Russia says it has successfully tested the nuclear-powered, nuclear-capable underwater drone Poseidon, days after heralding a fresh trial of the Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile.
President Vladimir Putin announced the Poseidon test on Wednesday, stating it was conducted the previous day and asserting the system is unmatched in speed and operating depth and cannot be intercepted. He disclosed few technical details beyond activation of the nuclear propulsion unit.
The timing follows the collapse or postponement of planned U.S.–Russia talks on a Ukraine ceasefire. A Budapest summit mooted for late October was shelved after Moscow rejected an immediate halt to hostilities, with the White House and Kremlin signalling no near-term path back to the table. In parallel, President Donald Trump described Russia’s recent nuclear-powered missile testing as “not appropriate”, urging Mr Putin to prioritise ending the war.
Poseidon—also known as Status-6, Kanyon and the Ocean Multipurpose System—was first revealed publicly in 2015 and is designed for launch from submarines. Russian state reporting in January 2023 said the first set of production torpedoes had been completed for deployment on the special-purpose submarine Belgorod, with supporting basing infrastructure under construction; open sources indicate a second carrier, Khabarovsk, is in development.
Advertised characteristics, largely unverified in the public domain, include nuclear propulsion for very long endurance, operation at depths up to roughly 1,000 metres, speeds reported between ~54 and 100 knots, and an indicative range near 10,000 kilometres. External assessments place the weapon’s diameter around 1.6–2 metres. Analysts note that if armed with a high-yield warhead, a detonation offshore could generate a destructive, radioactive sea surge against coastal infrastructure.
Russian outlets and some Western reporting have framed Poseidon as potentially more destructive than Russia’s silo-based Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile, though that comparison is contested and depends on employment and yield assumptions. Mr Putin’s remarks placed Poseidon alongside Burevestnik—claimed to have flown ~14,000 kilometres over ~15 hours in an October trial—as examples of systems intended to complicate missile defence.
Moscow links these programmes to the erosion of Cold War-era arms control, particularly the U.S. withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The official narrative is that novel propulsion and trajectories preserve second-strike credibility by circumventing U.S. defences. Independent experts, however, generally assess that Poseidon, even if fielded, would not fundamentally alter the strategic balance because Russia already retains assured means to strike the United States; its chief effects would be on coastal warning and crisis management.
Automation is central to Poseidon’s concept. Once launched, guidance would rely on remote communications and onboard systems rather than a human crew, removing the scope for post-launch human intervention that existed with earlier Soviet nuclear-torpedo concepts. Research and policy briefs flag risks from technical malfunction, environmental factors or third-party interference, and the escalatory potential of an autonomous nuclear delivery platform.
The broader Russian modernisation picture is mixed. Mr Putin said this week that Burevestnik has “unrivalled advantages”, but questions persist over Sarmat’s recent test record. Commercial satellite imagery in September 2024 indicated a likely Sarmat launch failure at Plesetsk, leaving a crater and extensive damage consistent with a silo incident; subsequent analysis from multiple institutes and outlets corroborated that assessment.
International reaction to Wednesday’s announcement has been measured. Reports in the United States and Europe have treated Poseidon chiefly as strategic signalling coinciding with stalled diplomacy and new U.S. sanctions discussions, rather than a decisive change in Russia’s nuclear posture. Mr Trump’s public criticism of nuclear-powered missile testing underscores the political context as Washington considers additional steps, including longer-range weapons for Ukraine.
Operationally, Poseidon’s trajectory depends on the pace of integration with its carriers, further at-sea trials, and clarity on command-and-control arrangements. Purpose-built and modified submarines, plus reported coastal infrastructure work, point to sustained investment. Absent independently verifiable performance data, however, many claims will remain contested. For now, the practical effect of the announcement is political: it signals resolve and technological continuity to multiple audiences while adding a variable for Western planners to factor into crisis communications and maritime warning.
Background note: Open-source technical profiles and long-form analyses provide additional context on Poseidon’s development history, carrier platforms and likely roles, including potential deployment numbers cited by Russian media (e.g., intent to field “at least 30” weapons). Such sources underline that most performance parameters remain estimates pending transparent testing data.
