Péter Magyar’s first foreign visit as Hungary’s prime minister points to an attempt to move Budapest back towards the EU mainstream, but the test will be whether his government can unlock frozen funds, reduce Russian energy dependence and repair trust with Brussels.
Hungary’s new prime minister, Péter Magyar, has chosen Poland for his first foreign visit since taking office, in a move intended to signal a reset in Budapest’s relations with the European Union after years of confrontation under Viktor Orbán.
Magyar began a two-day visit to Poland on Tuesday, with meetings planned in Kraków, Warsaw and Gdańsk. The trip is being presented by his government as a regional and European opening, but its political meaning is wider. Poland’s Prime Minister Donald Tusk has spent more than two years trying to rebuild Warsaw’s relations with Brussels after the rule-of-law disputes of the previous Polish government. Magyar now faces a similar, though not identical, task in Hungary.
According to reporting on the visit, the Hungarian leader is seeking Polish support as Budapest tries to recover billions of euros in EU funding withheld over rule-of-law and corruption concerns. The visit follows Magyar’s election victory in April, which ended Orbán’s long period in power and gave the new government a mandate to reposition Hungary inside the EU.
The funding issue is immediate. Magyar said on Monday that Hungary had opened a new round of talks with the European Commission over the release of €10.4 billion in post-pandemic recovery funds. Those funds remain politically and economically important for Budapest, particularly as Hungary faces pressure from a high budget deficit and weak growth. The government wants an agreement before an August 31st deadline, according to a separate report on the talks.
For Brussels, the question is not only whether Hungary has changed leadership, but whether it can show measurable institutional reform. Frozen EU funds were not withheld because of a diplomatic disagreement with Orbán alone. They were tied to concerns over the judiciary, public procurement, corruption safeguards and the use of EU money. A change of government may improve the political atmosphere, but it does not automatically resolve the conditions attached to the funding.
Magyar’s decision to start his foreign travel in Poland is therefore a deliberate signal. Tusk’s government has tried to restore Poland’s standing in Brussels while managing domestic legal obstacles left by its predecessors. Budapest is now looking to Warsaw as an example of how a Central European government can repair EU relations without giving up national political priorities.
There are also practical issues behind the symbolism. Hungary remains heavily dependent on Russian energy, an exposure that has repeatedly complicated EU policy on sanctions and Ukraine. During the Polish visit, energy cooperation is expected to feature prominently, including the possibility of Hungary gaining access to American liquefied natural gas through Poland’s planned Gdańsk terminal. That would not remove Hungary’s Russian energy dependency quickly, but it would point towards a longer-term effort to diversify supply.
The same applies to transport and regional infrastructure. Magyar’s itinerary includes Gdańsk, where Poland is developing strategic energy and logistics capacity. The Hungarian side has signalled interest in stronger regional connectivity, including rail links that could be supported by EU funding. Such projects would fit the new government’s attempt to present Hungary not as an outlier in Central Europe, but as a participant in regional integration.
Ukraine will be another test. Under Orbán, Hungary frequently obstructed or delayed EU decisions related to Ukraine, including sanctions, assistance and accession-related measures. Magyar has sought to move Budapest closer to the European mainstream, but he will still have to manage domestic political sensitivities and Hungary’s economic exposure to Russia. His position on Ukraine will be watched closely in Warsaw, Brussels and Kyiv.
Poland has a direct interest in Hungary’s repositioning. A Budapest government less aligned with Moscow would alter the balance inside Central Europe and reduce one of the recurring sources of friction within the EU. It could also weaken the ability of Russia-friendly voices to slow EU decisions on sanctions and Ukraine support.
However, Magyar’s task remains difficult. Unlocking EU funds will require more than political messaging. The Commission will need to see legal and administrative steps that meet agreed conditions. Hungary’s new government will also have to show that anti-corruption reforms are durable, not merely part of a transition from one ruling network to another.
For the EU, the Hungarian reset offers an opportunity, but also a test of consistency. Brussels has an interest in encouraging a government that wants to repair relations. At the same time, it cannot release funds solely because the political mood has changed. The credibility of the EU’s rule-of-law mechanism depends on whether conditions are applied to institutions and safeguards, not personalities.
Magyar’s visit to Poland is therefore best understood as the opening move in a broader diplomatic and financial negotiation. It marks Hungary’s attempt to return to the centre of EU politics after years of isolation and dispute. Whether that attempt succeeds will depend on decisions taken in Budapest, not only on goodwill in Warsaw or Brussels.
