ship listings and complementary restrictions, building on earlier actions. This framework enables port bans and service prohibitions, and it clarifies the evidentiary pathways for future listings.
Enforcement priorities now hinge on three pressure points. First, documentation and flag integrity, given frequent identity changes in the shadow fleet. Second, attestation quality under the price-cap regime, where false statements and layered intermediaries create weak points. Third, ship-to-ship transfers and dark activity patterns that obscure origins and destinations. Targeted inspections in EU waters—backed by EMSA intelligence—are likely to stress these areas.
Two outstanding policy questions follow for the Commission and Council. Will Brussels consider targeted listings of EU-based individuals and companies where evidence demonstrates knowing facilitation of shadow-fleet operations, complementing ship-level measures?
And how will enforcement tighten around the price-cap attestation system and high- risk practices such as unreported STS transfers, frequent re-flagging and opaque ownership? Clear answers would determine whether the next phase focuses on closing residual compliance gaps or on sanctioning domestic enablers that cross legal thresholds.
Main Image: Eagle S, beleived to be a part of Russia’s Shadow Fleet: By Htm – Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=157376203
